

# THE CONSUMMATE RELIGION<sup>1</sup>

## THE LECTURES OF 1827

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### Introduction

#### 1. Definition of This Religion<sup>2</sup>

The first [division] was the *concept of religion* in general; the second, religion in its particularity or *determinate religion*, the last of these being the religion of expediency. The third is the *consummate religion*, the religion that is for itself, that is objective to itself.

This is always the pattern in scientific knowledge: first the concept; then the particularity of the concept—reality, objectivity; and finally the stage in which the original concept is an object to itself, is for itself, becomes objective to itself, is related to itself. So this is the pattern in philosophy: first the concept of the conceptualizing science—the concept that *we* have. But at the end science itself grasps its concept, so that this concept is for itself.<sup>3</sup>

1. [Ed.] The title found in the Königsberg Anonymous, used by Lasson, is: "Part III. The Revelatory Religion." Erdmann offers as a title the words used by Hegel in the second sentence: "Part III. The Consummate Religion, the Religion That Is For Itself, or the Religion That Is Objective to Itself." The titles in the extant transcripts are as follows: *An*: "III. The Revealed Religion"; *Hu*: "Part III. The Christian Religion"; *B*: "III. The Revelatory Religion, or the Religion That Is Objective to Itself."

2. [Ed.] In this section, Hegel briefly summarizes the substance of the introductory remarks found in the *Ms.* and (in considerably expanded form) in the 1824 lectures. The agenda of the 1827 introduction is different, as we shall see below in Secs. 2–3. The polemic against the subjectivism of present-day theology is past, and Hegel now faces a different challenge.

3. *W (1831) reads*: We have now arrived at the realized concept of religion, the *consummate religion*, in which it is the concept itself that is its own object. We have defined religion more precisely as the *self-consciousness of God*. Self-consciousness

And therefore the sphere into which we are now entering is the concept of religion that is for itself, i.e., the *revelatory religion*. Religion is for the first time what is revelatory, is manifested, when the concept of religion is for itself, i.e., when religion or its concept has become objective to itself—not in limited, finite objectivity, but such that it is objective to itself in accord with its concept. |

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This can be defined more precisely as follows. Religion, in accord with its general concept, is the consciousness of God as such, consciousness of absolute essence. Consciousness, however, is a differentiating, a division within itself. Thus we have already two moments: consciousness and absolute essence. These two are, first of all, externalized forms in a finite nexus and relationship—empirical consciousness on the one hand, and essence in the abstract sense on the other. They stand in a finite relationship to each other, and to this extent they are both finite; in consciousness we accord-

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in its character as consciousness has an object, and it is conscious of itself in this object; this object is also consciousness, but it is consciousness as an object, and consequently it is finite consciousness, a consciousness that is distinct from God, from the absolute. Determinateness and consequently finitude are present in this form of consciousness. God is self-consciousness; he knows himself in a consciousness that is distinct from him, which is implicitly the consciousness of God, but is also the divine consciousness explicitly since it knows its identity with God, an identity that is mediated, however, by the negation of finitude. It is this concept that constitutes the content of religion. We define God when we say that he distinguishes himself from himself and is an object for himself but that in this distinction he is purely identical with himself—that he is *spirit*. This concept is now realized; consciousness knows this content and knows that it is utterly interwoven with this content: in the concept that is the process of God, consciousness is itself a moment. Finite consciousness knows God only to the extent that God knows himself in it; thus God is spirit, indeed the Spirit of his community, i.e., of those who worship him. This is the consummate religion, the concept that has become objective to itself. Here it is manifest what God is: he is no longer a “beyond,” an unknown, for he has made known to human beings what he is, and has done so not merely in an external history but in consciousness. We have here, therefore, the religion of the manifestation of God, since God knows himself in finite spirit. God is utterly revelatory: this is the [essential] circumstance here. The transition was our having seen that the knowledge of God as free spirit is still burdened with finitude and immediacy so far as its content is concerned. This finitude had yet to be done away with by the labor of spirit; it is nothingness, and we have seen how this nothingness has been made manifest to consciousness. The unhappiness, the anguish of the world was the condition, the preparation on the subjective side for the consciousness of free spirit as absolutely free and consequently infinite spirit.

We dwell initially on (A) the universal features of this sphere.

ingly have two elements that are related to each other in a finite, external way. Thus consciousness knows even the absolute essence only as something finite, not as what is true. God, however, is himself consciousness, differentiating himself within himself. Since God, as this differentiating of himself within himself, is consciousness, so is he, as consciousness, such that he gives himself as object for what we call the side of consciousness.

But when religion grasps itself,<sup>4</sup> its content and | object is this whole—*consciousness relating itself to its essence*, knowing itself as its essence and knowing its essence as its own—and that is spiritual religion. 179

This means that *spirit* is the object of religion,<sup>5</sup> and the object of the latter—essence knowing itself—is spirit. Here for the first time, spirit is as such the object, the content of religion, and spirit is only for spirit. Since it is content or object, it is, as spirit, this self-knowing or self-differentiating, and it itself furnishes the other side, that of subjective consciousness, which appears as finite. It is the religion whose fulfillment is itself.

## 2. The Positivity and Spirituality of This Religion<sup>6</sup>

This is the abstract determination of this idea or the sphere where religion is in fact idea. This is because an idea in the philosophical

4. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* the other determination in it emerges. The consciousness of God means that finite consciousness has this God, who is its essence, as an object—it knows him as its essence, sets him over against itself. Thus

5. *Thus L, similar in B, Hu, An; W (1831) adds:* Thus we have two elements, consciousness and object; but in the religion that has itself as its fulfillment, that is revelatory, that has comprehended itself, religion or the content itself is the object.

6. [Ed.] This section is new in the 1827 lectures, although it incorporates some materials used elsewhere in the earlier lectures. Against the charges of his critics, Hegel insists that Christianity is a *positive* religion, whose truth is mediated to consciousness in sensible historical fashion, and which has a necessary element of external authority. Yet the essential, rational truth revealed by this religion, while mediated positively, derives solely from its *spirituality* and can be verified only by the witness of spirit (see n. 16), not by historical proofs. Here materials from the Ms.'s treatment of the cultus in Part III (see above, Ms., Sec. C) and from the 1824 lectures' treatment of the cultus in Part I (see Vol. 1, 1824 *Concept*, Sec. B.3.b) are incorporated into the 1827 introduction to the revelatory religion. In contrast with the whole debate in late Enlightenment thought over reason versus revelation, Hegel claimed that the *revealed* (positive) religion is also one in which reason and truth are made open, manifest (*offenbar*). The term “revelatory” gathers up both the positivity and the spirituality of this religion.

sense<sup>7</sup> is the concept that has an object, has determinate being, reality, objectivity; it objectifies itself, and is no longer merely inner and subjective, but its objectivity is at the same time a return to itself.<sup>8</sup>

The consummate religion is the idea and has as its object what it [actually] is, namely, the consciousness of essence; thereby it is objectified.<sup>9</sup> This absolute religion is the *revelatory* [*offenbar*] religion, the religion that has itself as its content and fulfillment. But it is also called the *revealed* [*geoffenbart*] religion—which means, on the one hand, that it is revealed by God, that God has given himself for human beings to know what he is; and on the other hand, that it is a revealed, *positive* religion in the sense that it has come to humanity from without, has been given to it. In view of the peculiar meaning that attaches to the positive, it is interesting to see what positivity is.

In the first place, the absolute religion is, of course, a positive religion in the | sense that everything that is *for* consciousness is *objective* to consciousness. *Everything must come to us from outside.* The sensible is thus something positive. Initially there is nothing positive other than what we have before us in immediate intuition. Everything spiritual also comes to us in this fashion, whether it be the spiritual in general or the spiritual in finite or historical form. This mode of external spirituality, and spirit expressing itself outwardly, are likewise positive. The ethical realm, the laws of freedom, entail a higher, purer spirituality; the ethical by nature has nothing *externally* spiritual about it; it is not something external and contingent but is the nature of rational spirit itself. But even the ethical comes to us in an external mode, chiefly in the form of education, instruction, doctrine: it is simply given to us as something valid as it stands. Laws—e.g., civil laws, laws of the state—are likewise something positive: they come to us and are there for us as valid. They are not merely something external

7. [Ed.] See esp. *Science of Logic*, pp. 755 ff. (GW 12:173 ff.).

8. *Thus B, Hu, An; L, W (1827?) add:* or—to the extent that we speak of the concept as a goal—is the fulfilled, accomplished goal, which precisely as such is objective.

9. *Thus B; L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* [now] exists in a fashion similar to how at first it was the concept—or *our* concept—and the concept alone.

for us, as are sensible objects, so that we can leave them behind or pass them by; rather, in their externality, they also ought to have, for us subjectively, an essential, subjectively binding power. When we grasp or recognize the law, when we find it rational that crime should be punished, this is not because law is positive but rather because it has an essential status for us. It is not simply valid for us externally because it *is* so; rather it is also valid for us internally, it is rationally valid as something essential, because it also is itself internal and rational. Positivity does not in any way detract from its character as rational and therefore as something that is our own. The laws of freedom always have a positive aspect, an aspect marked by reality, externality, contingency in their appearance. Laws must be determinate. Externality already enters into the determination or the quality of punishment, and even more into its quantity. Positivity simply cannot be removed from punishment but is wholly necessary to it. <sup>~</sup>This final determination of the immediate, this immediate [factor], <sup>~</sup><sup>10</sup> is something positive, i.e., not at all rational in and for itself. For example, in the case of punishment, round numbers determine the amount of the penalty; | it is not possible to determine by reason what the absolutely just penalty is. Whatever is positive *according to its nature* is also irrational. It must be determinate, and is so in such a way that it has or contains <sup>~</sup>nothing rational<sup>~</sup><sup>11</sup> in it.

This aspect is also necessary in the case of the revelatory religion. Since historical, externally appearing elements are found in it, there is also present a positive and contingent [feature], which can just as well take one form as another.<sup>12</sup> Because of the externality and appearance that are posited along with it [i.e., revelation], this positive [feature] is always present. However, we must distinguish between the positive as such, the abstract positive, and <sup>~</sup>[the positive in the form of] rational law.<sup>~</sup><sup>13</sup> The law of freedom is not valid simply because it is there, but rather because it is the determination

10. *L* reads: —this final determination of the immediate. This immediate [factor] *W (Var)* reads: This final determinacy of the immediate

11. *Thus Hu, W; L* reads: a rational element

12. *Thus L, Hu, An; W (Var)* adds: This occurs also in the case of religion.

13. *Thus L; W<sub>1</sub> (Var)* reads: law, the rational law. *W<sub>2</sub> (Var)* reads: the positive in the form of and as the law of freedom.

of our rationality itself. When it is known in this way, then it is not something that is merely positive or externally valid. Religion also appears as positive in the entire content of its doctrines. But it should not remain in this form; it should not be a matter of mere representation or of bare remembrance.

The second aspect of positivity is connected with the verification of religion, namely, that this external [feature] should bear witness to the truth of a religion, and should be regarded as the ground of its truth. Verification may sometimes take the form of the positive as such—namely, *miracles* and *testimonies*,<sup>14</sup> which are supposed to verify the fact that this individual has done this or that,<sup>15</sup> has given this or that doctrine. Miracles are positive occurrences, sensible givens, perceptible alterations in the sensible world, and this perception itself is sensible because it consists in a sensible alteration. In regard to this form of positivity, it has already been remarked<sup>16</sup> that it certainly | can bring about a kind of verification for human beings as sentient beings. But that is only the beginning of verification, it is the sensible or as it were unspiritual verification, by which precisely what is spiritual cannot be verified. The spiritual as such cannot be directly verified by the unspiritual, the sensible. The chief thing about this aspect of miracles is that in this way they are actually put aside. For, on the one hand, the understanding can attempt to explain the miracles naturally, it can advance many probabilities against them; but this involves confining one's attention to the external, eventlike character of miracles and directing one's arguments against this aspect. What matters most to reason with respect to miracles, on the other hand, is that what is spiritual cannot be verified externally. For the spiritual is higher than the external; it can be verified only from within and through itself; it is confirmed only in and through itself. This is what can be called “the witness of spirit.”<sup>16</sup>

14. *L* reads: which are supposed to verify the fact that this individual *Hu* reads: that this individual has done this or that, *An* reads: that this individual *W<sub>1</sub>* (*Var*) reads: the verification that this individual *W<sub>2</sub>* (*Var*) reads: which are supposed to prove the divinity of the revealing individual, and that this individual

15. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:411–413.

16. [Ed.] The expression *Zeugnis des Geistes* contains an ambivalence or double meaning for Hegel. On the one hand, it can refer to the witness of the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of God, by which authentic faith is awakened in human subjects; on

This very point has found expression in religious narratives. Moses performs miracles before Pharaoh, and the Egyptian magicians imitate him;<sup>17</sup> which is to say that no great value is placed on miracles. The main point, however, is that Christ indeed says, "You demand signs and wonders," and so reviles the Pharisees, who demand from him attestations of this sort;<sup>18</sup> he himself also says, "After <sup>~</sup>my death<sup>~</sup><sup>19</sup> many will come who perform miracles in my name, but I have not recognized them."<sup>20</sup> Here Christ himself rejects miracles as a genuine criterion of truth. This is the essential point, and we must hold fast to it. Verification by miracles, as well as the attack upon miracles, belong to a lower sphere that concerns us not at all.

The witness of spirit is the authentic witness. It can be of diverse sorts. <sup>~</sup>In an indeterminate, more general way,<sup>~</sup><sup>21</sup> it can be whatever accords with spirit, whatever awakens in it, or produces in its inwardness, a deeper resonance. In history, all that is noble, lofty, and divine speaks to us internally; to it our spirit bears witness. This witness may remain nothing more than this general resonance, this inner agreement, | this empathy and sympathy. But beyond this, the witness of spirit may also be connected with insight and thought. Insofar as this insight is not sensible in character, it belongs directly to thought; it appears in the form of reasons, distinctions, etc., in the form of mental activity, exercised along with and according to the specific forms of thought, the categories. This thinking may

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the other hand, it can refer to the witness of *our* spirit to spiritual truth. (See Vol. 1:337 n. 149.) The two meanings are in fact two aspects of a single truth, since the Spirit of God witnesses only in and through our spirits: there is no divine witness apart from the activity of human spirit; however, the latter is not an autonomous, singular activity but the inner working of the one holy and universal Spirit. In some contexts, especially those concerned with the formation of the community of the Spirit, Hegel intends the former meaning, while in others (such as the paragraphs immediately following) the stress falls on the latter. In accord with our principle of capitalizing "spirit" when it has the representational-religious function of referring to the Holy Spirit, we translate as either "the witness of the Spirit" or "the witness of spirit," depending on how we construe the primary intention of specific passages.

17. [Ed.] See Exod. 7:9–12, 22; 8:3.

18. [Ed.] A conflation of John 4:48 and Matt. 12:38–39.

19. *Thus An*; *L* reads: my resurrection

20. [Ed.] A paraphrase of Matt. 7:22–23.

21. *Thus L*; *W (Var)* reads: indeterminately and generally,

appear in more or less mature forms; it may serve as the presupposition of one's heart or of one's spiritual life in general—the presupposition of universal principles, which are acknowledged to be valid and which direct the life of a human being, serving as one's maxims. These need not be conscious maxims, but they are the means by which the character of a human being is formed, the universal that has obtained a firm foothold in one's spirit. This is a permanent, governing element in one's spirit. It is upon firm foundations of this kind, on presuppositions like this, on ethical principles of this type, that the powers of reasoning and defining can begin. In this respect the levels of development and ways of life of human beings vary considerably, just as do their needs. The highest need of the human spirit, however, is so to think that the witness of spirit is present [for it] not merely in that first resonating mode of sympathy, nor in the second way of providing firm foundations<sup>22</sup> upon which views may be established and firm presuppositions from which conclusions can be drawn and deductions made. The witness of spirit in its highest form is that of philosophy, according to which the concept develops the truth purely as such from itself without presuppositions. As it develops, it cognizes—in and through its development it has insight into—the necessity of the truth.

Faith and thought have often been opposed in such a way that we say: one can "be convinced"<sup>23</sup> of God, of the truths of religion, in no other way than by thinking.<sup>24</sup> But the witness of spirit can be present in manifold and various ways; it is not required that for all of | humanity the truth be brought forth in a philosophical way. The needs of human beings are different in accord with their cultivation and their free spiritual development; and this diversity in accord with the stage of development also encompasses that standpoint [we call] trust or belief on the basis of *authority*. Miracles

22. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and principles

23. *Thus B; L, W<sub>1</sub> (Var) read:* have an awareness *W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* have a genuine conviction

24. *Thus B, An, similar in Hu; L, W (Var) add:* Hence the proofs of the existence of God have been declared the sole means of knowing the truth and of being convinced.

also have their place here, but it is interesting to note that miracles have been reduced to a minimum—namely, to those recounted in the Bible.

<sup>25</sup>That sympathy of which we have spoken earlier, where the spirit or the soul cries out, “Yes, that is the truth”—that sympathy is so immediate a form of certainty that it can be as secure for one person as thinking is for another. [It is] something so immediate that just for this reason it is something posited, given, or positive; [it is so immediate] that precisely this immediacy has the form of positivity and is not brought forth by means of the concept.<sup>26</sup> We ought to bear in mind, however, that only human beings have religion. Religion has its seat and soil in the activity of thinking. The heart and feeling that directly sense the truth of religion are not the heart and feeling of an animal but of a thinking human being; they are a thinking heart and a thinking feeling, and whatever [measure] of religion is in this heart and feeling is a thought of this heart and feeling.<sup>27</sup> But to be sure, insofar as we begin to draw conclusions, to reason, to give grounds, to advance to the categories of thought, this is invariably thinking.

Since the doctrines of the Christian religion are present in the Bible, they are thereby given in a positive fashion; and if they are subjectively | appropriated, if spirit gives witness to them, this can happen in an entirely immediate fashion, with one’s innermost being, one’s spirit, one’s thought, one’s reason, being touched by them and assenting to them. Thus the Bible is for Christians the basis, the fundamental basis, which has this effect on them, which strikes a chord within them, and gives firmness to their convictions.

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25. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W<sub>2</sub>:* In general, however, there is still something positive in these different forms of the witness of spirit.

26. *Thus L with Hu, An; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* Because of its immediacy, sympathy—this immediate certainty—is itself something positive, and the reasoning that proceeds from something posited or given has just such a foundation.

[Ed.] Cf. the following footnote.

27. *Precedes in L (1827?):* Likewise, as we have noted in the second instance, in any process of reasoning that has a firm foundation and presupposition, the foundation is something positive, posited, given. Reasoning has a foundation that has not investigated itself, that has not been produced by the concept.

[Ed.] Cf. the preceding footnote.

Beyond this, however, human beings, because they are able to think, do not remain in the immediacy of assent and testimony, but also indulge in thoughts, in deliberation, in considerations concerning this immediate witness. These thoughts and considerations result in *“a developed”*<sup>28</sup> religion; in its most highly developed form it is *theology* or scientific religion, whose content, as the witness of spirit, is [also] known in scientific fashion.

But here the opposing thesis perhaps comes in, for the theologians say that we ought to hold exclusively to the Bible. In one respect, this is an entirely valid principle. For there are in fact many people who are very religious and hold exclusively to the Bible, who do nothing but read the Bible, cite passages from it, and in this way lead a very pious, religious life. Theologians, however, they are not; such an attitude has nothing of a scientific, theological character.<sup>29</sup> But just as soon as religion is no longer simply the reading and repetition of passages, as soon as what is called explanation or interpretation begins, as soon as an attempt is made by inference and exegesis to find out the *meaning* of the words in the Bible, then we embark upon the process of reasoning, reflection, thinking; and the question then becomes how we should exercise this process of thinking, and whether our thinking is correct or not. It helps not at all to say that one’s thoughts are based on the Bible. As soon as these thoughts are no longer simply the words of the Bible, their content is given a form, more specifically, a logical form. Or certain presuppositions are made with regard to this content, and with these one enters into the process of interpretation. These

28. *Thus L, B, An; W (Var) reads:* still further development in

29. *Thus L, An, W<sub>1</sub>, similar in Hu; W<sub>2</sub> (MiscP) adds:* Goeze, the Lutheran zealot, had a celebrated collection of Bibles; the Devil quotes the Bible too, but that by no means makes the theologian.

[Ed.] The Hamburg Hauptpastor Johann Melchior Goeze was Lessing’s chief opponent in the controversy surrounding Reimarus’s *Fragnents*. It began with the publication of Goeze’s book, *Versuch einer Historie der gedruckten niedersächsischen Bibeln vom Jahr 1470 bis 1621* (Halle, 1775), with which it is unlikely that Hegel was familiar. But Lessing alluded many times to Goeze’s Bible collection; see his *Anti-Goeze, d.i. Notgedrungene Beiträge zu den freiwilligen Beiträgen des Herrn Pastor Goeze* (Braunschweig, 1778), nos. 1, 9, in Lessing, *Vermischte Schriften*, vol. 6 (Leipzig, 1791), pp. 159, 275 (Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften* 13:142, 195).

presuppositions are the permanent element in interpretation; one brings along representations and principles, which guide the interpretation. |

The interpretation of the Bible exhibits its content, however, in the form of a particular age; <sup>~</sup> the interpretation of a thousand years ago<sup>~30</sup> was wholly different from that of today. Among the presuppositions that one brings to the Bible today belong, for example, the views that humanity is good by nature, or that we cannot cognize God.<sup>31</sup> Thus here the positive can enter again in another form: we bring with us certain propositions such as that human beings have these feelings, are constituted in this or that particular way. So everything then depends on whether this content, these views and propositions, are true; and this is no longer the Bible, but instead words that spirit comprehends internally. If spirit expresses in a different way what is expressed in the Bible, then this is already a form that spirit gives [the content], the form of thinking. The form that one gives to this content has to be investigated. Here again the positive enters, in the sense that, for example, the formal logic of inference has been presupposed, namely, finite relations of thought. In terms of the ordinary relations of inference, only the finite can be grasped and cognized, only the understandable, but not the divine. This way of thinking is not adequate to the divine content; the latter is ruined by it. Insofar as theology is not a mere rehearsal of the Bible but goes beyond the words of the Bible and concerns itself with what kinds of feelings exist internally, it utilizes forms of thinking, it engages in thinking. If it uses these forms haphazardly, <sup>~</sup>because one<sup>~32</sup> has presuppositions and prejudices, the result is something contingent and arbitrary. [What is pertinent here] can only be forms that are genuine and logically developed in terms of

30. *Thus Hu; An* reads: indeed a thousand years ago [it] *L* reads: the first interpretation in the early period of the church *W (Var)* reads: the first interpretation

31. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W*: Imagine how someone with these prejudices in mind must distort the Bible! People bring these prejudices to the Bible, although the meaning of the Christian religion is precisely the cognition of God; it is indeed the religion in which God has revealed himself, has said what he is.

[Ed.] See above, Ms., nn. 106, 253.

32. *Thus L; W (Var)* reads: because it

necessity. But the investigation of these forms of thought falls to philosophy alone. Thus theology itself does not know what it wants when it turns against philosophy. Either it carries on unaware of the fact that it needs these forms, that it itself | thinks, and that it is a question of proceeding in accord with thought; or ~ it fosters~<sup>33</sup> a deception, by reserving for itself the option to think as it chooses, in contingent fashion, when it knows that the cognition of the true nature of spirit is damaging to this arbitrary sort of cognition. This contingent, arbitrary way of thinking is the positive element that enters in here. Only the *concept* on its own account liberates itself truly and thoroughly from the positive. For in philosophy and in religion there is found this highest freedom, which is thinking itself as such.

Doctrine itself, the content, also takes on the form of the positive, as noted above; it is valid, it is firmly established, it is ~an entity that has to be reckoned with in actual society.~<sup>34</sup> Everything rational, every law, has this form.<sup>35</sup> But only its *form* is positive; its *content* must be that of spirit. The Bible has this form of positivity, yet according to one of its own sayings,<sup>36</sup> "The letter kills, but the Spirit gives life" [2 Cor. 3:6]. It is a question, then, as to which spirit we bring in, which spirit gives life to the positive. We must know that we bring with us a concrete spirit, a thinking, reflecting, sensing spirit; we must be aware of this spirit, which is at work, comprehending the content. This comprehension is not a passive acceptance, but since it is spirit that comprehends, it is at the same time its activity. Only in the mechanical sphere does one of the sides remain passive in the process of reception. Spirit, therefore, reaches out to, attains the positive realm; it has its representations

33. *Thus L; W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads:* it is ~ *W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* it is not serious about it but rather is

34. *L (Var) reads:* an entity reckoned with by everyone. *Hu reads:* a thing to be reckoned with in actual society. *W (Var) reads:* something binding, to be reckoned with in society.

[Ed.] Cf. the following footnote.

35. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* namely, that it is an entity and, as such, is what is essential and binding for everyone.

[Ed.] Cf. the preceding footnote.

36. *In B's margin:* 26 July 1827

and concepts, it is logical in essence, it is a thinking activity. This, its [own] activity, spirit must know.

This thinking can proceed in one or another of the categories of finitude. It is, however, spirit that begins in this way from the positive but is itself there essentially alongside it. It is to become the true and proper Spirit, the Holy Spirit, which comprehends the divine and knows its content to be divine. This is the witness of spirit, | which, as we have shown above,<sup>37</sup> may be more or less developed. In regard to positivity, the main point is that spirit conducts itself in a thinking fashion and its activity occurs within the categories or determinations of thought; here "spirit is purely active, sentient, or rational."<sup>38</sup> But most people are not conscious of the fact that they are active in this reception. Theologians are like the Englishman who didn't know that he was speaking prose,<sup>39</sup> because they work exegetically and (so they believe) in a passively receptive way, [they] have no inkling of the fact that they are thereby active and reflective. But if thinking is merely contingent, it abandons itself to the categories of finite content, of finitude, of finite thinking, and is incapable of comprehending the divine in the content; it is not the divine but the finite spirit that moves in such categories. As a result of such a finite thinking and comprehending of the divine, or of what is in and for itself, as a result of this finite thinking of the absolute content, the fundamental doctrines of

37. [Ed.] See above, pp. 255–257.

38. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* spirit is active, whether it be in sentient or rational fashion, etc.

39. [Ed.] Hegel is alluding here to the dialogue between M. Jourdain and the teacher of philosophy in Molière's *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, act 2, scene 4, where the philosopher assures M. Jourdain that he is indeed speaking prose (and that one must really speak either prose or verse). Hegel erroneously ascribes M. Jourdain's lack of culture to an Englishman. That this is actually an error of Hegel and not of Hube's transcription (our only source for this passage) is confirmed by the following comment about Newton's lack of awareness of the conceptual presuppositions of the physical sciences, found in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3:323 (Werke 15:447): "Newton is so complete a barbarian as regards his conceptions that his case is like that of another of his countrymen who was surprised and rejoiced to learn that he had talked prose all his life, not having had any idea that he was so accomplished." It was probably because of this association with Newton that the erroneous ascription of M. Jourdain's naïveté to an Englishman came about. Cf. Hegel, *Briefe* 2:251.

Christianity have for the most part disappeared from dogmatics. Philosophy <sup>is</sup> preeminently, though not exclusively,<sup>40</sup> what is at present essentially orthodox; the propositions that have always been valid, the basic truths of Christianity, are maintained and preserved by it.

In our present consideration of this religion, we shall not set to work in *merely historical* fashion, which would entail starting with external matters, but rather we shall proceed *conceptually*.<sup>41</sup> The form of activity that begins with externals appears to be [capable of] comprehension only on one side, while on the other it is <sup>is</sup> independent.<sup>42</sup> Our attitude here essentially takes the form of an activity such that thinking is conscious of itself, of the process involved in the categories of thought—a thinking that has tested and recognized itself, that knows how it thinks and which are the finite and which the true categories of thought. The fact that we began from the other side, from the positive side, <sup>is</sup> from the individual | development of the subject, from education in faith—[this has]<sup>43</sup> to be put aside insofar as we proceed *scientifically*.

### 3. Survey of Previous Developments<sup>44</sup>

This is the point at which to survey our previous course and to discuss the relation of this course to the final stage of religion; here

40. *Thus L, similar in W; An (Var) reads:* alone is

41. [Ed.] In the *Philosophy of Religion* as a whole, Hegel offers a speculative transfiguration of religion, not a merely historical (*historisch*) description of it. This is true also of the Christian religion, to which he now turns; it is already being viewed and interpreted from the standpoint of the absolute philosophy. Hegel does not intend to deny the positive, historical (*geschichtlich*) character of religion, and of the Christian religion especially; but since his intention is to proceed *scientifically* in this work, as he says in the last sentence of the paragraph, and since scientific cognition entails the speculative grasp of what is true, actual, rational, and spiritual, merely historical details are deemphasized.

42. *Thus Hu; L, W (Var) read:* [merely] activity.

43. *Thus An with Hu; L (Var) reads:* occurs in education etc., and has *W (Var) reads:* occurs in education and is necessary there, but here it has

44. [Ed.] This section expands considerably the brief concluding section to the 1824 introduction (Sec. 4), where Hegel discussed the relation of the consummate religion to the preceding religions. The present survey is developed in rather strictly logical categories and describes the process by which finite spirit “rises” to the absolute through the various forms of religious consciousness, which, when taken together, constitute the history of religion. The survey reflects Hegel’s penchant for

for the first time we are able to comprehend the course as a whole and its meaning. We refer back to what has already been said.<sup>45</sup> Religion is spirit as consciousness of its essence. On the one hand, there is a spirit that is the spirit of distinction; the other spirit is spirit as essence, as true, nonfinite spirit. This separation or di-remption, this distinguishing, which resides in the concept of spirit, is what we have called the elevation of spirit from finite to infinite.<sup>46</sup> This elevation appears metaphysically in the proofs for the existence of God. Finite spirit makes infinite spirit its object, knows it as its own essence. If we allow ourselves to speak this way, the word “finite” becomes an indefinite, abstract word, in turn making the word “infinite” also indefinite; and spirit, defined as infinite, is designated only in an indeterminate way—indeed, not only indeterminately but also one-sidedly.

One must be clear about these logical definitions of “finite” and “infinite.”<sup>47</sup> When we keep them apart, we are in the realm of finite thinking. When we say “infinite spirit,” the word “infinite” is itself understood in a one-sided way because it has the finite over against it. In order not to be one-sided, spirit must encompass finitude within itself, and finitude in general means nothing more than a process of self-distinguishing. Consciousness is precisely the mode of finitude of spirit: distinction is present here. One thing is on one side, another on the other side; something has its limit or end in something else, and in this way they are limited. Finitude is this distinguishing, which in spirit takes the form of consciousness. Spirit must have consciousness, distinction, otherwise it is not spirit; accordingly, this is the moment of finitude in it. It must have this character of finitude within itself—that may seem blasphemous. But if it did not have it within itself, and thus if it confronted finitude

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summing up previous stages of the discussion, but it may also reflect the closer association with the *Logic* that is characteristic of the 1827 lectures as a whole. Hegel is at pains to show in these lectures that the concept of religion and the various historical forms that it assumes correspond strictly to logical moments of the concept itself.

45. [Ed.] See above, p. 249, as well as Vol 1:380 ff.

46. *L* (1827?) adds: Just as spirit defines itself as finite, it [also] defines itself vis-à-vis spirit as infinite.

47. [Ed.] For this and what follows, see *Science of Logic*, pp. 137–156 (cf. GW 11:78–85).

from the other | side, then its infinitude would be a spurious infinitude. When we view the characteristic of finitude as something contradictory to God, then we take the finite as something fixed, independent—not as something transitional, but rather as something essentially independent, a limitation that remains utterly such—and then we have not properly recognized the nature of the finite and the infinite. The finite is not, however, the absolute. Neither are finite things absolute, nor is the absolute the definition of finitude logically or in thought; rather the definition of the latter is precisely to be not true in itself. If God has the finite only over against himself, then he himself is finite and limited. Finitude must be posited in God himself, not as something insurmountable, absolute, independent, but above all as this process of distinguishing that we have seen in spirit and in consciousness—a distinguishing that, because it is a transitory moment and because finitude is no truth, is also eternally self-sabotaging. Infinite spirit is posited in a one-sided abstraction when we say that the finite elevates itself to the infinite. The finite is here taken just as indefinitely as infinitude. This is the deficiency; this abstraction of the infinite has to be sublated, and likewise the abstraction of the finite, in which we initially perceive the finitude. The *consideration* of finitude is what gives us development and progressive determination.

We began with the *concept of religion*.<sup>48</sup> Religion is the spirit that relates itself to itself and thus to its essence, to true spirit; it is reconciled with true spirit and finds itself in it. Because this concept of religion is *only* a concept, it is finite; it is not yet the *idea*, the realization, the actualization of the concept. It is *in itself* the true, but it is not yet *for itself*; but the essence of spirit is to be for itself what it is in itself or what its concept is. Since, therefore, finitude is so defined that this being-in-itself is only spirit in its concept or religion in its concept, any advance appears to sublate the concept, i.e., the one-sidedness, deficiency, or mere abstraction of the concept, whether it be grasped now as finitude or as abstract infinitude. Our advance had, therefore, the signification or character of sublating this abstraction. The second point is this: whatever is

48. [Ed.] As treated in Part I of the lectures.

conceptual to begin with | —i.e., merely conceptual or subjective in the sense that it has the content only in itself—is at the same time the first or immediate. Whatever is only in itself or in accord with its concept—such as the human being as a child—is, in its existence as a determinate being, at first only something immediate; and immediacy, therefore, is the finitude that we have to deal with first.

So this is the course we have taken. First we have considered the concept of spirit or of religion. But this in-itself, or the concept merely as such, is nothing but the immediate modality of the concept, immediate being, and this we have in *the natural*.<sup>49</sup> The natural is whatever is *immediately*; finitude is immediate being. In its immediate being, spirit is empirical consciousness, immediate self-consciousness, which views itself as essence, knows itself as the power of nature. This immediate spirit is indeed fulfilled, determinate in itself, concrete, but it is only empirically concrete. For the content by which it is filled is the content of inclinations and desires, instincts and passions; and this first fulfillment is the fulfillment of spirit's merely natural state. This constitutes the finitude of spirit, its natural, empirical self-consciousness. Spirit is fulfilled, but empirically, not by its concept; but what is needful is that it must become *for itself* what it is *in itself*, it must arrive at its concept. This progression is logical: it lies in the nature of the determining process itself to determine itself further in this way—this is logical necessity.

The further form of this finitude we have also seen. This finitude, which is unmediated being, can also be defined as the unitary being of immediate, finite spirit with itself, or as spirit that has not yet arrived at the separation through which it distinguishes this natural state and desire from itself, and therefore it is not yet self-contained, it has not yet attained the determination of freedom. In order to be free, spirit must remove this immediate, natural, empirical state, withdrawing from it. The next step, therefore, is the withdrawal-

49. [Ed.] “Nature Religion” constitutes the first of the three main divisions of Part II, *Determinate Religion*, in the 1827 lectures. The religion of natural immediacy, or magic, represents the first and most primitive form of nature religion.

into-self of spirit from its submersion in the natural. We have seen various forms of this.<sup>50</sup> The outstanding example is the religion of India—this being-within-self, Brahman, pure self-consciousness, the severance by means of which the being-within-self of pure self-consciousness is posited in abstraction from everything concrete and natural | and from all worldly delight and imagery. But this separation is at the same time abstract: this way of thinking is on the one hand still empty; on the other hand it is an immediate self-consciousness that has not yet distinguished itself from itself, has no object, and is nothing other than subjective, abstract knowledge. From this sort of cognition, then, there emerges a first form of unity or reconciliation,<sup>51</sup> namely, that this inwardness fills itself with externality, that it shows itself no longer as an abstraction but as something concrete, that it takes this externality into itself, showing itself above all as *power*. This is the unrefined condition in which the inward has only the signification of something external, an external that still remains only in its natural state.

The second stage was the beginning of *spiritual religion*,<sup>52</sup> namely, a religion of being-withdrawn-into-self,<sup>53</sup> a religion of the freedom of spirit, for which the natural (which was the previous fulfillment) is not an independent content, constituting a fulfillment in an immediate way, but is only the appearance of something inward instead, the appearance of the ethical, which has rational inwardness as its defining character. This inwardness is so concrete

50. [Ed.] Hegel here turns to the second form of nature religion, the religion of being-within-self (*Insichsein*), which in this summary he identifies with Buddhism and Hinduism, but which in his actual treatment he distinguishes, regarding Buddhism (the religion of being-within-self in the strict sense) as the earlier form, and Hinduism (the religion of phantasy) as the higher form.

51. [Ed.] This is an apparent reference to what are described in the 1827 lectures as “the religions of transition” from nature religion to spiritual religion, namely, the religion of light (Persian religion) and Egyptian religion, and in particular to the connection in these religions between the pure (spiritual) inwardness of the good and the pure (natural) externality of light.

52. [Ed.] “Spiritual religion” (or the religion of spiritual individuality, in which “spirit” is still construed as *finite*) is the second main division of *Determinate Religion*. In this paragraph Hegel describes Greek religion as the religion of ethical inwardness.

53. [Ed.] *Insichgegangensein*, literally, “being-gone-within-self.”

within itself, therefore, that concreteness belongs to it and constitutes the definition or nature of inwardness: the concrete is the ethical as such. But it does indeed have the natural as its manifestation, its appearance; this concrete inwardness—the ethical—is, however, not yet posited within itself as subjectivity. Thus a condition of finitude comes about in which the ethical distinguishes itself into particular ethical powers; it is only a collection of these powers with a particular content—an encompassing totality, to be sure, though only a wholeness and not subjectivity—for the appearance still occurs in sensible fashion.<sup>54</sup>

The other mode of finitude is that the external still is [has the character of] sensible being. In this second sphere of withdrawal-into-self, over against the *religion of beauty* we have seen the *religion of sublimity*<sup>55</sup>—that is, spirituality fulfilled within itself in such a way that these particularities, these ethical powers, are brought together in a single purpose by means of which the One, the spirit, is defined as having being within itself, | as wise. Here, therefore, we have spirit in its freedom, at once inwardly concrete and inwardly determinate, which is to say that it exists as the Wise One. This spirit first merits for us the name of God, while the previous one did not. It is no longer substance but subject. Thus spirit has a purpose within itself; it is inwardly determinate. But the content of its subjectivity, its infinite determination, its inner content that we call purpose, is still abstract.

The third stage is the one where *purpose*<sup>56</sup> receives a comprehensive, universal content, although chiefly within the world in external fashion—[specifically] among the Romans. Wisdom is a

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54. *L* (1827?) reads: One can make light of the fact that particularity has not been taken up into absolute harmony or unity.

55. [Ed.] The religion of beauty (Greek religion) and the religion of sublimity (Jewish religion) together constitute spiritual religion (the religion of spiritual individuality). In the 1827 lectures, Hegel treats Greek religion first, followed by Jewish religion—just the reverse of the order in which he discusses these religions in the other lecture series. In Jewish religion, what is “external” over against the ethical inwardness of the Greeks—namely, the one good, wise, all-powerful God—is still construed as a finite, sensible being.

56. [Ed.] The “religion of purposiveness” (*Zweckmässigkeit*) or Roman religion constitutes the third and final division of *Determinate Religion*.

purpose [of this kind], but in the form of an abstraction. Once this purpose is developed, its mode is externality. It is a worldly purpose, a unity, but still an abstract unity, which even in this reality is only abstract and consequently [mere] domination as such. The purpose, therefore, takes the form of subjectivity possessing comprehensive reality, but in such fashion that the subject, while comprehensive, comprehends only what is finite.

The transition [to the consummate religion] is the spirit that has entered into itself: it is the concept that has only *itself* as its purpose—this inwardly subsisting mode [of being] whose purpose is only itself, is God himself. The idea has only itself as purpose; and now this concept is purified in order to have a more comprehensive purpose, but one that is also taken back into subjectivity. Spirit now has as its final purpose its concept, its concrete essence itself; it eternally realizes and objectifies its purpose, and is free in it—indeed it is freedom itself because this purpose is its own nature. Thereby finitude is sublated. This progression has the more specific character of containing that which is inwardly self-determining, the determinateness of spirit. It involves the fact that spirit shows itself in this sphere as inwardly posited. Spirit is precisely that which determines itself infinitely. To be sure, the series of forms that we have passed through is a succession of stages that follow upon one another; but these forms are encompassed within the infinite, absolute form, in absolute subjectivity, and only the spirit so defined as absolute subjectivity *is* spirit.

On the one hand we have seen a stripping away of these determinacies, these modes of finitude and of finite forms. On the other hand it is the nature of spirit, of the concept itself, to determine itself in this way; | in order to be spirit, the concept must first traverse these forms. Only when this content has traversed these determinations is it spirit. Spirit is essence—but only insofar as it has returned to itself from out of itself, only insofar as it is that actual being which returns and is at home with itself, that being which posits itself from itself as at home with itself. This positing produces the distinctive determinations of its activity, and these distinctive determinations are the forms through which spirit has to move.

We have said that spirit is immediate. This is a mode of finitude. All the same, it is spirit, the concept, that determines itself. The first of its determinate forms is that of inward self-diremption and of being immediately, in accordance with this form of finitude. The concept determines itself, posits itself as immediate; that concept for which spirit so determines itself, posits itself as immediate, we ourselves still are. The last stage, however, is that this concept, this subjectivity for which spirit is, is not to remain something external to spirit, but rather is itself to be absolute and infinite subjectivity, infinite form. The infinite form is the circuit of this determining process; the concept is spirit only because it has achieved determinacy through this circuit, has moved through it. This is how it first becomes concrete.<sup>57</sup> This means on the one hand a stripping away of the mode of finitude, and on the other hand a self-diremption and a return to self from diremption; only so is it posited as spirit. At first, spirit is only a presupposition; that it *is* as spirit and comes to be comprehended as spirit is nothing immediate, and cannot happen in an immediate fashion. It is spirit only as that which dirempts itself and returns into itself again—i.e., only after traversing this circuit. What we have traversed in our treatment is the becoming, the bringing forth of spirit by itself, and *only* as such, or as eternally bringing itself forth, is it spirit.<sup>58</sup> This course is, therefore, the grasping or comprehension of spirit. It is the concept that determines itself, and takes these determinations back into itself, as the concept; in this way the concept is | infinite subjectivity.<sup>59</sup> What results is the concept that posits itself, and has itself as its content. This, then, is the absolute idea. The idea is the unity of concept and reality; it is concept *and* objectivity. Truth consists in objectivity being adequate to the concept; but what is adequate to the concept is only the concept itself insofar as it has itself as its counterpart or object. The content as idea is the truth.

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57. *In B's margin:* 27 July 1827

58. *Hu reads:* that which it now traverses, it is as such, namely, spirit.

59. *Precedes in L (1827?):* In this way, the absolute objectification of spirit consists precisely in the fact that the concept determines itself, fulfills itself with its own concept, with itself. The circuit of these forms is the process of self-positing by the concept. These forms, comprehended together in their unity, are the concept.

Freedom is the following aspect of the idea: the concept, because it is conceptually at home with itself, is free. The idea alone is what is true, but equally so it is freedom. The idea is what is true, and the true is thus absolute spirit. This is the true definition of spirit. The concept that has determined itself, that has made itself into its own object, has thereby posited finitude in itself, but posited *itself* as the content of this finitude and in so doing sublated it—that is spirit.

<sup>60</sup>We are accustomed to say of God that he is the creator of the world, that God is wholly just, all-knowing, totally wise. But this is not the authentic way of cognizing what the truth is, what God is; it is the way of representation, of understanding. It is necessary, of course, to define the concept by predicates too, but this is an incomplete, reflective way of thinking; it is not thinking by means of the concept, thinking the concept of God, the idea. Predicates signify particular determinations; attributes, as particular determinations of this kind, are distinguished from one another. If one thinks of these differences determinately, they fall into contradiction with each other, and this contradiction is not resolved, or is resolved only in an abstract, superficial manner. We resolve it merely in an abstraction, by allowing the | attributes to temper each other mutually or by abstracting from their particularity.<sup>61</sup> The outcome is that in this way God, because he is thus defined by predicates, is not grasped as living. This amounts to the same thing we have just stated, namely, that the contradictions are not resolved, or they are only abstractly resolved. The vitality of God or of spirit is nothing other than a self-determining (which can also appear as a predicate), a self-positing in finitude, [which involves] distinction and contradiction, but [is] at the same time an eternal sublating of this con-

196 60. *Precedes in L (1827?)*: The task of philosophy is to cognize what God, the absolute truth, is. The customary, usual procedure (apart from proofs for the existence of God) is to assert this or that about God and to define him by means of predicates. His attributes tell us what he is, render him determinate.

[Ed.] Hegel is criticizing here the procedure of the *theologia naturalis*, which appends to the proofs a derivation of the divine attributes. See, e.g., Christian Wolff, *Theologia naturalis*, Part I, chaps. 1–4; Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, chaps. 1–2, has a similar structure.

61. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 49.

tradition. This is the life, the deed, the activity of God; he is absolute activity, creative energy [*Aktuosität*], and his activity is to posit himself in contradiction, but eternally to resolve and reconcile this contradiction: God himself is the resolving of these contradictions. From this point of view, definition by predicates is incomplete, since they are only particular determinations whose contradiction is not resolved. They represent God as though he were not himself the resolution of these contradictions, as though he were not himself the one who resolves them. It would seem, then, that it is only our human particularity that comprehends specific, distinguishable aspects in God, and that these characteristics are rather just our own. But the particularity does not merely belong to our reflection; rather it is the nature of God, of spirit, it is his concept itself. In the same way, however, God is the one who resolves the contradiction—not by abstraction but in concrete fashion. This, then, is the living God.<sup>62</sup>

#### 4. Division of the Subject<sup>63</sup>

Since we have now indicated the position of our earlier discussion in relation to the idea of God itself—namely, that it is the concept itself that sets up these distinctions and attains to itself through them, becoming for the first time idea in this way—we are now able to view the idea in its development and completion. We turn first to the division of the subject. In its outward aspect, | we can say that this idea is for us. We now have the following distinctions regarding God as the absolute idea.

(1) First, God is the absolute idea for [us in the mode of] *thought* or *thinking*. Insofar as the content is [present] for thought, for the

62. *L* (1827?) adds: That God is living, the vitality of God, signifies that the particularities in him and their resolution are not merely an external aspect and are not grasped merely from our side.

63. [Ed.] In the *Ms.* and in the 1824 lectures, the “division of the subject” is found at the beginning of the second main section (“Concrete Representation” in the *Ms.*, “The Development of the Idea of God” in the 1824 lectures). Since the 1827 lectures lack a first section, containing the ontological proof of the existence of God—which in 1827 has been moved to *The Concept of Religion*—the “division” falls logically into the introduction, followed by the three main sections in which the three “elements” of the consummate religion are explicated.

soil of thinking, it can and must be grasped also in the mode of representation. Since indeed the eternal idea is for the thinking of humanity as a whole, and the thinking of humanity as a whole is extraneous to philosophical thinking, which transposes itself into the form of thinking itself, this thinking must also occur in the mode of representation. The idea of God is first to be considered as it is for thinking or in itself. This is *the eternal idea of God for itself*, what God is for himself, i.e., the eternal idea in the soil of thinking as such.

(2) Second, God is the eternal idea, not for us in the mode of thinking, but rather for finite, external, empirical spirit, for *sensible intuition*, for *representation*. The determinate being that God gives himself for the sake of representation is, in the first instance, *nature*; and therefore one of the ways God is there for representation is that finite, empirical spirit recognizes God from [the evidence of] nature. The other way, however, is that God is [present] for finite spirit as *finite spirit*. Thus, finite, concrete spirit is itself necessarily involved in the way that God is for it, the way God is manifest for it. To be more precise, God as such cannot properly *be* for spirit as finite; rather the basis of his being for finite spirit lies in the fact that the latter does not hold fast to its finitude as a subsisting being or something fixed, but is instead precisely the process of reconciling itself with God. As finite spirit, it is placed in a condition of separation; it has fallen away from God, it is apart from God. Since it is still related to God in this state of being apart from God, the contradiction consists in its cleavage and separation from God. The concrete spirit, the finite spirit defined as finite, is therefore in contradiction to its object or content, and this gives rise above all to the need to sublate this contradiction and separation that appear in finite spirit as such—in other words, the need for *reconciliation*. This need is the starting point; the next step is that God comes into being for finite spirit, that the latter should arrive at a knowledge and certainty of the divine content, and that the divine content should represent *itself* to that finite spirit which is at the same time the *representing* spirit, spirit in finite, | empirical form. This can happen only insofar as spirit does indeed appear to it, but in an external fashion, and insofar as it is able to bring to consciousness (in this external fashion) what God is.

(3) <sup>64</sup>Third, God comes to be, one may say, for *sensibility*, for *subjectivity* and in the subjectivity of spirit, in the innermost being of subjective spirit. Here reconciliation, the sublation of that separation, is made actual; here *God as spirit is [present] in his community*, and the community is liberated from that antithesis and has the consciousness or certainty of its freedom in God.

These are the three ways by which the subject is related to God, the three modes of God's determinate being for subjective spirit. Since it is *we* who have made this distinction, this trichotomy, we have arrived at it more or less empirically, from our own standpoint. We know, in terms of our own spirit, that first of all we are able to think without this antithesis or cleavage within us, that secondly we are finite spirit, spirit in its cleavage and separation, and that thirdly we are spirit in the state of sensibility and subjectivity, of return to self—[which is] reconciliation, innermost feeling. Of these three, the first is the realm of *universality*; the second, the realm of *particularity*; the third, that of *singularity*.<sup>65</sup> These three realms are a presupposition that we have taken up as our definition. They are not to be regarded, however, as realms that are externally distinct, or as externally subsisting modes vis-à-vis God; rather it is the idea itself that makes these distinctions. The absolute, eternal idea is:

(1) First, in and for itself, God in his eternity before the creation of the world and outside the world.

(2) Second, God creates the world and posits the separation. He creates both nature and finite spirit.<sup>66</sup> What is thus created is at first an other, posited outside of God. But God is | essentially the reconciling to himself of what is alien, what is particular, what is posited in separation from him. He must restore to freedom and

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64. *Precedes in L (1827?)*: Thus we have God in the first sphere of thinking in general; second, we have him in the form of representation.

65. [Ed.] The moments of universality (*Allgemeinheit*), particularity (*Besonderheit*), and singularity (*Einzelheit*) are the constitutive moments in the dialectic of the concept. See *Science of Logic*, pp. 600–621 (GW 12:32–52); *Encyclopedia*, §§ 183–187. The logical idea is the principle of universality; nature, the principle of particularity; and finite spirit, the principle of singularity. Each of these, in turn, mediates between the other two; together they constitute the structure of Hegel's entire philosophical system. The unity of all three is the infinite subjectivity of absolute spirit.

66. *Precedes in L (1827?)*, *similar in W*: This creation [W: What is created], this other-being, divides of itself into two sides—physical nature and finite spirit.

to his truth what is alien, what has fallen away in the idea's self-diremption, in its falling away from itself. This is the path and the process of reconciliation.

(3) In the third place, through this process of reconciliation, spirit has reconciled with itself what it distinguished from itself in its act of diremption, of primal division, and thus it is the Holy Spirit, the Spirit [present] in its community.

These are not external distinctions, which *we* have made merely in accord with what *we* are; rather they are the activity, the developed vitality, of absolute spirit itself. It is itself its eternal life, which is a development and a return of this development into itself; this vitality in development, this actualization of the concept, is what *we* have now to consider.<sup>67</sup>

67. W adds the "Division of the Subject" contained in the 1831 lectures; the fuller version of W<sub>2</sub> reads: We have, speaking generally, to consider the idea as divine self-revelation, and this revelation is to be taken in the sense indicated by the three determinations just mentioned.

According to the first of these, God is [present] for finite spirit purely and solely as thinking. This is the theoretical consciousness in which the thinking subject has an attitude of full composure and is not yet posited in this relationship itself, is not yet posited in the process [of reconciliation], but remains in the wholly undisturbed calm of thinking spirit. Here God is thought for thinking spirit, the latter's thought consisting in the simple conclusion that God brings himself into harmony with himself, is immediately present to himself, by means of his differentiation—which, however, is still [found] here in the form of pure ideality and has not yet reached the form of externality. This is the first relationship, which is only for the thinking subject, and is occupied only with the pure content. This is *the kingdom of the Father*.

The second determination is *the kingdom of the Son*, in which God is [present] for representation in the element of representing as such. This is the moment of particularization as such. In this second standpoint, that which was God's "other" in the first moment, though without being defined as such, now obtains the *determination* of the other. Considered from the first standpoint, God as the Son is not distinguished from the Father, but is merely expressed in the mode of sensibility. In the second element, however, the Son obtains the determination as other, and thus we pass out of the pure ideality of thinking and into representation. If, according to the first determination, God begets only a son, here he brings forth nature. Here the other is nature, and distinction comes into its own. What is distinguished is nature, the world as a whole, and the spirit that is related to it, the natural spirit. What we have earlier designated as "subject" comes into play as itself the content; human being is involved in this content. Since human beings are here related to nature and are themselves natural, they have the character of subjects only within the sphere of religion, and consequently we have here to consider nature and humanity from the point of view of religion. The Son comes into the world, and this

### A. THE FIRST ELEMENT: THE IDEA OF GOD IN AND FOR ITSELF<sup>68</sup>

In accord with the first element, then, we consider God in his eternal idea, as he is in and for himself, prior to or apart from the creation | of the world, so to speak.<sup>69</sup> Insofar as he is thus within himself, it is a matter of the eternal idea, which is not yet posited in its reality but is itself still only the abstract idea. But God is the creator of the world; it belongs to his being, his essence, to be the creator; insofar as he is not the creator, he is grasped inadequately. His creative role is not an *actus* that "happened"<sup>70</sup> once; [rather,] what takes place in the idea is an *eternal* moment, an eternal determination of the idea. |

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Thus God in his eternal idea is still within the abstract element of thinking in general—the abstract idea of thinking, not of conceiving. We already know this pure idea, and therefore we need only dwell on it briefly.

Specifically, the eternal idea is expressed in terms of the holy

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is the beginning of faith. When we speak of the coming of the Son into the world, we are already using the language of faith. God cannot properly *be* for finite spirit as such because, to the extent that God is for it, it follows immediately that finite spirit does not hold fast to its finitude as a subsisting being, but rather is in a relation to spirit, reconciles itself with God. As finite spirit its stance is one of falling away, of separation from God; thus it is in contradiction to its object, its content, and this contradiction constitutes, in the first instance, the need for the sublation of the contradiction. This need is the first step, and the next one is that God should come to be for spirit, that the divine content should represent itself to spirit—though at the same time this spirit exists in an empirical, finite fashion. Hence what God is appears to it in empirical fashion. But since in this history the divine steps into view for spirit, the history loses the character of external history. It becomes divine history, the history of the manifestation of God himself.

This constitutes the transition to *the kingdom of the Spirit*, which comprises the awareness that human beings are implicitly reconciled with God and that reconciliation exists for humanity. The process of reconciliation itself is comprised in the cultus.

68. [Ed.] "The First Element," like that of the 1824 lectures, and like Sec. B.a of the Ms., "The Idea In and For Itself," concerns the immanent or logical Trinity. It is given an especially full treatment in the 1827 lectures, perhaps in response to recent attacks on the doctrine of the Trinity by F. A. G. Tholuck and others (see Vol. 1, 1827 *Intro.*, nn. 17, 18).

69. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, p. 50 (GW 11:21).

70. *Thus L; W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads:* was undertaken

*Trinity*: it is God himself, eternally triune. Spirit is this process, movement, life. This life is self-differentiation, self-determination, and the first differentiation is that spirit *is* as this universal idea itself. The universal contains the entire idea, although it only contains it, it is only implicitly the idea. In this primal division is found the other, the particular, what stands over against the universal—that which stands over against God as distinguished from him, but in such a way that this distinguished aspect is God's entire idea in and for itself, so that these two determinations are also one and the same for each other, an identity, the One. Not only is this distinction implicitly sublated, and not only do we know that, but also it is established that the two distinguished moments are the same, that this distinction is sublated insofar as it is precisely what posits itself as no distinction at all; hence the one remains present to itself in the other.

That this is so is the Holy Spirit itself, or, expressed in the mode of sensibility, it is eternal love: *the Holy Spirit is eternal love*.

When we say, "God is love," we are saying something very great and true. But it would be senseless to grasp this saying in a simple-minded way as a simple definition, without analyzing what love is. For love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely not distinguished for each other. The consciousness or feeling of the identity of the two—to be outside of myself and in the other—this is love. I have my self-consciousness not in myself but in the other. I am satisfied and have peace with myself only in this other—and I *am* only because I have peace with myself; if I did not have it, then I would be a contradiction that falls to pieces. This other, because it likewise exists outside itself, has its self-consciousness only in me, and both the other and I are only this consciousness of being-outside-ourselves and of our identity; we are only this intuition, feeling, and knowledge of our unity. This is love, and without knowing that love is both a | distinguishing and the sublation of the distinction, one speaks emptily of it. <sup>71</sup> This is the simple, eternal idea.<sup>71</sup>

71. *Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads, similar in W<sub>1</sub>, first and last sentence similar in W<sub>2</sub>:* God is love: he is this distinguishing and the nullity of the distinction, a play of distinctions in which there is nothing serious, distinction precisely as sublated, i.e., the simple, eternal idea. We deal with the simple idea of God—the fact that

<sup>72</sup>When we speak of God in order to say what he is, it is customary to make use of attributes: God is thus and so; he is defined by predicates. This is the method of representation and understanding. Predicates are determinate, particular qualities: justice, goodness, omnipotence, etc. Because they have the feeling that this is not the authentic way to express the nature of God, the Orientals say that God is πολυώνυμος [worshiped under many names] and does not admit of exhaustion by predicates<sup>73</sup>—for names are in this sense the same as predicates. The real deficiency in this way of defining by predicates consists in the very fact that gives rise to this endless number of predicates, namely, that they designate only particular characteristics, of which there are many, and all of them are borne by the subject.<sup>74</sup> Because there are particular characteristics, and because one views these particularities in their determinateness, one thinks and develops them, they fall into opposition and contradiction with each other as a result, since they are not only distinct but opposed, and these contradictions remain unresolved.

This is also evident when these predicates are taken as expressing God's relation to the world.<sup>75</sup> The world is something other than God. Predicates as particular characteristics are not appropriate to the nature of God. Here, then, is the occasion for the other method, which regards them as relations of God to the world: e.g., the omnipresence and omniscience of God in the world. Accordingly, the predicates do not comprise the true relation of God to himself, but rather his relation | to an other, the world. So they are limited and thereby come into contradiction with each other.

We are conscious of the fact that God is not represented in living fashion when so many particular characteristics are enumerated alongside one another. Put in another way, this is the same point

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[W, reads: as] it is in the simple element of thinking and is the idea in its universality; this is the essential determination of the idea, the determination by which it has truth. We make the following remarks about this idea, its content and form.

72. *In B's margin: 30 July 1827*

73. [Ed.] Hegel may be referring here to Philo, to whom Neander attributes just this expression (*Gnostische Systeme*, p. 12).

74. *Thus L, B, Hu, W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) adds:* which is inwardly without distinction.

75. [Ed.] Most likely an allusion to Schleiermacher's derivation of the divine attributes, namely, as modifications of the feeling of absolute dependence, or of God's relation to self and world. See above, Ms. n. 48.

that was stated earlier: the contradictions among the different predicates are not resolved. The resolution of the contradiction is contained in the idea, i.e., in God's determining of himself to distinguish himself from himself while [remaining] at the same time the eternal sublation of the distinction. The distinction left as is would be a contradiction.<sup>76</sup>

If we assign predicates to God in such a way as to make them particular, then we are immediately at pains to resolve their contradiction. This is an external action, a product of our reflection, and the fact that it is external and falls to us, and is not the content of the divine idea, implies that the contradictions cannot in fact be resolved. But the idea is itself the resolution of the contradictions posited by it. Its proper content, its determination, is to posit this distinction and then absolutely to sublate it; this is the vitality of the idea itself.

At the point where we now stand, our interest is in passing over from concept to being. We should also recall our characterization of the metaphysical proofs of God,<sup>77</sup> which serve as the route for going from the concept to being.<sup>78</sup> The divine idea is the pure concept, without any limitation. The idea includes the fact that the concept determines itself and thereby posits itself as what is self-differentiated. This is a moment of the divine idea itself, and because the thinking, reflecting spirit has this content before it, the need arises for this transition and progression. |

We observed the logical aspect of this transition earlier.<sup>79</sup> It is contained in those so-called proofs by means of which the transition ought to be made, in, from, and through the concept, into objectivity

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76. *Hu adds*: This resolution is forever and always sublated, not left standing on its own account. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W*: If the distinction were permanent, then finitude would persist. The two sides confront each other independently, yet remain in relation; hence an unresolvable contradiction emerges. The idea does not involve leaving the difference alone, but rather resolving it. God posits himself in this distinction and likewise sublates it.

77. [Ed.] In the 1827 lectures, all the proofs for the existence of God are treated in Part I, *The Concept of Religion*, Sec. B.4.c. In this paragraph and the next, Hegel provides a brief summary of the ontological proof.

78. *Thus B; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) adds, similar in W<sub>1</sub>*: so that the concept is not merely concept but also *is*, has reality.

79. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:432–441.

and being (all within the element of thought). What appears as a subjective need and demand is the content, is one moment of the divine idea itself. When we say, "God has created the world," this also entails a transition from concept to reality; but the world is there defined as the essentially other of God, as the negation of God, it is what has being outside God, without God, godlessly. Insofar as the world is defined as the other, we do not have the distinction as a distinction within the concept itself; it is not contained in the concept before us. But now being and objectivity are to be exhibited *in* the concept as its activity and consequence, as a determination of the concept. This shows, therefore, that what we have here, within the idea, is the same content and exigency that is found in the form of those proofs of the existence of God. In the absolute idea, in the element of thinking, God is this utterly concrete universal, the positing of self as other, but in such a way that the other is immediately defined to be himself, and the distinction is only ideal, it is immediately sublated, and does not take on the shape of externality. This means precisely that what is distinguished ought to be exhibited in and within the concept.<sup>80</sup> It is the logical aspect in which it becomes clear that every determinate concept is self-sublating, it occurs as the contradiction of itself, and ~ is a positing of what is distinguished from it.<sup>81</sup> Thus the concept itself is still burdened with one-sidedness and finitude, as indicated by the fact that it is something subjective, posited as subjective; the characteristics of the concept and its distinctions are posited only as ideal and not as distinctions in fact. This is the concept that objectifies itself.<sup>82</sup>

When we say "God," we speak of him merely as abstract; or if we say, "God the Father," we speak of him as the universal, | only abstractly, in accord with his finitude. His infinitude means precisely that he sublates this form of abstract universality and immediacy, and in this way distinction is posited; but he is precisely the sublating

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80. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* What this transition itself concerns we have considered at the appropriate time.

81. *Thus L, An; W (Var) reads:* is thus a coming to be of what is distinguished from it and a positing of itself as such.

82. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* This is the logical aspect, which is presupposed.

of the distinction. Thereby he is for the first time true actuality, the truth, infinitude.

This is the speculative idea, i.e., the rational element, insofar as it is thought, the thinking of what is rational. For the nonspeculative thinking of the understanding, distinction remains as distinction, e.g., the antithesis of finite and infinite. Absoluteness is ascribed to both terms, yet each also has a relation to the other, and in this respect they are in unity; in this way contradiction is posited.

The speculative idea is opposed not merely to the sensible but also to what is understandable; for both, therefore, it is a secret or mystery. It is a  $\mu\nu\sigma\tau\eta\varphi\iota\omega$  for the sensible mode of consideration as well as for the understanding. In other words,  $\mu\nu\sigma\tau\eta\varphi\iota\omega$  is what the rational is; among the Neoplatonists, this expression already means simply speculative philosophy.<sup>83</sup> The nature of God is not a secret in the ordinary sense, least of all in the Christian religion. In it God has made known what he is; there he is manifest. But he is a secret or mystery for external sense perception and representation, for the sensible mode of consideration and likewise for the understanding.

The sensible in general has as its fundamental characteristic externality, the being of things outside each other. Space-time is the externality in which objects are side by side, mutually external, and successive. The sensible mode of consideration is thus accustomed to have before it distinct things that are outside one another. Its basis is that distinctions remain explicit and external. In reason this is not the case. Therefore, what is in the idea is a mystery for sensible consideration. For in [the region of] the idea, the way [things are looked at], the relations [ascribed to things], and the categories [employed] are entirely different from those found in sense experience. The idea is just this distinguishing which | at the same time is no distinction, and does not persist in its distinction. God intuits

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83. *Thus L; Hu reads:* The speculative is accordingly [canceled: reason] the mysteries, and nothing else—simply reason. In the pagan religions God is no secret. *W (Var) reads:* For both it is a  $\mu\nu\sigma\tau\eta\varphi\iota\omega$ , with respect, that is, to what is rational in it.

[Ed.] Hegel attributes the connection between mystery and speculation to Proclus in particular; see Vol. 1:382 n. 44.

himself in what is distinguished, he is united with himself only in his other, and is only present to himself in it; only there does God close with himself and behold himself in the other. This is wholly repugnant to sense experience, since for it one thing is here and another there. Everything counts as independent; what counts for it is not to be the sort of thing that subsists because it possesses itself in another. For sense experience, two things cannot be in one and the same place; they exclude each other. But in the idea, distinctions are not posited as exclusive of each other; rather they are found only in this mutual inclusion of the one with the other. This is the *truly supersensible* [realm], not <sup>~</sup>that of the understanding,<sup>84</sup> which is supposed to be above and beyond; for the latter is just as much a sensible [realm] where things are outside one another and indifferently self-contained.<sup>85</sup>

In the same way this idea is a mystery for the understanding and beyond its ken. For the understanding holds fast to the categories of thought, persisting with them as utterly independent of each other, remaining distinct, external to each other, and fixed. The positive is not the same as the negative, the cause is not the effect, etc. But for the concept it is equally true that these distinctions are sublated. Precisely because they are distinctions, they remain finite, and the understanding persists in finitude. Indeed, even in the case of the infinite, it has the infinite on one side and finitude on the other. But the truth of the matter is that neither the finite nor the infinite standing over against it has any truth; rather both are merely transitional. To that extent this is a mystery for sensible representation and for the understanding, and both resist the rationality of the idea.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>87</sup>What has life *is*, and it has drives and needs; accordingly, it

84. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* the ordinary supersensible,

85. *Thus L; W (Var) omits:* self-contained *and adds:* To the extent that God is defined as spirit, externality is sublated; accordingly, this is a mystery to the senses.

86. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* The opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity are merely the partisans of sensibility and understanding.

87. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* Moreover, the understanding is equally powerless to grasp anything else whatever, to grasp the truth of anything at all. Animal life, for example, also exists as idea, as the unity of the concept, as the unity

207 has | distinction within itself, the latter arises within it. Thus life itself is a contradiction, and the way the understanding comprehends such distinctions is that the contradiction remains unresolved; when the distinctions are brought into relation with each other, only the contradiction remains, which is not to be resolved.<sup>88</sup> Life has certain needs and thus is in contradiction, but the satisfaction of the need annuls the contradiction. I myself am distinguished <sup>for myself</sup><sup>89</sup> from myself in my drives and needs. But life is the resolving of the contradiction, the satisfying of the need, giving it peace, though in such a way that the contradiction emerges once more. The distinction, the contradiction, and its annulment alternate back and forth.<sup>90</sup> When considering drive and satisfaction on their own account, the understanding does not grasp the fact that even in the act of affirmation and self-feeling, the negation of self-feeling, limitation, and lack are simultaneously found, yet at the same time, as self-feeling, I reach beyond this lack. This is the determinate representation of the  $\mu\nu\sigma\tau\eta\varrho\circ\circ\circ$ ; a mystery is called inconceivable, but what appears inconceivable is precisely the concept itself, the speculative element or the fact that the rational is thought. It is precisely through thinking that the distinction comes out specifically.<sup>91</sup> Now when the understanding comes to this point, it says, "This is a contradiction," and it stands still at this point; it stands by the contradiction in the face of the experience that it is life itself which sublates the contradiction. | When [for example] drive is analyzed, the contradiction appears, and then the understanding can say, "This is inconceivable."

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of soul and body. For the understanding, by contrast, each is on its own. To be sure, they are distinct, but equally it is their nature to sublate the distinction. Life or vitality is simply this perennial process.

88. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* This is the case; the contradiction cannot cease when the distinctions are maintained to be perennial in character, just because the fact of this distinction is insisted upon.

89. *Thus L; W (Var) reads: in myself*

90. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* They do not occur simultaneously but succeed each other in temporal progression, and accordingly the entire process is finite.

91. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* The thinking of the drive is only the analysis of what the drive is; as soon as I think "drive," I have the affirmation and therein the negation, the self-feeling, the satisfaction, and the drive. Thinking it means recognizing what is distinguished, what is within it.

Thus the nature of God is inconceivable; but, as we already said, this is just the concept itself, which contains the act of distinguishing within itself. The understanding does not get beyond the fact of the distinction, so it says, "This can't be grasped." For the principle of understanding is abstract identity with itself, not concrete identity, in accord with which these distinctions are [present] within a single [concept or reality]. According to the abstract identity, the one and the other are independent, each for itself, yet at the same time are related to each other.<sup>92</sup> This is what is called inconceivable. The resolution of the contradiction is the concept, a resolution which the understanding does not attain because it starts from the pre-supposition that the two [distinguished moments] both are and remain utterly independent of each other.

One of the circumstances contributing to the assertion that the divine idea is inconceivable is the fact that, | in religion, the content of the idea appears in forms accessible to sense experience or understanding, because religion is the truth for everyone. Hence we have the expressions "Father" and "Son"—a designation taken from a sentient aspect of life, from a relationship that has its place in life. In religion the truth has been revealed as far as its *content* is concerned; but it is another matter for this content to be present in the *form* of the concept, of thinking, of the concept in speculative form.<sup>93</sup>

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92. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* therefore the contradiction is present.

93. *Cf. the amplification of this theme by the 1831 lectures, inserted by W<sub>1</sub> in the context of the 1824 lectures at p. 192, and by W<sub>2</sub> in the context of the 1827 lectures at p. 276; W<sub>2</sub> reads, similar in W<sub>1</sub>:* This eternal idea, accordingly, finds expression in the Christian religion under the name of the Holy Trinity, which is God himself, the eternally triune God.

Here God is present only for the person who thinks, who remains silently within himself. The ancients called this "enthusiasm";<sup>a</sup> it is a purely theoretical contemplation, the supreme repose of thought, but at the same time its highest activity, namely, to grasp the pure idea of God and to become conscious of that idea. The mystery of the dogma of what God is, is imparted to human beings; they believe in it, and already have the highest truth vouchsafed to them, although they apprehend it only in the form of representation, without being conscious of the necessity of this truth, without conceiving it. Truth is the disclosure of what spirit is in and for itself; human beings are themselves spirit, and therefore the truth is for them. Initially, however, the truth that comes to them does not yet possess for them the form of freedom; it is for them merely something given and received, though they can receive it only because they are spirit. This truth, this idea, has been called the *dogma of*

Yet another form of understandability is the following: When we say, "God in his eternal universality is the one who distinguishes himself, determines himself, posits an other to himself, and likewise

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*the Trinity*—God is spirit, the activity of pure knowing, the activity that is present to itself. It was chiefly Aristotle who comprehended God under the abstract determination of activity.<sup>b</sup> Pure activity is knowing (in the Scholastic age, *actus purus*), but in order to be posited as activity, it must be posited in its moments: knowing requires an other, which is known, and since it is knowing that knows it, it is appropriated to it. This explains why God, the actual being that is eternally in and for itself, eternally begets himself as his Son, distinguishes himself from himself—the absolute primal division. What God thus distinguishes from himself does not take on the shape of an other-being, but rather what is thus distinguished is immediately only that from which it has been distinguished. God is spirit, and no darkness, no coloring or mixture enters into this pure light. The relationship of father and son is drawn from organic life and is used in representational fashion. This natural relationship is only figurative and accordingly never wholly corresponds to what should be expressed. We say that God eternally begets his Son, that God distinguishes himself from himself, and thus we begin to speak of God in this way: God does this, and is utterly present to himself in the other whom he has posited (the form of love); but at the same time we must know very well that God is himself this entire activity. God is the beginning, he acts in this way; but he is likewise simply the end, the totality, and it is as totality that God is the Spirit. Merely as the Father, God is not yet the truth (he is known in this way, without the Son, in the Jewish religion). Rather he is both beginning and end; he is his own presupposition, he constitutes himself as presupposition (this is simply another form of differentiation); he is the eternal process. The fact that this is the truth, and the absolute truth, may have the form of something given. But that this should be *known* as the truth in and for itself is the task of philosophy and the entire content of philosophy. In it is seen how all the content of nature and spirit presses forward dialectically to this central point as its absolute truth. Here we are not concerned to prove that this dogma, this tranquil mystery, is the eternal truth; this comes to pass, as has been said, in the whole of philosophy.

In W<sub>1</sub> there follows a further passage from the 1831 lectures, which in W<sub>2</sub> is transmitted at a later point (p. 283, 1st par.), in part more fully, in part abridged; W<sub>1</sub> reads: Against this truth the understanding adduces its categories of finitude. But there is no reference at all here to the notion of three as a number; it would be the most thoughtless and unconceptual procedure to introduce this form here. Principally, the understanding sets up its notion of identity against it [the truth of divine self-differentiation]: God is the One, the essence of essences, it says. But this is only an untrue abstraction, a product of the understanding without truth, empty identity as an absolute moment. God is spirit, making himself objective and knowing himself in this objectivity: this is concrete identity [W<sub>2</sub> continues: and thus the idea is also an essential moment], whereas identity without distinction is the false product of the understanding and of modern theology; identity by itself is a false, one-sided characteristic. The understanding, however, believes that it has done everything when it detects a contradiction; it believes that it has prevailed over everything since

sublates the distinction, thereby remaining present to himself, and is spirit only through this process of being brought forth," then the understanding enters in | and counts one, two, three.<sup>94</sup> Oneness is to begin with wholly abstract. But the three ones are expressed more profoundly when they are defined as persons. Personality is what is based upon freedom—the first, deepest, innermost mode,<sup>95</sup> but it is also the most abstract mode in which freedom announces its presence in the subject. "I am a person, I stand on my own"—this is an utterly unyielding position. So when these distinctions are defined in such a way that each of us [is taken] as one or indeed as a person, then through this definition of the person<sup>96</sup> what the idea demands appears to be made even more unattainable, namely, to regard these distinctions as distinctions which are not distinct but remain absolutely one, [and so to attain] the sublating of this distinction. Two cannot be one; each is a rigid, unyielding, independent being-for-self. Logic shows that the category of "the one" is a poor category, the wholly abstract unit.<sup>97</sup> If I say "one" [of God], I [must also] say this of everything else. | But as far as personality is concerned, it is the character of the person, the subject, to surrender its isolation and separateness. Ethical life,

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identity is supposed to be the foundation [of everything]. But [even] if there were a contradiction, it is the nature of spirit to sublate it eternally. Here, however, opposition and contradiction are not yet found in the first element, but only in the second.

[Ed.] <sup>a</sup>In referring to "enthusiasm" as a "purely theoretical contemplation," Hegel apparently has in mind Plato: "The love for ideas is what Plato calls enthusiasm" (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:30 [*Werke* 14:199]). He is thinking especially of the description of the contemplation of the ideas in *The Republic* 475e–477b, although Plato does not speak there of "enthusiasm." In any case, both Hegel and Plato distinguish enthusiasm in this sense from any sort of suprarational ecstasy, which would be the opposite of presence of mind; cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 71e–72a. <sup>b</sup>See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1072b18–30.

94. *Thus L, similar in B, Hu, An; W (1831) reads:* and brings its categories of finitude to bear, counts one, two, three, mixing in the unfortunate form of number. But there is no reference to number here; counting betokens a complete lack of thought. Thus by introducing this form, one introduces a complete absence of concept.

95. *Thus B; L, W (Var) read:* freedom

96. *Thus L, similar in W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* this infinite form, namely, that each moment should be as a subject,

97. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 164–170 (cf. *GW* 11:91–97).

love, means precisely the giving up of particularity, of particular personality, and its extension to universality—so, too, with friendship.<sup>98</sup> In friendship and love I give up my abstract personality and thereby win it back as concrete. The truth of personality is found precisely in winning it back through this immersion, this being immersed in the other.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>100</sup>But, even though representation grasps the content in its own forms, the content still belongs to thinking. We are considering the idea in its universality, as it is defined in and through pure thinking. This idea is the one truth and the whole truth; therefore everything particular that is comprehended as true must be comprehended according to the form of this idea. Nature and finite spirit are products of God; therefore rationality is found within them. That something is made by God involves its having the truth within it, the divine truth as a whole, i.e., the determinateness of this idea in general. The form of this idea is only in God as spirit; if the divine idea is grasped in the forms of finitude, then it is not posited as it is in and for itself—only in spirit is it so posited. In the finite forms it exists in a finite way; but, as we have stated, the world is something produced by God, and therefore the divine idea always forms the foundation of what the world as a whole is. To cognize the truth of something means to know and define it according to the truth, in the form of this idea in general.

In the earlier religions, particularly in Hinduism, we <sup>have</sup> had<sup>101</sup> anticipations of the triad as the true category.<sup>102</sup> | This idea of threefoldness indeed came to expression with the recognition that the One cannot remain as one, that it is what it ought to be not as one<sup>103</sup> but rather as movement and distinction in general, and as the relation of these distinctions to each other. Nevertheless,

212 98. *L* (1827?) adds: Inasmuch as I act rightly toward another, I consider the other as identical with myself. *W* (*Var*) reads: family, friendship; here this identity of one with another is present. Inasmuch . . . [continues with *L*]

99. *L* (1827?) adds, similar in *W*: Such forms of the understanding show themselves immediately in experience as the sort that annul themselves.

100. *In B's margin*: 31 July 1827

101. *Thus B*, similar in *Hu*, *An*; *L*, *W*<sub>2</sub> read: have

102. *W*<sub>1</sub> (*Var*) adds: and we see that the category of the triad is the true category.

103. *Thus L*; *W* (*Var*) adds: —the One is not what is true—

the third element here—in the Trimurti<sup>104</sup>—is not the Spirit, not genuine reconciliation, but rather origin and passing away, or the category of change, which is indeed the unity of the distinctions, but a very inferior union—a reconciliation that is still abstract. Even in the Christian religion the Holy Trinity does not appear in the immediate appearance [itself]; rather the idea is first completed only when the Spirit has entered into the community and when the immediate, believing spirit has raised itself to the level of thinking.<sup>105</sup>

It is also well known that the Trinity played an essential role for the Pythagoreans<sup>106</sup> and Plato, but its determinate characteristics are left entirely in a state of abstraction: partly in the abstraction of numerical units (one, two, three); partly (and specifically for Plato) in somewhat more concrete fashion, the nature of the one, then the nature of the other (that which is distinct within itself, θάτερον); and finally the third, which is the unity of the two.<sup>107</sup> Here the triad is found not in the Hindu mode of fanciful imagination but in mere abstraction. These are categories of thought that are better than numbers, better than the category of number, but they are still wholly abstract categories of thought. They are found, most surprisingly, in Philo, who carefully studied Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy, among the Alexandrian Jews and in Syria. Consciousness of this truth, this triune idea, arose especially among the heretics, indeed primarily among the Gnostics,<sup>108</sup> although they brought this content to expression in obscure and fanciful notions.<sup>109</sup> |

104. *Thus Hu; W (Var), preceding this sentence, reads:* The Trimurti is the most uncontrolled form of this [triadic] category.

[Ed.] The Trimurti is later Hinduism's divine triad: Brahmā, Vishnu, Siva.

105. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* It is of interest to consider these fermentations of an idea and to learn to recognize their ground in the marvelous appearances that manifest themselves.

106. [Ed.] See above, *Ms.*, n. 60.

107. [Ed.] See above, *Ms.*, n. 59.

108. [Ed.] Hegel's information on Philo and the Gnostics in this paragraph and the next derives primarily from Neander's *Gnostische Systeme*. See above, *Ms.*, n. 71.

109. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* We see here, however, at least the struggle of spirit for the truth, and that merits recognition.

Apart from those already mentioned above, one can point to a countless number of forms in which the content of the Trinity appeared distinctly and in various religions. But this properly belongs to church history. The main features are as follows: First, the Father, the One, the ὁν, is the abstract element that is expressed as the abyss, the depth (i.e., precisely what is still empty), the inexpressible, the inconceivable, that which is beyond all concepts. For in any case what is empty and indeterminate is inconceivable; it is the negative of the concept, and its conceptual character is to be this negative, since it is only a one-sided abstraction which makes up only one moment of the concept.<sup>110</sup> The second moment, other being, the action of determining, self-determining activity as a whole, is, according to the broadest designation, λόγος—rationally determinative activity, or precisely the word. The word is this simple act of letting itself be heard that neither makes nor becomes a hard-and-fast distinction, but rather is immediately heard, and that, because it is so immediate, is likewise taken up into interiority and is returned to its origin. This second moment is also defined as σοφία, wisdom, the original and wholly pure human being, “an existing other”<sup>111</sup> or as that initial universality, something particular and determinate.<sup>112</sup> For this reason it has been defined as the archetype of humanity, Adam Kadmon, the only-begotten. This is not something contingent but rather an eternal activity, which does not happen merely at one time. In God there is only one birth, the act as eternal activity, a determination that itself belongs essentially to the universal.<sup>113</sup> The essential point is that this σοφία, the only-begotten, remains likewise in the bosom of God; so that the distinction is no distinction. |

214 These are the forms in which this truth, this idea, has fermented. The main point is to know that these appearances, wild as they are,

110. *L, W (1827?) add:* The One for itself is not yet the concept, the true.

111. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* something existing, something other,

112. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* God is the creator, and is such indeed in the specification of the Logos as the self-externalizing, self-expressing word, as the ὄφασις, God’s vision.

113. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* This is a genuine differentiation, which affects the quality of both; however, it is only one and the same substance, and thus the distinction here is still constituted only superficially, indeed as a person.

are rational—to know that they have their ground in reason, and to know what sort of reason is in them. But at the same time one must know how to distinguish the form of rationality that is present and not yet adequate to the content. For this idea has “in fact”<sup>114</sup> been placed beyond human beings, beyond the world, beyond thought and reason; indeed, it has been placed over against them, so that this determinate quality, though it is the sole truth and the whole truth, has been regarded as something peculiar to God, something that remains permanently above and beyond, and does not reflect itself in the other (in what appears as the world, nature, humanity). But to this extent, this fundamental idea has not been treated as the universal idea.

Jacob Boehme was the first to recognize the Trinity in another manner, as universal. His way of representing and thinking is rather wild and fanciful; he has not yet risen to the pure forms of thinking. But the ruling foundation of the ferment [in his mind], and of his struggles [to reach the truth], was the recognition of the presence of the Trinity in everything and everywhere. He said, for example, that it must be born in the hearts of human beings.<sup>115</sup> The Trinity is the universal foundation of everything considered from the point of view of truth, albeit as finite, but in its finitude as the truth that lies in it. Thus Jacob Boehme sought to make nature and the heart or spirit of humanity representable—in his own way, to be sure, but according to the [logical] determinations of the Trinity.

In more recent times, especially through the influence of the Kantian philosophy, the triad has been put to use again as a type or a schema for thought, so to speak—not in any extensive way, certainly, though indeed in quite specific categorial forms.<sup>116</sup> But this is the one aspect, namely, that when this idea is known as the essential and sole nature of God, it must not be regarded as something above and beyond, as it was formerly; rather it is the goal of cognition to know the truth in particular things as well. If it is thus cognized, then whatever in such particular things is the true

114. *Thus L; W (Var) reads: frequently*

115. [Ed.] See Jacob Boehme, *Aurora, oder Morgenröhte im Aufgang*, in *Theosophia revelata* (1715), 10.116.

116. [Ed.] See above, *Ms.*, n. 62.

215 contains the form of this idea. For cognition in fact means knowing something in its | determinateness; but its nature is that of determinateness itself, and the nature of determinateness is what has been expounded in the idea. [To show] that this idea is what is true as such, and that all categories of thought are this movement of determining, is the [task of] logical exposition.<sup>117</sup>

### B. THE SECOND ELEMENT: REPRESENTATION, APPEARANCE<sup>118</sup>

#### 1. Differentiation

##### a. *Differentiation within the Divine Life and in the World*

We now consider, therefore, the eternal idea in the second element, in the form of *consciousness* or of *representation* in general; in other words, we consider this idea insofar as it emerges out of universality and infinitude into the determinacy of finitude.

Once again, the first aspect or form is that of the universality of the idea with respect to content—but precisely in this sense: that God is everywhere. He is everywhere present; the presence of God is just the element of truth that is in everything. We can comment further here: <sup>119</sup>what is universal or abstract must precede everything else in scientific knowledge; scientifically, one must start with it. But in existence it is in fact what comes later. It is the in-itself, which nevertheless appears subsequently, specifically in knowledge—the in-itself that comes to consciousness and knowledge later.

117. *Thus L, similar in W<sub>1</sub>; Hu reads:* To show that the Trinity is what is true is the task of logic. *W (Var) adds:* and is logical necessity.

[Ed.] Cf. Hegel's formulation of the result of this logical exposition at the beginning of the section on the absolute idea in *Science of Logic*, pp. 824–825 (GW 12:236–237).

118. [Ed.] The structure of “The Second Element” in the 1827 lectures is almost identical with that of 1824, and we have adopted the same section headings. The only structural variation in 1827 is that the treatment of the story of the fall precedes the discussion of the knowledge of evil and estrangement. There are, however, differences of content and emphasis between 1827 and 1824.

119. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* At first the idea was found in the element of thinking; this is the foundation, and we began with it.

The form of the idea comes to appearance as a result, even though this result is essentially the in-itself, the beginning. Just as the content of the idea is such that the last is first and the first last, so it is that what appears as a result is at the same time the presupposition, the in-itself, the foundation. And now we have to consider this idea in the second element, the element of *appearance* in general.

We can comprehend this progression from two sides.

First of all, the subject for which this idea is [present] is the thinking subject. Even the forms of representation take | nothing away from the nature of the fundamental form, namely, that this latter is [available] for human being only as a thinking being. The subject behaves in general as a thinking subject, thinking this idea; yet the subject is also concrete consciousness. The idea must therefore be [present] for this subject as concrete self-consciousness, as an actual subject.

Or one might say that this idea is the absolute truth. Absolute truth is for thinking. But the idea must not only be the truth for the subject; the subject must also have the [sort of] certainty about the idea that belongs to the subject as such, as a finite, empirically concrete, sentient subject. The idea possesses certainty for the subject only insofar as it is a perceptible idea, insofar as it exists for the subject. If I can say of anything, “it is so” [*das ist*], then it possesses certainty for me; this is immediate knowledge, this is certainty. To prove that “what is so” is also *necessary*, that it is what is true that is certain for me—that is the further process of mediation and is no longer something immediately apprehended; so this mediation is the transition into the universal.<sup>120</sup>

The other side of this progression starts from the idea. Eternal being-in-and-for-itself is what discloses itself, determines itself, divides itself, posits itself as what is differentiated from itself, but the difference is at the same time constantly sublated. Thereby actual being in and for itself constantly returns into itself—only in this way is it spirit. What is distinguished is defined in such a way that

120. *L adds (1827?)*, *similar in W*: Having started with the form of truth, we now proceed to the fact that the truth obtains the form of certainty, that it exists for me.

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the distinction immediately disappears, and we have a relationship of God, of the idea, merely to himself. The act of differentiation is only a movement, a play of love with itself, which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of separation and rupture. The other is to this extent defined as "Son"; in terms of sensibility, what-has-being-in-and-for-itself is defined as love, while in a higher mode of determinacy, it is defined as spirit that is present to itself and free. In the idea as thus specified, the determination of the distinction is not yet complete, since it is only abstract distinction in general. We have not yet arrived at distinction in its own proper form; [here] it is just one | determinate characteristic.<sup>121</sup> The distinguished elements are posited as the same; they have not yet come to be defined so that they are distinctly determined.

From this side the primal division of the idea is to be conceived in such a way that the other, which we have also called "Son," obtains the determination of the other as such—that this other exists as a free being for itself, and that it appears as something actual, as something that exists outside of and apart from God. Its ideality, its eternal return into actual being in and for itself, is posited in the first form of identity, the idea, in an immediate and identical way. Otherness is requisite in order that there may be difference;<sup>122</sup> it is necessary that what is distinguished should be the otherness as an entity. Only the absolute idea determines itself and is certain of itself as absolutely free within itself because of this self-determination. For this reason its self-determination involves letting this determinate [entity] exist as something free, something independent, or as an independent object. It is only for the being that is free that freedom *is*; it is only for the free human being that an other has freedom too.<sup>123</sup> It belongs to the absolute freedom of the idea that, in its act of determining and dividing, it releases the other to exist as a free and independent being. This other, released as something free and independent, is *the world* as such.

121. *Thus L, W<sub>1</sub>; precedes in W<sub>2</sub> (Var)*: To that extent we can say that we have not yet arrived at distinction.

122. *Thus L, W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) adds*: and that it may come into its own,

123. *Thus L, W; Hu adds*: As free, human beings do not comport themselves according to desires; they leave them aside.

The truth of the world is only its *ideality*—for it is not true that it possesses genuine actuality. Its nature is to *be*, but only in an *ideal* sense; it is not something eternal in itself but rather something created, whose being is only posited. For the world, to be means to have “being only for an instant,”<sup>124</sup> so to speak, but also to sublate this its separation or estrangement from God. It means to return to its origin, to enter into the relationship of spirit, of love—to *be* this relationship of spirit, of love, which is the third element. The second element is, therefore, the process of the world in love by which it passes over from fall and separation into reconciliation. |

This is the second element—the creation of the world. The first element, within the idea, is only the relationship of the Father to the Son in eternal reconciliation, or, alternatively, nonreconciledness, because no fall is present yet. But the *other* also obtains the determinacy of *other-being*, of an actual entity. It is in the Son, in the determination of distinction, that the advance to further distinction occurs, that distinction comes into its own as [true] diversity.

As we have already said,<sup>125</sup> Jacob Boehme expressed this transition inherent in the moment of the Son as follows: the first only-begotten one was Lucifer, the light-bearer, brilliance and clarity, but he inwardly fancied himself, i.e., he posited himself for himself, he strove to be, and thereby he fell. But the eternal only-begotten One appeared immediately in his place. Looked at from this standpoint, that [first] other is not the Son but rather the external world, the finite world, which is outside the truth—the world of finitude, where the other has the form of being, and yet by its nature is only the ἔτερον,<sup>126</sup> the determinate, what is distinct, limited, negative. The finite world is the side of distinction as opposed to the side that remains in unity; hence it divides into the *natural world* and

124. *Thus B, An; L, W (Var) read:* only an instant of being,

125. [Ed.] This cross-reference was probably introduced into the text by Lasson in order to camouflage the repetition relating to the 1824 lectures (see 1824, n. 106), but possibly Hegel is referring to p. 289 above.

126. [Ed.] From Hegel’s *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 2:64 (Werke 14:233), we may assume that he is here alluding to Plato (see *Sophist* 254e–259d and *Parmenides* 143a–c).

the world of *finite spirit*. On its own account, nature "enters into relationship" <sup>127</sup> only with humanity, not with God, for nature is not knowledge. God is spirit; nature knows nothing of spirit. It is created by God, but of itself it does not enter into relationship with him—in the sense that it is not possessed of knowledge. It stands in relation only to humanity, and in this relationship it provides what is called the dependent side of humanity. But to the extent that thinking recognizes that nature is created by God, that understanding and reason are within it, nature is known by thinking human beings. To that extent it is posited in relation to the divine, because its truth is recognized.<sup>128</sup> |

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127. *Thus L, Hu, W<sub>1</sub>, similar in An; B, W<sub>2</sub> (Var) read: appears in relationship*

128. *W<sub>2</sub> (1831) adds, located elsewhere in W<sub>1</sub>:* The manifold forms of relationship of finite spirit to nature do not belong here [in the philosophy of religion]. Their scientific treatment forms part of the phenomenology of spirit or the doctrine of spirit.<sup>a</sup> Here this relationship has to be considered within the sphere of religion, so as to show that nature is for human beings not only the immediate, external world but rather a world in which humanity knows God; in this way nature is for humanity a revelation of God. We have already seen<sup>b</sup> how this relationship of spirit to nature is present in the ethnic religions where we encountered those forms that belong to the advance of spirit from immediacy, in which nature is taken as contingent, to necessity and to a wise and purposeful mode of activity. Thus the consciousness of God on the part of finite spirit is mediated by nature. Humanity sees God by means of nature; thus far nature is only the veil and the untrue configuration [of God].

What is distinguished from God now is actually an other, and has the form of an other: it is nature, which is for spirit and for humanity. Through it unity is to be accomplished and the consciousness attained that the goal and destination of religion is reconciliation. The first step is the abstract consciousness of God, the fact that humanity raises itself in nature to God: this we have seen in the proofs for the existence of God; and here too belong those pious reflections as to how gloriously God has made everything and how wisely he has arranged all things. These elevated thoughts go straight to God and may start from any set of facts. Piety makes edifying observations of this kind, it starts with the most particular and insignificant things, recognizing in them something that is higher in principle. Mixed in with these observations there is often the distorted notion that what goes on in the world of nature is to be regarded as something higher than what is found in the human sphere. This way of looking at things, however, is inappropriate because it starts from singulars. Another form of observation can be opposed to it, namely, that the cause should be appropriate to the appearance and should itself contain the element of limitation that belongs to the appearance; we require a particular ground on which this particular effect is based. The observation of a particular appearance always has this inappropriate aspect. Further, these particular appearances belong to the realm of the natural. God, however, must be conceived as spirit, and the

*b. Natural Humanity*

<sup>129</sup>The truth is [now to be] considered as posited in the second element, in the finite element.<sup>130</sup> The first thing we have now to consider is the *need* for truth; the second is the *mode* and *manner* of its appearance. |

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Regarding the first point, the need for truth, it is presupposed that there is present within subjective spirit the demand to know the absolute truth. This need directly implies that the subject exists in a state of untruth. As spirit, however, the subject implicitly surmounts its untruth at the same time, and consequently the latter is for it something that *ought* to be overcome. More strictly defined, untruth means that the subject exists in a state of cleavage from itself; hence the need [for truth] expresses itself in this way: that the cleavage within the subject and its attendant cleavage from the truth should be annulled, that the subject should be reconciled, and that this reconciliation can in itself be only a reconciliation with the truth. This is the more precise form of the need. The way it is defined is that the cleavage is all within the subject, that the subject is evil, that it *is* the split and the contradiction—yet not a contra-

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element in which we cognize him must likewise be spiritual [cf. John 4:24]. “God thunders with his thundering voice,” it is said, “and yet is not recognized” [cf. Job 37:5]; the spiritual person, however, demands something loftier than what is merely natural. In order to be recognized as spirit, God must do more than thunder [W<sub>1</sub> reads: God is more than a mere thunderer].

*Follows additionally in W<sub>2</sub> (MiscP):* The higher mode of viewing nature, and the deeper relation in which it is to be placed to God, is that in which nature itself is conceived as something spiritual, i.e., as the natural aspect of humanity. It is only when the subject ceases to be classed as belonging to the immediate being of the natural and is posited as what it intrinsically is, namely, as *movement*, and when it has gone into itself, that finitude as such is posited, and indeed as finitude in the process of the relationship in which the need for the absolute idea and its appearance come to exist for it.

[Ed.] <sup>a</sup>It is not clear from this reference whether Hegel has in mind the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807 or the chapter by the same title in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), §§ 413–439. It is probably the latter since the “doctrine of spirit” could refer to the “Psychology” of the *Encyclopedia*, §§ 440–482. <sup>b</sup>This is a reference to the cosmological and physicotheological proofs of the existence of God found in Part II; see the physicotheological proof according to the lectures of 1831 in the Appendix to Vol. 2.

129. In B's margin: 2 August 1827

130. *Thus Hu; L (1827?) reads, similar in W<sub>1</sub>:* The absolute idea must come to be *for* consciousness and *in* it; it must become the *truth* for the subject and in it.

diction that simply falls apart, but rather one that simultaneously holds itself together. It is only through its holding together that it is split and has the contradiction within itself.

Consequently, it is requisite that we recall to mind and define the nature or character of humanity on its own account—how it is to be regarded, how human beings should regard *“themselves,”*<sup>131</sup> what they should know about themselves. At this point we encounter two opposed definitions, both at once. The first is that *humanity is by nature good*. Its universal, substantial essence is good; far from being split within itself, its essence or concept is that it is by nature what is harmonious and at peace with itself. Opposed to this is the second characterization: *humanity is by nature evil*—that is, its natural, substantial aspect is evil. These are the antitheses that are present for us at the outset for | external consideration: sometimes one view has been in vogue, and sometimes the other. It should be added, moreover, that this is not just the way that *we* view the situation; it is human beings [generally] who have this knowledge of themselves, of how they are constituted and what their definition is.

*Humanity is by nature good.*<sup>132</sup> This is the more or less predominant notion of our time.<sup>133</sup> If only this proposition is valid, that humanity by nature is good, is not cloven, then it has no need of reconciliation; and if reconciliation is unnecessary, then the entire process we are here considering is superfluous.

It is [indeed] essential to say that humanity is good: human beings are implicitly spirit and rationality, created in and after the image of God [Gen. 1:26–27]. God is the good, and human beings as spirit are the mirror of God; they, too, are *implicitly* good. This is a correct statement. Precisely on this proposition, and on it alone, the possibility of their reconciliation rests. The difficulty and ambiguity of the proposition, however, reside in the definition of the “implicitly” [*an sich*]. Humanity is “implicitly” good: this seems

131. *Thus L, Hu; B, W read: it An reads: it (themselves)*

132. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 106.

133. *L adds (Var/Ed?):* In treating the community, a topic for consideration will be how religious intuition and the religious relationship are developed and determined within it.

to say it all, but the “implicitly” designates precisely a one-sidedness which implies that everything has *not* been said. Humanity is “implicitly” good: this means that human beings are good only in an inner way, or according to the concept, and not according to their actuality. But insofar as they are spirit, they must be in actuality, i.e., *explicitly*, what they are in truth. Physical nature remains in the condition of implicitness [*Ansich*]; it is “implicitly” the concept.<sup>134</sup> Precisely this word “implicitly”—the notion that humanity is “implicitly” good—contains the deficiency. The implicitness of nature consists in the laws of nature; it remains true to its laws and does not go beyond them. It is this that constitutes its substantiality, and hence it is within the sphere of necessity. The other side, however, is that human beings ought to be explicitly what they are implicitly—they ought to become this explicitly. “Good by nature” means “immediately good,” and spirit is precisely something that is not natural and immediate. On the contrary, humanity as spirit is what steps forth out of natural life | and passes over into a separation between its concept and its immediate existence. But in the case of nature the concept of nature does not arrive at its being-for-self; this separation of an individual from its law, from its substantial essence, does not occur in nature just because [in it] the individual is not free. But human being is what sets its implicit being, its universal nature, over against itself and enters into this separation.

The other characterization derives immediately from what has just been said, namely, that human being ought not to remain as it is immediately, but should pass beyond its immediacy: this is the concept of spirit. It is correct that human beings are good by nature; but with that, one has only said something one-sided. It is this passing beyond the natural state of humanity, beyond its implicit being, that for the first time constitutes the cleavage within humanity; it is what posits the cleavage. Thus the cleavage is a stepping forth out of natural life and immediacy. But this is not to be construed to mean that there would be no evil until the stepping forth;

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134. *L* (1827?) adds, similar in *W*: But in it the concept does not arrive at its being-for-itself [*Fürsichsein*].

rather this stepping forth is already contained in the natural state itself. "The implicit constitutes"<sup>135</sup> the immediate; but because the implicit being of human being is spirit, humanity in its immediacy is already involved in stepping forth from immediacy, in falling away from it, from its implicit being. Here lies the basis for the second proposition: *humanity is by nature evil*; its implicit being, its natural being, is what is evil. In the natural being of humanity, the deficiency is directly present. Because human being is spirit, it is distinguished from its implicit being and *is* the cleavage.<sup>136</sup> When humanity exists only according to nature [*nur nach der Natur ist*], it is evil. The way humanity is implicitly, or according to its concept, is of course what we refer to abstractly as humanity "according to nature"; but concretely the person who follows passions and instincts, and remains within the sphere of desire, the one whose law is that of natural immediacy, is the natural human being. At the same time, a human being in the natural state is one who wills, and since the content of the natural will is only instinct and inclination, this person is evil. From the formal point of view, since the natural human being has volition and will, | it is not an animal any more; but the content and purposes of its volition are still natural. It is from this standpoint—obviously the higher standpoint—that humanity is evil by nature; and it is evil just because it is a natural thing.

What we vacuously represent to ourselves, in taking the original condition of the human being to have been the state of innocence, is the state of nature, the animal state. Humanity ought not to be innocent [in this sense], it ought not to be brutish; insofar as human being is good, it ought not to be so in the sense that a natural thing is good. Rather it is up to its responsibility [*Schuld*], its will, to be good—it ought to be *imputable*. Responsibility means, in a general sense, the possibility of imputation. The good person is good by and through his will, and hence in virtue of his responsibility. Innocence [*Unschuld*] means to be without a will—without indeed being evil, but also at the same time without being good. Natural

135. *Thus L, W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> reads:* The implicit and the natural state constitute

136. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* In the natural state, one-sidedness is directly present.

things and animals are all good, but this kind of goodness cannot be attributed to humanity.<sup>137</sup>

What is absolutely required is that human being should not persist as a natural will, a natural essence. It is simultaneously possessed of consciousness, to be sure, but as human being it can still be essentially natural inasmuch as the natural constitutes the purpose, content, and definition of its volition. We must look at this definition more closely: the human being is human as a subject, and as a natural subject it is *this* single individual; the will involved is this singular will, and it is fulfilled with the content of its singularity. This means that natural humanity is selfish. But we demand of one who is called good that he should at least be guided by general principles and laws. Strictly speaking, the naturalness of the will is the selfishness of the will; in its naturalness, the will is private, distinguished from the universality of willing and opposed to the rationality of the will that has been cultivated into universality.

So whenever we consider what humanity is implicitly, the deficiency of implicit being is directly involved. But the fact that, insofar as its will is natural, humanity is evil, does not annul the other side, the fact that it is implicitly good, which always remains part of its concept. Humanity, however, is reflection and consciousness, | and therefore it engages in the process of distinguishing; for this reason it is something actual, a "this," a subject, distinct from its concept. And since this subject exists to begin with *only* in a state of distinction and has not yet returned to unity, to the identity of subjectivity and the concept, to rationality, the actuality that it has is the natural actuality that is selfishness. The condition of evil directly presupposes the relation of actuality to the concept; this simply posits the contradiction between implicit being or the concept and singularity, the contradiction between good and evil. This is the antithesis that is our first topic of inquiry. It is false to ask whether humanity is only good by nature or only evil. That is a false way of posing the question. In the same way, it is superficial to say that

137. *L* (1827?) adds, similar in *W*: Insofar as one is good, one should be so by means of one's will.

humanity is both good and evil equally. Implicitly, according to its concept, human being is good; but this implicitness is a one-sidedness, and the one-sidedness is marked by the fact that the actual subject, the “this,” is only a natural will. Thus both of them, both good and evil, are posited, but essentially in contradiction, in such a way that each of them presupposes the other. It is not that only one of them is [there], but instead we have both of them in this relation of being opposed to each other.

This is the first fundamental definition, the essential determination of the concept [of natural humanity].

c. *The Story of the Fall*<sup>138</sup>

This accordingly is the mode and manner of the shape in which this conceptual determination appears representationally as a story and is represented for consciousness in an intuitable or sensible mode, so that it is regarded as something that *happened*. It is the familiar story in Genesis. The gist of it is that God created human beings in his own image: this is the concept of the human being.<sup>139</sup> Humankind lived in Paradise; we can call it a zoological garden. This life is called the state of innocence. The story says, too, that

138. [Ed.] In the 1827 lectures, the discussion of the story of the fall (Gen. 3) is not simply appended at the end of the treatment of differentiation and natural humanity, as in the *Ms.* and the 1824 lectures. Rather it is integrated as the representational, storylike version of what has just been treated conceptually. This then enables Hegel to conclude the entire discussion of differentiation with the conceptual insight that it is humanity’s cognitive capacity—specifically the knowledge of good and evil—that gives rise to estrangement (or cleavage) and hence to evil (Sec. d). A smooth transition is then provided from the fact of estrangement to the need for reconciliation, which is taken up in Sec. B.2.

In this section and the next, the term *Erkenntnis* is translated as “knowledge” rather than as “cognition” when the reference is to such familiar expressions as “the tree of knowledge” or “the knowledge of good and evil.” Also in these sections Hegel customarily uses the term *Entzweiung* (“cleavage,” “rupture,” etc.) instead of *Entfremdung* (“estrangement,” “alienation”). The terms are virtually synonymous since to be “split” or “cloven” within oneself is to exist in a state of estrangement or self-alienation. We have maintained the terminological distinction, although in the present context “estrangement” could be a more idiomatic rendering of *Entzweiung*.

139. *L* (1827?) adds: This concept is now represented as something that also has being.

the tree of the knowledge of good and evil stood in Paradise, and that human beings disobeyed God's command by eating of it. On the one hand, it is formally set down that this eating was the transgression of a commandment. The content, however, is the essential thing, namely, that the sin consisted in having eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and | in this connection there comes about the pretense of the serpent that humanity will be like God when it has the knowledge of good and evil.

It is said, then, that human beings have eaten of this tree. It is clear, as far as the content is concerned, that the fruit is an outward image—it belongs only to the sensible portrayal. What it really means is that humanity has elevated itself to the knowledge of good and evil; and this cognition, this distinction, is the source of evil, is evil itself. Being evil is located in the act of cognition, in consciousness. And certainly, as we already said earlier,<sup>140</sup> being evil resides in cognitive knowledge; cognition is the source of evil. For cognition or consciousness means in general a judging or dividing, a self-distinguishing within oneself. Animals have no consciousness, they are unable to make distinctions within themselves, they have no free being-for-self in the face of objectivity generally. The cleavage,<sup>141</sup> however, is what is evil; it is the contradiction. It contains the two sides: good and evil. Only in this cleavage is evil contained, and hence it is itself evil. Therefore it is entirely correct to say that good and evil are first to be found in consciousness.

The first human being is represented as having brought about this fall. Here again we have this sensible mode of expression. From the point of view of thought, the expression "the first human being" signifies "humanity in itself" or "humanity as such"—not some single, contingent individual, not one among many, but the absolutely first one, humanity according to its concept. Human being

140. [Ed.] This cross-reference has probably been inserted into the text by Lasson in order to camouflage the repetition of the corresponding passage in the *Ms.*

141. [Ed.] Hegel here draws upon the etymological similarity between the terms *Entzweierung* ("cleavage," "division into two" [*Ent-zwei-ung*]) and *Urteil* ("judgment," "primal division" [*Ur-teil*]). Because knowledge or cognition (*Erkenntnis*) entails an act of judgment, it issues in division, cleavage, and estrangement; and because evil is "contained" in the cleavage, knowledge is the source of evil.

as such is conscious being; it is precisely for that reason that humanity enters into this cleavage, into the consciousness that, when it is further specified, is cognition. But inasmuch as universal humanity is represented as a first man, he is represented as distinguished from others. Hence the question arises: if there is only one who has done this, how is that deed transmitted to others? Here the notion of an inheritance of sin that is passed on to all others comes into play. By this means the deficiency involved in viewing humanity as such representationally as a first man is corrected. The one-sidedness involved in representing the cleavage belonging to the concept of human being generally as the act of a single individual is absorbed by this notion of a communicated or inherited sin.

226 Neither the original representation | nor the correction are really necessary; for it is humanity as a whole that, as consciousness, enters into this cleavage.

But in the same way as this cleavage is the source of evil, it is also the midpoint of the conversion that consciousness contains within itself whereby this cleavage is also sublated.<sup>142</sup> The story reports that an alien creature, the serpent, seduced humanity by the pretense that, if one knows how to distinguish good and evil, one will become like God. In this way the story represents the fact that humanity's deed springs from the evil principle. However, the confirmation of the fact that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to the divinity of humanity is placed on the lips of God himself.<sup>143</sup> God himself says: "Behold, Adam has become like one of us" [Gen. 3:22]. So the words of the serpent were no deception. This is customarily overlooked along the lines of the ingrained prejudice to the effect that this is an irony of God,<sup>144</sup> that God has made a joke.<sup>145</sup>

142. *L* (1827?) adds: The highest cleavage, the distinction between good and evil (good as such by definition exists only in contrast with evil, and evil only in contrast with good), is certainly cognitive knowledge; and human being as such, as spirit, eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

143. *In B's margin*: 6 August 1827

144. [Ed.] See above, 1824 lectures, n. 117.

145. *L* (1827?) adds: However, what distinguishes human being as human, as spirit, is precisely cognition and cleavage.

Labor and the childbearing of woman are then declared to be the punishment for sin [Gen. 3:16–19]. In general, this is a necessary consequence. The animal does not labor, or it does so only when compelled, and not by nature; it does not eat its bread in the sweat of its brow or produce its own bread, but rather finds the satisfaction of all its needs directly in nature. Human beings, too, find the material for their satisfaction in nature, but this material is, so to speak, the least important element for them; the infinite provision for the satisfaction of their needs occurs only through labor. Labor done in the sweat of one's brow, or bodily work, and the labor of the spirit, which is the harder of the two, are immediately connected with the knowledge of good and evil. That humanity must make itself what it is, that it must produce and eat bread in the sweat of its brow, belongs to what is most essential and distinctive about it and coheres necessarily with the knowledge of good and evil.

The story further depicts a second tree, a tree of life, that stood in Paradise. God wanted to drive Adam out [of Paradise (Gen. 3:22–23)], so that he would not be immortal. This, too, is expressed in a simple, childlike image. For the wishes of human beings, there are two ~directions.<sup>146</sup> One line is directed toward living in undisturbed happiness, in harmony with oneself and external nature; it is the animals that remain in this unity, while humanity has to pass beyond it. The other line answers rather to the wish to live eternally. And the representation of the tree of life is formed in accord with ~this latter wish.<sup>147</sup> When we consider it more closely, it is directly evident that this is only a childlike representation. Human being as a single living thing, its singular life, its natural life, must die.<sup>148</sup> So on the one hand, it is said that human beings in Paradise and without sin would be immortal; they would be able to live forever.<sup>149</sup> For, if outward death were only a consequence

146. *Thus L; W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads: branches. W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads: types of good.*

147. *Thus An; B reads: the wish. L reads: these two wishes. W reads: these wishes.*

148. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* But when the story is viewed more closely, this is seen to be the wondrous aspect of it, the self-contradictory aspect.

149. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* (In this story, immortality on earth and immortality of the soul are not separate.)

of sin, then humanity in Paradise would be implicitly immortal. On the other hand, however, it is also said that human beings will become immortal for the first time when they have eaten of the tree of life—but it cannot be assumed that they would have eaten of the tree of life without sin, for this was forbidden them.

228 The fact of the matter is that humanity is immortal only through cognitive knowledge,<sup>150</sup> for only in the activity of thinking is its soul pure and free rather than mortal and animallike. Cognition and thought are the root of human life, of human immortality as a totality within itself. The animal soul is submerged in corporeality, while spirit is a totality within itself. This is the first point that is represented.

#### *d. Knowledge, Estrangement, and Evil*

The second point is that the view we have grasped as essential in [the realm of] thought should become actual in humanity as such—i.e., that human beings should realize the infinity of this antithesis between good and evil within themselves, and that as natural beings they should *know* themselves to be evil in their naturalness. They should become conscious of this antithesis<sup>151</sup> within themselves and know that they are the ones who are evil. But it also pertains to this that evil at the same time refers to the good, that there is present [along with evil] the demand of the good, of being good, and that one becomes aware of this contradiction, undergoing anguish because of it, because of this cleavage. We have encountered the form of this antithesis in all religions. But the antithesis to the power of nature, to the ethical law, the ethical will, and ethical life, or to fate—these are all subordinate antitheses that contain only “something”<sup>152</sup> particular. The person who violates a commandment is evil, but only in this particular case; he stands in opposition to this particular commandment. In the Parsee religion,<sup>153</sup> we saw that

150. [Ed.] See Fragment 3 from Michelet.

151. *Thus L; W<sub>2</sub> adds:* not only in general but of it

152. *Thus L, W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* the antithesis to something

153. [Ed.] The religion of Persia, or Zoroastrianism.

good and evil, light and darkness, stand in universal antithesis to each other. There, however, the antithesis is *external* to human beings, and they themselves are outside it. This abstract antithesis is not present within them.

It is therefore required that ~humanity should comprehend this abstract antithesis *within* itself.~<sup>154</sup> It is not that one has transgressed this or that commandment, but rather that one is intrinsically evil—universally evil, purely and simply evil in one's innermost being.<sup>155</sup> This evil character is the essential definition of one's concept: this is what one must bring to consciousness. It is with this depth that we are concerned. Depth means abstraction | —the pure universalization of the antithesis so that its two sides attain this wholly universal specification vis-à-vis each other.

Speaking generally, this antithesis has now two forms. On the one hand, it is the antithesis of evil as such, the fact that it is humanity itself that is evil: this is the *antithesis vis-à-vis God*. On the other hand, it is the *antithesis vis-à-vis the world*, the fact that humanity exists in a state of rupture from the world: this is unhappiness or misery, the cleavage viewed from the other side.

We have first to consider the relation of the cleavage to one of the extremes, namely, to God. It is an aspect of there being the need for universal reconciliation in humanity—and this means divine, absolute reconciliation—that the antithesis has attained this infinite degree, that this universality [of evil] encompasses the innermost being, that nothing remains outside this antithesis, and that therefore the antithesis is not something particular. This is the deepest depth. Human beings are inwardly conscious that in their innermost being they are a contradiction, and have therefore an infinite *anguish* concerning themselves. Anguish is present only where there is opposition to what ought to be, to an affirmative. What is no longer in itself an affirmative also has no contradiction, no anguish.

154. *Thus L; W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads:* humanity should overcome this abstract antithesis. *W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* humanity should have this abstract antithesis within itself and should overcome it.

155. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* evil in one's core.

Anguish is precisely the element of negativity in the affirmative, meaning that within itself the affirmative is self-contradictory and wounded. This anguish is thus one moment of evil. Evil merely on its own account is an abstraction; it is only in antithesis to the good, and since it is present in the unity of the subject, the latter is split, and this cleavage is infinite anguish. If the consciousness of the good, the infinite demand of the good, is not likewise present in the subject itself, in its innermost being, then no anguish is present and evil itself is only an empty nothingness, for it is only in this antithesis.

230 Evil and anguish can be infinite only when the good or God is known as *one* God, as a pure, spiritual God. It is only when the good is this pure unity, only when we have faith in *one* God, and only in connection with such a faith, that the negative can and must advance to this determination of evil and negation can advance to this universality. One side of this cleavage becomes apparent in this way, through the elevation of humanity to the pure, spiritual unity of God. This anguish and this consciousness are the condition of the absorption [*Vertiefung*] of humanity into itself, | and likewise into the negative moment of cleavage, of evil. This is ~an objective,~<sup>156</sup> inward absorption into evil; inward absorption of an affirmative kind is absorption into the pure unity of God.

At this point it is evident that humanity, I as a natural human being, ~do not correspond to~<sup>157</sup> what the truth is, but likewise the truth of the one good remains firmly fixed within me. This lack of correspondence is characterized as what ought not to be. The task and demand are infinite. One can say: Since I am a natural human being, I have, on the one hand, consciousness of myself, but on the other hand my natural being [*Natürlichkeit*] consists rather in a lack of consciousness with regard to myself, in being without a will. I am the sort of being that acts according to nature, and in this respect I am innocent, it is often said, having no consciousness

156. Thus *L*, *W*<sub>1</sub>; *W*<sub>2</sub> reads: a negative,

157. *L*, *W*<sub>1</sub> read: does not correspond to *Hu* reads: am unsuitable to *W*<sub>2</sub> reads: do not correspond to, and am caught in the many natural particularities [vis-à-vis]

of what I do, being without a will of my own, acting without inclination, allowing myself to be surprised by instinct. But *here*, in the antithesis that we have observed, the innocence disappears, for precisely the natural being of humanity, lacking in consciousness and will, is what ought not to be. In the face of the pure unity and perfect purity that I know as absolute truth, this natural being is declared to be evil. What has been said implies that<sup>158</sup> the absence of consciousness and will is to be considered as itself essentially evil. And thus the contradiction remains, no matter how one twists ~oneself<sup>159</sup> about. Since this so-called innocence is defined as evil, my lack of correspondence to my essence and to the absolute remains; and from one side or the other I know myself always as what ought not to be.

This is the relation to the one extreme, and the result, the more determinate mode of this anguish, is my humiliation, my remorse; I experience anguish because I as a natural being do not correspond to what at the same time I *know* to be my own essence, to what I should be in my own knowing and willing. |

Concerning the relation to the other extreme, the world, the separation appears as *unhappiness* [*Unglück*]—the fact that humanity is not satisfied in the world.<sup>160</sup> As natural beings, human beings are related to other natural beings, and others are related to them as powers [*Mächte*], and to this extent each is as contingent as the other. However, the higher requirements of humanity, those having to do with ethical life, are requirements and determinations of freedom. Insofar as these requirements, which are implicitly justified in the concept of humanity—for human beings know what is good, and the good is in them—do not find satisfaction in existence, in the external world, humanity is in a state of unhappiness.

It is this unhappiness that drives and presses human beings back into themselves; and since the fixed demand that the world should be rational is present within them but does not find fulfillment, they

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158. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* when we arrive at this point

159. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* it

160. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W:* Its natural needs have no further right or claim to satisfaction.

renounce the world, seeking happiness and satisfaction in the harmony of the self with itself. [The demand becomes] that they renounce the world and achieve the satisfaction of their happiness [in this inner harmony]. In order to achieve the harmony of their affirmative side with their determinate being, they give up the external world, transfer their happiness into themselves, and seek satisfaction within themselves.

~This element<sup>161</sup>—the anguish that comes from universality, from above—we saw in the Jewish people; it does not release me in my natural existence, in my empirical willing and knowing, from the infinite demands of absolute purity. The other form [of cleavage or estrangement], the being driven back into oneself by unhappiness, is the standpoint at which the Roman world arrived—the universal unhappiness of the world. We saw the formal inwardness that satisfies itself in the world ~as the dominion of God's purpose,<sup>162</sup> which is represented, intended, and known as a worldly dominion.

Each of these sides has its one-sidedness. The first may be described as the sensation | of ~humiliation;<sup>163</sup> the other is the abstract elevation of human being inwardly—the human being who is concentrated within himself—and hence it is Stoicism and Skepticism. The Stoic or Skeptic sage was directed back to himself and was supposed to be satisfied within himself. Through independence and rigid self-containment, he was supposed to find happiness and be in harmony with himself; in this abstract self-absorption, in the presence of [his own] self-conscious interiority; he was supposed to be at rest.

These are the highest, most abstract moments of all; here the antithesis is at its height, and both sides embrace the antithesis in its most complete universality—in the universal itself—and in its innermost essence, its greatest depth. But, as we have said, both

161. *Thus Hu, similar in An; L reads:* We already found these two forms of cleavage in the particular religions. *W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads:* We found these two forms: *W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* With respect to this demand and this unhappiness, we found these two forms:

162. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* [we saw] this dominion, the purpose of God,

163. *Thus Hu, W; L (Var) reads:* humility;

forms are one-sided. The first contains that anguish and abstract humiliation the crowning feature of which is the utter lack of correspondence between the subject and the universal, the cleavage or rupture that is not bridged, is not healed. This is the standpoint of the most abstract antithesis between the infinite on the one side and a fixed finitude on the other—and this finitude is abstract finitude. Here everything that is reckoned as belonging to me is simply evil. This abstraction finds its complement on the other side, namely in the process of internal thought; here we have the correspondence of self with self, [the claim] that I am satisfied, and can be satisfied within myself. This second form, however, is just as one-sided on its own account, because it comprises only the affirmative side, and indeed the one-sided affirmation of myself within myself. The contrition of the first side is only negative, lacking in self-affirmation; the second side is now supposed to be this pure affirmation, this self-satisfaction. But this satisfaction of myself within myself is only an abstract satisfaction; it occurs only by means of flight from the world and from actuality—by means of this inactivity. Since this is a flight from actuality, it is also a flight from *my* actuality—and indeed not from my external actuality, but from that of my own volition. The *actuality* of my volition—I as a specific subject, as a will filled with content—is no longer mine, but what remains for me is the *immediacy* of my self-consciousness. To be sure, the latter is completely abstract, but the final extremity of depth is contained therein, and “I have preserved it therein.”<sup>164</sup> It is not an abstraction from the abstract actuality within me or from my immediate self-consciousness, from the immediacy of my self-consciousness. On this side, therefore, affirmation is the predominant factor, but it does not include the negation of the one-sidedness of immediate being found on the other side; while on that side the negation is [itself] the one-sided factor. These two moments contain within themselves the need for a transition.

The concept of the preceding religions has refined itself into this

164. *Thus L; B reads:* and that which I have preserved for myself therein. *W (Var) reads:* I have preserved myself therein.

antithesis; and the fact that the antithesis has disclosed and presented itself as an actually existing need is expressed by the words, "When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son" [Gal. 4:4]. This means: the Spirit is at hand, the need for the Spirit that points the way to reconciliation.

## 2. Reconciliation

### a. *The Idea of Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual*

<sup>165</sup>The deepest need of spirit is that the antithesis within the subject itself should be intensified to its universal, i.e., its most abstract, extreme. This is the cleavage, the anguish that we have considered. That these two sides do not fall completely apart, but rather constitute a contradiction within the unity of the subject, demonstrates at the same time that the subject is the infinite power of unity: it can bear this contradiction. This is the formal, abstract, yet infinite energy of unity that it possesses. What satisfies this need is the consciousness of atonement, of the sublation, the nullification of the antithesis, so that the latter is not the truth. Rather, the truth is the attainment of unity through the negation of the antithesis; this is the peace, the reconciliation, that the need demands. Reconciliation is what is demanded by the need of the subject, and this exigency resides in the subject as infinite unity or as self-identity.

The sublation of the antithesis has two sides. First, the subject must become conscious of the fact that the antithetic opposites are not [things] in themselves, but that instead the truth, the inner nature [of spirit], consists in the sublatedness of the antithesis. Second, because the antithesis is implicitly and truthfully sublated, | the subject as such, in its being-for-itself, can reach and attain peace and reconciliation through the sublation of the antithesis.

That the antithesis is *implicitly* sublated constitutes the condition, the presupposition, the possibility that the subject should also sublate this antithesis *explicitly*. In this respect it may be said that the subject does not attain reconciliation on its own account, i.e., as this [single] subject and in virtue of its [own] activity or conduct;

165. *In B's margin: 7 August 1827*

reconciliation is not brought about, nor can it be brought about, by the subject in its way of conducting itself. The subject's activity consists only in positing, in doing, the one side. The other side is what is substantial and foundational, that without which there is no possibility of resolving the antithesis—namely, that implicitly this antithesis is not present. Put more precisely, the antithesis arises eternally and just as eternally sublates itself; there is at the same time eternal reconciliation. That this is the truth may be seen in the eternal, divine idea: God is the one who as living spirit distinguishes himself from himself, posits an other and in this other remains identical with himself, has in this other his identity with himself. This is the truth.

It is this truth that constitutes one side of what must come to consciousness in humanity, namely, the side that has substantial being in itself. This can be expressed more precisely as follows: the antithesis is incongruous in principle. The antithesis (or evil) is the natural state of human being and willing; it is human immediacy, which is precisely the modality of natural life. Along with immediacy, finitude is likewise posited, and this finitude or naturalness is incongruous with the universality of God, with the infinite, eternal idea, which is utterly free within itself and present to itself. This incongruity is the point of departure that constitutes the need [for reconciliation]. But the more precise determinacy [of it] is not that this incongruity of the two sides disappears for consciousness. The incongruity is [there], it resides in spirituality. Spirit is the process of self-differentiating, the positing of distinctions. If the distinctions are made, then in the respect that they are distinct they are not equal; they are distinct, not congruous with one another. *This* incongruity cannot disappear, for otherwise the judgment of spirit, its | vitality, would disappear, and it would cease to be spirit. It is rather the case that the two sides are not merely incongruous and that the identity of the two persists in spite of their incongruity. The other-being, the finitude, the weakness, the frailty of human nature is not to do any harm to that divine unity which forms the substance of reconciliation. That no harm is done has been seen in the divine idea. For the Son is other than the Father, and this otherness is difference—otherwise it would not be spirit. But the

other is [also] God and has the entire fullness of the divine nature within itself. The character of otherness in no way detracts from the fact that this other is the Son of God and therefore God.<sup>166</sup> This otherness is what eternally posits and eternally sublates itself; the self-positing and sublating of otherness is love or spirit.

Evil, the one side, has been abstractly defined as only the other, the finite, the negative, and God is placed on the other side as the good, the positive, the true. But this is not a true representation. For that which is negative and other also contains affirmation within itself. It must be brought to consciousness<sup>167</sup> that the principle of affirmation is contained within that negative, and that in the affirmative principle there lies the principle of identity with the other side—even as God, as truth, is not just abstract identity with himself, but on the contrary the other, negation, the positing of oneself otherwise, is God's own essential determination, and the proper determination of spirit. ~Hence this need could come to consciousness. This implicit being, this implicitly subsisting unity | of divine and human nature, must come to consciousness in infinite anguish—but only in accord with implicit being, with substantiality, so that finitude, weakness, and otherness can do no harm to the substantial unity of the two. Or expressed differently, the substantiality of the unity of divine | and human nature comes to consciousness for humanity in such a way that a human being<sup>168</sup> appears to consciousness as God, and God appears to it as a human being. This is ~the necessity and need<sup>169</sup> for such an appearance.

Furthermore, the consciousness of the absolute idea that we have in philosophy in the form of thinking<sup>170</sup> is to be brought forth not for the standpoint of philosophical speculation or speculative thinking but in the form of *certainty*. The necessity [that the divine-human unity shall appear] is not first apprehended by means of thinking; rather it is a certainty for humanity. In other words, this content—the unity of divine and human nature—achieves certainty,

236 237 166. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* nor does it detract from this other in human nature.

167. *Thus L, W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) adds:* within finite being

168. *Thus L, Hu; An adds:* (but not every human being)

169. *Thus L; W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads:* the necessity of this need

170. [Ed.] See *Science of Logic*, pp. 824–844 (GW 12:236–253).

obtaining the form of immediate sensible intuition and external existence for humankind, so that it appears as something that has been seen in the world, something that has been experienced. It is essential to this form of nonspeculative consciousness that it must be *before* us; it must essentially be *before* me—it must become a certainty for humanity. For it is only what exists in an immediate way, in inner or outer intuition, that is certain. In order for it [this divine-human unity] to become a certainty for humanity, *God had to appear in the world in the flesh* [cf. John 1:14]. The necessity that God [has] appeared in the world in the flesh is an essential characteristic—a necessary deduction from what has been said previously, demonstrated by it—for only in this way can it become a certainty for humanity; only in this way is it the truth in the form of certainty.

At the same time there is this more precise specification to be added, namely, that the unity of divine and human nature must appear in *just one human being*. Humanity in itself as such is the universal, or the thought of humanity.<sup>171</sup> From the present standpoint, however, it is not a question of the thought of humanity but of sensible certainty; thus it is just one human being in whom this unity is envisaged—humanity as singular, or in the determinacy of singularity and particularity. Moreover, it is not just a matter of singularity *in general*, for singularity in general is something universal once more. But from the present standpoint, singularity is not something universal; universal singularity is found in abstract thinking as such. Here, however, it is a question of the certainty of intuiting and sensing. The substantial unity [of God and humanity] is what humanity implicitly is; hence it is something that lies beyond immediate consciousness, beyond ordinary consciousness and knowledge. Hence it must stand over against subjective consciousness, which relates to itself as ordinary consciousness and is defined as such. That is exactly why the unity in question must appear for others as a singular human being set apart; it is not present in the others, but only in one from whom all the others are excluded.

171. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* The unity of divine and human nature, humanity in its universality, is the thought of humanity. *W<sub>2</sub> (Var) adds:* and the idea of absolute spirit, which has being in and for itself.

—Thus this one stands over against the others as what humanity implicitly is—a single individual [who is there] as the soil of certainty.”<sup>172</sup> |

Thus there are two conditions for this appearance. The first is that consciousness can achieve this content, this substantial unity, the consciousness of which is given and which is its reconciliation. The second condition is the consciousness of the determinate form of this exclusive singularity.”<sup>173</sup>

172. *Thus L, which reads in German: So ist er ihnen drüber als das Ansich und ein Einzelner als Boden der Gewissheit. W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads: Thus it [es (the unity?)] stands over against the others as what humanity implicitly is—singularity on the soil of certainty. Hu reads: For only in this way does this one become what stands over there [das Drüber] for the intuition of human beings. W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads: —but no longer as what implicitly is [das Ansich], which is over there [das drüber ist], but as singularity on the soil of certainty.*

173. *W<sub>1</sub>, and in part also W<sub>2</sub>, transmit a parallel to this passage from the 1831 lectures. The text below follows W<sub>1</sub>, but the passages contained in W<sub>2</sub> in somewhat fuller form are also given. W<sub>1</sub> (1831) reads: The one mode of revelation that leads as a whole to the elevation [of spirit], whose general characteristics we have considered earlier, is revelation by way of nature and the world. The other mode is the higher one and occurs through finite spirit. This is what first displays the interest of the standpoint at which we now find ourselves. Divinity is recognized by finite human beings in what is objectively available to intuition, sensibility, and immediate consciousness.*

This is the appearance of God in the flesh. God should be known as being for other, for humanity, and the human is an intuiting and sensing being—this singular human being. The possibility of reconciliation is present only when the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is known. Human beings can know themselves to be taken up into God only when God is not something alien to them, only when they are not merely an extrinsic accident upon God's nature, but rather when they are taken up into God in accordance with their essence and freedom. The implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature must be revealed to humanity in an objective way; this is what happened through the incarnation of God.

W<sub>2</sub> reads: The possibility of reconciliation resides only in the fact that the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is known; this is the necessary foundation. Human beings can know themselves to be taken up into God inasmuch as God is not something alien to them and they are not related to him as an extrinsic accident [W<sub>1</sub> reads: as something extrinsic]—[i.e.,] when they are taken up into God in accordance with their essence, their freedom and subjectivity [W<sub>1</sub> reads: when they are subjects in God in accordance with their essence and freedom]. But this is possible only in virtue of the fact that this subjectivity of human nature is [present] within God himself. W<sub>1</sub> continues: and the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature is [there] for them when God appears as human. Similarly, in a quite inferior form we have seen the incarnations of the Hindu deities, the Dalai Lama, and Buddha—[these are] human beings revered as deities. Among the Greeks there

In the church Christ has been called the “God-man.” This is a monstrous compound, which directly contradicts both representation and understanding. But what has thereby been brought into human consciousness and made a certainty for it is the unity of divine and human nature, implying that the otherness, or, as we also say, the finitude, weakness, and frailty of human nature, does not damage this unity, just as otherness does not impair the unity

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is even a human being, Heracles, who swings himself up into heaven through his bravery and his deeds, and is received among the gods. All this is quite different from what we have before us at this point; but all the same the impulsion toward this way of determining the implicitly subsisting unity is unmistakable. The form is still quite inferior, to be sure: in Hindu pantheism, substance dons only the mask of subjectivity, for it does not attain to actual, free subjectivity.

*W<sub>2</sub> reads:* This determination, namely, that God becomes human [*dass Gott Mensch wird*], and consequently that finite spirit has the consciousness of God within the finite itself, is the most difficult moment of religion. According to a common representation, which we find among the ancients especially,<sup>a</sup> the spirit or soul has been relegated to this world as something alien; this indwelling [of the soul] in the body, and this singularization to [the limit of] individuality, are held to be a degradation of spirit. This is what characterizes the purely material side, or immediate existence, as untrue. But on the other hand immediate existence is at the same time an essential determination; it is where spirit is sharpened to a final point in its subjectivity. Human beings have spiritual interests and are spiritually active; they can feel that they are hindered in exercising these interests and activities because they feel that they are physically dependent and must make provision for their sustenance etc. Thus they fall away from their spiritual interests because of their bondage to nature. But the moment of immediate existence is contained within spirit itself; it is [logically] characteristic of spirit to advance to this moment. Natural life is not merely an external necessity; on the contrary, spirit as subject, in its infinite relatedness to itself, has the [logical] character of immediacy in it. Now, inasmuch as it is to be revealed to humanity what the nature of spirit is, and the nature of God is to become manifest in the entire development of the idea, this form [of immediacy] must also be present here, and this is precisely the form of finitude. The divine must appear in the form of immediacy. This immediate presence is only the presence of the spiritual in its spiritual shape, i.e., in the human shape. In no other way is this appearance genuine—not, for instance, the appearance of God in the burning bush [Exod. 3:2 ff.], and the like. God appears as a single person to whose immediacy all [the usual] physical needs are attached. In Hindu pantheism a countless number of incarnations occur; but there subjectivity, the human being, is only an accidental form in God; it is only a mask that substance adopts and exchanges in contingent fashion. As spirit, on the other hand, God contains the moment of subjectivity and uniqueness in himself; his appearance, therefore, can only be a single one, it can take place only once.

[Ed.] <sup>a</sup>Hegel is referring to Gnostic representations of the imprisonment of the spirit and soul in matter, with which he was familiar through Neander's *Gnostische Systeme* (on Basilides, see pp. 36–37; on Valentinus, pp. 106–107).

that God is in the eternal idea. It is the appearance of a human being in sensible presence; God in sensible presence can take no other shape than that of human being. In the sensible and mundane order, only the human is spiritual; so if the spiritual is to have a sensible shape, it must be a human shape.

*b. The Historical, Sensible Presence of Christ*

This ~appearance of the God-man<sup>174</sup> has to be viewed from two different perspectives at once. First, he is a human being in accord with his external circumstances. This is the nonreligious perspective [*die irreligiöse Betrachtung*] in which he appears as an ordinary human being. Second, there is the perspective that occurs in the Spirit or with the Spirit. Spirit presses toward its truth because it has an infinite cleavage and anguish within itself. It wills the truth; the need of the truth and the certainty thereof it will have, and must have. Here for the first time we have ~the religious view [*das Religiöse*].<sup>175</sup> |

When Christ is viewed in the same light as Socrates, then he is regarded as an ordinary human being, just as in Islam he is regarded as a messenger of God in the general sense that all great men are messengers of God.<sup>176</sup> If one says no more of Christ than that he is a teacher of humanity, a martyr to the truth, one is not adopting ~the religious standpoint;<sup>177</sup> one ~says<sup>178</sup> no more of him than of Socrates. But there is this human side of Christ too—his appearance as a living human being—and we shall mention briefly its moments.

The first moment is that he is *immediately a human being* in all the external contingencies, in all the temporal exigencies and conditions, that this entails. He is born like every other human being,

174. *Thus L; Hu, An* reads: appearance *W (Var)* reads: historical appearance

175. *Thus L, Hu; An* reads: the religious perspective [*religiöse Betrachtung*].

*W (1831)* reads: the genuine perspective in religion. These two sides are to be distinguished here—the immediate perspective and that of faith. Through faith we know that this individual has a divine nature, and in that way the “beyondness” of God is superseded [*Durch den Glauben wird dieses Individuum als von göttlicher Natur gewusst, wodurch das Jenseits Gottes aufgehoben werde*].

176. [Ed.] See above, 1824 lectures, n. 215.

177. *Thus L, Hu; W (Var)* reads: the Christian standpoint, that of the true religion;

178. *Hu* reads: speaks

and as a human he has the needs of other human beings; only he does not share the corruption, the passions, and the evil inclinations of the others, nor is he involved in particular worldly interests, along with which integrity and teaching may also find a place. Rather he lives only for the truth, only for its proclamation; his activity consists solely in completing the higher consciousness of humanity.<sup>179</sup>

Thus the second moment is that of his teaching office.<sup>180</sup> The question now is this: "How can, how must this teaching be constituted?" This original teaching cannot be constituted in a manner similar to the later doctrine of the church; it must have its own distinctive aspects, which in the church<sup>181</sup> partly take on another character and are partly set aside.<sup>182</sup> Once the community is established, once the kingdom of God has attained its determinate being and its actuality, these teachings are either interpreted in other ways or else they fall by the wayside.<sup>183</sup> |

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Since what is at issue is the consciousness of absolute reconciliation, we are here in the presence of a new consciousness of humanity, or a new religion. Through it a new world is constituted, a new actuality, a different world-condition, because [humanity's] outward determinate being, [its] natural existence, now has religion as its substantiality. This is the aspect that is negative and polemical, being opposed to the subsistence of externality in the consciousness<sup>184</sup> of humanity. The new religion expresses itself precisely as a new consciousness, the consciousness of a reconciliation of

179. *Thus L, similar in An; W<sub>1</sub> (1831) adds:* This affords an intuition of what is available for the community. It is available at the same time in a sensuous way, and to this extent it is an emptying out [*Entäusserung*] of the divine, of the idea, which has to annul itself.

180. *Thus L, similar in An; W (1831) reads:* The teaching of Christ also belongs on this human side.

181. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* in necessary fashion

182. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* As this immediate teaching, Christ's teaching cannot be Christian dogmatics, cannot be the doctrine of the church.

183. *Thus L; W<sub>1</sub> (1831) adds:* The primitive [*unmittelbare*] Christian teaching arouses sensibilities by means of representation. Its content, which at the highest level is explication of the nature of God, is [directed] precisely at sensible consciousness and comes to the latter as intuition, not doctrine, which has the concept as its form—this only became necessary in the church later on when science began.

184. *Thus Hu; W (Var) adds:* and faith

humanity with God. This reconciliation, expressed as a state of affairs, is the kingdom of God, an actuality.<sup>185</sup> The souls and hearts [of individuals] are reconciled with God, and thus it is God who rules in the heart and has attained dominion.

This kingdom of God, the new religion, thus contains implicitly the characteristic of negating the present world. This is its polemical aspect, its revolutionary attitude toward all the determinate aspects of that outer world, [all the settled attitudes] of human consciousness and belief.<sup>186</sup> So what is at issue is the drawing of those who are to achieve the consciousness of reconciliation away from present actuality, requiring of them an abstraction from it. The new religion is itself still concentrated and does not actually exist as a community, but has its vitality rather in that energy which constitutes the sole, eternal interest of its adherents who have to fight and struggle in order to achieve this for themselves, because it is not yet coherent with the world consciousness and is not yet in harmony with the condition of the world.

Hence the first emergence of this religion directly contains this polemical aspect. It poses the demand that one should remove oneself <sup>242</sup> from finite things<sup>187</sup> | and elevate oneself to an infinite energy for which all other bonds are to become matters of indifference, for which all other bonds—indeed, all things hitherto regarded as ethical and right—are to be set aside. Thus Christ says: “Who is my mother, who are my brothers? Whoever does the will of God is my mother, [my] sister, and [my] brother.” Or: “Follow me! Leave the dead to bury the dead. Go forth and proclaim the kingdom of God.” “I have not come to bring peace on earth, but rather children will leave their parents and follow me.”<sup>188</sup>

185. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* in which God rules.

186. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W:* The previous [state of things] is now altered; the way things used to be, the previous condition of religion and the world, cannot continue as before.

187. *Thus L, W; An reads:* from worldliness *Hu reads:* from the world *B reads:* from worldly, earthly thought

188. [Ed.] Here Hegel conflates and quotes loosely from Matt. 12:48, 50; Mark 3:33–34; Luke 9:59–60; Matt. 8:21–22; and Matt. 10:34–38. The last clause (“but rather children will leave . . .”) is not found in any of the Gospels but may be inferred from Matt. 10:35–38. These quotations are found in the extant sources rather than *L*, which at this point interpolates 1824 text in place of 1827.

We see here a polemical attitude expressed against the ethical relationships that have hitherto prevailed. These are all teachings and characteristics that belong to its first appearance, when the new religion constitutes the sole interest [of its adherents], which they were bound to believe they were still in danger of losing. This is the one side.

This renunciation, surrender, and setting aside of all vital interests and moral bonds is an essential characteristic of the concentrated manifestation of the truth, a characteristic that subsequently loses its importance when the truth has achieved a secure existence. ~ Beyond that<sup>189</sup> is the proclamation of the kingdom of God. Humanity must transpose itself into this kingdom<sup>190</sup> in such a way as to cast itself immediately upon this truth. This is expressed with the purest, most colossal boldness, as, for example, at the beginning of the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the [poor] in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of God. Blessed are the pure in heart, [for] they shall see God" [Matt. 5:3, 8].<sup>191</sup> |

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<sup>192</sup> Nothing is said about any mediation through which this elevation [of soul] may come to pass for humanity; rather what is spoken of is this immediate being, this immediate self-transposition into the truth, into the kingdom of God. It is to this kingdom, to this intellectual, spiritual world, that humanity ought to belong.

With respect to details, there are more specific teachings, among which the teaching about love constitutes a focal point: ~ "Love your neighbor as yourself" [Matt. 22:39].<sup>193</sup> But these teachings are already found in the Old Testament [cf. Deut. 6:5; Lev. 19:18].<sup>194</sup>

189. *Thus Hu; L, W<sub>1</sub> read: It W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* Beyond that, in the affirmative sphere,

190. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* as the kingdom of love for God

191. *W (1831) adds:* Words like these are among the greatest that have ever been uttered; they are an ultimate focus that annuls every superstition, every bondage on the part of human beings. It is of the highest importance that, by means of Luther's translation of the Bible, a folk-book has been placed in the hands of the people, a book in which the heart, the spirit, can find itself at home in the highest, infinite fashion; in Catholic lands there is in this respect a great lack. There [in Protestant regions?] the Bible is the means of deliverance from all servitude of spirit.

192. *In B's margin: 8 August 1827*

193. *Thus Hu; W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads:* "Love God above all and your neighbor as yourself" [cf. Matt. 22:37-39].

194. *Thus Hu, similar in B; W<sub>1</sub> (1831/Var?) adds:* What can be regarded as

Thus the following [distinctive] moment or determinate aspect enters into these teachings. Because the demand, "Seek first . . ." <sup>195</sup>—[i.e.,] cast yourself upon the truth—is expressed so directly, it emerges almost as a subjective declaration, and to this extent the person of the teacher comes into view. Christ speaks not merely as a teacher, who expounds on the basis of his own subjective insight and who is aware of what he is saying and doing, but rather as a prophet. He is the one who, because his demand is immediate, expresses it immediately from God, and God speaks it through him. His having this life of the Spirit in the truth, so that it is simply there without mediation, expresses itself prophetically in such a way that it is God who says it. It is a matter of the absolute, divine truth that has being in and for itself, and of its expression and intention; and the confirmation of this expression is envisaged as God's doing. It is the consciousness of the real unity of the divine will and of his harmony with it. In the form of this expression, however, the accent is laid upon the fact that the one who says this is at the same time essentially human. It is the Son of Man who speaks thus, in whom this expression, this activity of what subsists in and for itself, is essentially the work of God—not as something suprahuman that appears in the shape of an external revelation, but rather as [God's] working in a human being, so that the divine presence is essentially identical with this human being. |

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We still have to consider the fate of this individual, namely, that he became, humanly speaking, a martyr to the truth in a way that coheres closely with his earlier role, because the establishment of the kingdom of God stands in stark contradiction to the worldly

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moral commandments are [found] partly in other religions and partly in the Jewish religion.

195. [Ed.] See Matt. 6:33: "Seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well." The phrase that follows ("Cast yourself upon the truth"), while appearing to be a saying of Jesus, is in fact found nowhere in the Gospels. Hegel may have had in mind a saying such as that found in Luke 16:16 ("The law and the prophets were until John; since then the good news of the kingdom of God is preached, and everyone enters it violently"), or John 16:13 ("When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth"); but more likely it is intended as Hegel's interpretation of what it *means* to seek and to enter the kingdom of God (see the preceding two paragraphs).

authority [*vorhandenen Staate*], which is grounded upon another mode, a different determinate form, of religion.

These are the principal moments in the <sup>~</sup> appearance of this man, upon the human view of it. But this is only one side, and it is not a religious view.<sup>~196</sup> |

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196. *Thus L; W (1831) reads:* human appearance [W, *reads:* teaching] of Christ. This teacher gathered friends about him. Inasmuch as his teachings were revolutionary, Christ was accused and executed, and thus he sealed the truth of his teaching by his death. Even unbelief can go this far in [the view it takes of] this story: it is quite similar to that of Socrates, only on a different soil. Socrates, too, brought inwardness to consciousness; his δαιμόνιον is nothing other than this. He also taught that humanity must not stop short at obedience to ordinary authority but must form convictions for itself and act according to them. Here we have two similar individualities with similar fates. The inwardness of Socrates was contrary to the religious beliefs of his people as well as to their form of government, and hence he was put to death: he, too, died for the truth.

Christ happened to live among another people, and to this extent his teaching has a different hue. But the kingdom of heaven and the purity of heart contain, nonetheless, an infinitely greater depth than the inwardness of Socrates. This is the outward history of Christ, which is for unbelief just what the history of Socrates is for us.

With the death of Christ, however, the reversal of consciousness begins. The death of Christ is the midpoint upon which consciousness turns; and in the comprehension of it lies the difference between outward comprehension and that of faith, which entails contemplation with the Spirit, from the Spirit of truth, the Holy Spirit. According to the comparison made earlier, Christ is a human being like Socrates, a teacher who lived his life virtuously, and who brought humanity to the awareness of what the truth really is and of what must constitute the basis of human consciousness. But the higher view is that the divine nature has been revealed in Christ. This consciousness is reflected in those often-quoted passages which state that the Son knows the Father, etc.—sayings which of themselves have at the outset a certain generality about them and which exegesis can draw out into the arena of universal views, but which faith comprehends in their truth through an interpretation of the death of Christ. For faith is essentially the consciousness of absolute truth, of what God is in and for himself. But we have already seen what God is in and for himself: he is this life-process, the Trinity, in which the universal places itself over against itself and therein remains identical with itself. God, in this element of eternity, is the conjoining of himself with himself, the closure of himself with himself. Only faith comprehends and is conscious of the fact that in Christ this truth, which has being in and for itself, is envisaged in its process, and that through him this truth has been revealed for the first time.

[Ed.] On the *daimonion* (“genius” or “demon”) of Socrates, see esp. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.7–9; Plato, *Apology* 10–14; also Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 421–425 (cf. *Werke* 14:94–101). On the comparison of Socrates and Christ, see above, 1824 lectures, n. 215. On the conclusion to the note, see Fragment 1 from Michelet.

*c. The Death of Christ and the Transition to Spiritual Presence*

It is this second view that leads us for the first time into the religious sphere as such, where the divine itself is an essential moment. Among those friends and acquaintances who were taught by Christ, there was present this presentiment, this representation, this desire for a new kingdom, a new heaven and a new earth, a new world. This hope and certainty penetrated the actuality of their hearts and became entrenched there. But the suffering and death of Christ superseded his human relationships, and it is precisely in his death that the transition into the religious sphere occurs.<sup>197</sup> On the one hand it is a natural death, brought about by injustice, hatred, and violence.

But in the hearts and souls [of believers] is the firm [belief] that the issue is not a moral teaching, nor in general the thinking and willing of the subject within itself and from itself; rather what is of interest is an infinite relationship to God, to the present God, the certainty of the kingdom of God—finding satisfaction not in morality, ethics, or conscience, but rather in that than which nothing is higher, <sup>198</sup> the relationship to God himself. All other modes of satisfaction involve the fact that they are still qualities of a subordinate kind, and thus the relationship to God remains a relationship to something above and beyond, which in no sense lies present at hand.

The defining characteristic of this kingdom of God is the *presence of God*, which means that the members of this kingdom are expected to have not only a love for humanity but also the consciousness that God | is love. This is precisely to say that God is present, that his presence must exist as one's own feeling, as self-feeling. The kingdom of God, God's presentness, is this determination [of one's feeling]; so the certainty of God's presentness belongs to it. But since the kingdom is on the one hand [present] in need or feeling [on the part of the subject], the latter must, on the other hand, distinguish itself from it, must establish a distinction between this

197. *L adds:* it is the meaning of or the way of comprehending this death. *W (Var) adds:* It is a question of the meaning of, of the way of comprehending, this death.

198. *Thus L; W<sub>1</sub> (Var) reads:* relationship *W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* absolute relationship

presence of God and itself, but in such a way that this presence remains certain to it, and this certainty can here occur only in the mode of sensible appearance. <sup>199</sup> Because this is how the content

199. *W<sub>1</sub> here contains a lengthy passage from the 1831 lectures, which is also found in W<sub>2</sub>, although dispersed into several disconnected segments. Our text follows the order of W<sub>1</sub>, which is also confirmed by S, but the wording is that of W<sub>2</sub>. The parallel in the main text follows, ending with the penultimate paragraph of this section. W<sub>2</sub> (1831) reads:*

We have seen God as the God of free humanity, though still at first in the subjective, limited forms of the folk-spirits and in the contingent shapes of phantasy; next we saw the anguish of the world following upon the suppression of the folk-spirits. This anguish was the birthplace for the impulse of spirit [W<sub>1</sub> reads: the birthplace of a new spirit, the impulse] to know God as spiritual, in universal form and stripped of finitude. This need was engendered by the progress of history and the progressive formation of the world-spirit. This immediate impulse, this longing, which wants and desires something determinate—this instinct, as it were, of spirit, which is impelled to seek for this [W<sub>1</sub> reads: —this is the witness of the Spirit and the subjective side of faith. This need and this longing]—demanded such an appearance, the manifestation of God as infinite spirit in the shape of an actual human being. [W<sub>1</sub> reads: The faith that rests upon the witness of the Spirit then makes the life of Christ explicit for itself. *Instead of this sentence, W<sub>2</sub> gives as a transition:* The eternal idea itself means that the characteristic of subjectivity as actual, as distinguished from mere thought, is allowed to appear immediately. On the other hand, it is faith, begotten by the anguish of the world and resting on the testimony of the Spirit, which explicates the life of Christ.] The teaching and the miracles of Christ are grasped and understood in this witness of faith. [W<sub>1</sub> reads: The words of Christ are truly grasped and understood only by faith.] The history of Christ is also narrated by those upon whom the Spirit has already been poured out. The miracles are grasped and narrated in this Spirit, and the death of Christ has been truly understood through the Spirit to mean that in Christ God is revealed together with the unity of divine and human nature. Thus the death of Christ is the touchstone, so to speak, by which faith is verified, since it is here, essentially, that its understanding of the appearance of Christ is set forth. This death means principally that Christ was the God-man, the God who at the same time had human nature, even unto death. It is the lot of human finitude to die. Death is the most complete proof of humanity, of absolute finitude; and indeed Christ has died the aggravated death of the evildoer: not merely a natural death, but rather a death of shame and humiliation on the cross. In him, humanity was carried to its furthest point.

Now, however, a further determination comes into play. *God has died, God is dead*—this is the most frightful of all thoughts, that everything eternal and true is not, that negation itself is found in God. The deepest anguish, the feeling of complete irretrievability, the annulling of everything that is elevated, are bound up with this thought. However, the process does not come to a halt at this point; rather, a reversal takes place: God, that is to say, maintains himself in this process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed. The resurrection is something that belongs just as essentially to faith [as the crucifixion].

behaves, | we have here the religious aspect, and the formation of the community begins here. This content is the same as what is called the outpouring of the Holy Spirit: it is the Spirit that has

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After his resurrection, Christ appeared only to his friends.<sup>a</sup> This is not an external history for unbelievers; on the contrary, this appearance occurs only for faith. The resurrection is followed by the glorification of Christ, and the triumph of his ascension to the right hand of God concludes this history, which, as understood by [believing] consciousness, is the explication of the divine nature itself. [W<sub>1</sub> reads: of God. This history is the explication of the divine nature itself.] If in the first sphere we grasped God in pure thought, then in this second sphere we start from the immediacy appropriate to intuition and sensible representation. The process is now such that immediate singularity is sublated: just as in the first sphere the seclusion of God came to an end, and his original immediacy as abstract universality, according to which he is the essence of essences, has been sublated, so here the abstraction of humanity, the immediacy of subsisting singularity, is sublated, and this is brought about by death. But the death of Christ is the death of this death itself, the negation of negation. We have had the same course and process of the explication of God in the kingdom of the Father, but this is where it occurs insofar as it is an object of consciousness. For at this point the urge to *see* the divine nature was present.

Concerning Christ's death, we have still finally [W<sub>1</sub> reads: particularly] to emphasize the aspect that it is God who has put death to death, since he comes out of the state of death. In this way, finitude, human nature, and humiliation are posited of Christ—as of him who is strictly God—as something alien. It is evident that finitude is alien to him and has been taken over from an other; this other is the human beings who stand over against the divine process. It is their finitude that Christ has taken [upon himself], this finitude in all its forms, which at its furthest extreme is evil. This humanity, which is itself a moment in the divine life, is now characterized as something alien, not belonging to God. This finitude, however, on its own account (as against God), is evil, it is something alien to God. But he has taken it [upon himself] in order to put it to death by his death. As the monstrous unification of these absolute extremes, this shameful death is at the same time infinite love.

It is out of infinite love that God has made himself identical with what is alien to him in order to put it to death. This is the meaning of the death of Christ. It means that Christ has borne the sins of the world and has reconciled God [with the world (2 Cor. 5:18–19)].

Suffering and death interpreted in this way are opposed to the doctrine of moral imputation, according to which all individuals are accountable only for themselves, and all are agents of their own actions. The fate of Christ seems to contradict this imputation, but the latter only applies in the region of finitude, where the subject stands as a single person, not in the region of free spirit. It is characteristic of the region of finitude that all individuals remain what they are. If they have done evil, then they *are* evil: evil is in them as their quality. But already in the sphere of morality, and still more in that of religion, spirit is known to be free, to be affirmative within itself, so that its limitation, which extends to evil, is a nullity for the infinitude

revealed this. The relationship [of believers] to a mere human being is changed into a relationship | that is completely altered and transfigured by the Spirit, so that the nature of God discloses itself therein, and so that this truth obtains immediate certainty in its manner of appearance.

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In this experience, then, Christ, who at first was regarded as a teacher, friend, and martyr to the truth, assumes quite a different posture.<sup>200</sup> | On the one hand, the death of Christ is still the death of a human being, a friend, who has been killed by violent means; but when it is comprehended spiritually, this very death becomes the means of salvation, the focal point of reconciliation. To have before oneself the intuition of the nature of spirit and of the satisfaction of its needs in a sensible fashion is, therefore, what "has been"<sup>201</sup> disclosed to the friends of Christ only after his death.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>203</sup>The authentic disclosure was given to them by the Spirit, of whom Christ had said, "He will guide you into all truth" [John 16:13]. By this he means: only that into which the Spirit will lead you will be the truth. Regarded in this respect, Christ's death assumes the character of a death that constitutes the transition to glory, but to a glorification that is only a restoration of the original glory. Death,

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of spirit. Spirit can undo what has been done. The action certainly remains in the memory, but spirit strips it away. Imputation, therefore, does not attain to this sphere.

For the true consciousness of spirit, the finitude of humanity has been put to death in the death of Christ. This death of the natural has in this way a universal significance: finitude and evil are altogether destroyed. Thus the world has been reconciled; by this death it has been implicitly delivered from its evil. In the true understanding [*Verstehen*] of death, the relation of the subject as such [to death] comes into view in this way. Here any merely historical view comes to an end; the subject itself is drawn into the process. The subject feels the anguish of evil and of its own estrangement, which Christ has taken upon himself by putting on humanity, while at the same time destroying it by his death.

[Ed.] <sup>a</sup>See Matt. 28:9–10, 17–20; Mark 16:9 ff.; Luke 24:13 ff.; John 20–21.

200. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: Up to this point only the beginning has been posited, which is now carried forward by the Spirit to an end, a result, the truth.

201. *Thus B, Hu; L reads: was*

202. *W (Var) adds: Thus the conviction that they were able to derive from his life was not yet the proper truth; rather first the Spirit [had to be sent].*

203. *Precedes in L (1827?), similar in W*: Prior to his death he was to them an outwardly sensible individual.

the negative, is the mediating term through which the original majesty is posited as now achieved. The history of the resurrection and ascension of Christ to the right hand of God begins at the point where this history receives a spiritual interpretation.<sup>204</sup> That is when it came about that the little community achieved the certainty that God has appeared as a human being.

But this humanity in God—and indeed the most abstract form of humanity, the greatest dependence, the ultimate weakness, the utmost fragility—is natural death. “God himself is dead,” it says in a Lutheran hymn,<sup>205</sup> expressing an awareness that the human, the finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God himself, that finitude, negativity, otherness are not outside of God and do not, as otherness, hinder unity with God. | Otherness, the negative, is known to be a moment of the divine nature itself. This involves the highest ~idea~<sup>206</sup> of spirit. In this way what is external and negative is converted into the internal. On the one hand, the meaning attached to death is that through death the human element is stripped away and the divine glory comes into view once more—death is a stripping away of the human, the negative. But at the same time death itself is this negative, the furthest extreme to which humanity as natural existence ~is exposed; God himself is [involved in] this.~<sup>207</sup>

The truth to which human beings have attained by means of this history, what they have become conscious of in this entire history, is the following: that the idea of God has certainty for them, that humanity has attained the certainty of unity with God, that the human is the immediately present God. Indeed, within this history as spirit comprehends it, there is the very presentation of the process of what humanity, what spirit is—implicitly both God and dead.

204. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* Religious history is [found] where a spiritual interpretation of the history of Christ before his death prevails; for, of course, even the Gospels were written only after the outpouring of the Spirit. *In An's margin:* The overstepping of sensible verification: the church cannot undertake an investigation of it [the history of Christ] in a sensible manner.

205. [Ed.] See above, *Ms.*, n. 163.

206. *Thus L, W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) reads:* cognition of the nature of the idea

207. *Thus L with Hu; W (Var) reads:* and just for that reason, God himself, is exposed.

This [is] the mediation whereby the human is stripped away and, on the other hand, what-subsists-in-itself returns to itself, first coming to be spirit thereby.

It is with the *consciousness* of the community—which thus makes the transition from mere humanity to the God-man, to the intuition, consciousness, and certainty of the union and unity of divine and human nature—that the community begins; this consciousness constitutes the truth upon which the community is founded. This is the explication of reconciliation: that God is reconciled with the world, or rather that God has shown himself to be reconciled with the world, that even the human is not something alien to him, but rather that this otherness, this self-distinguishing, finitude as it is expressed, is a moment in God himself, although, to be sure, it is a disappearing moment.<sup>208</sup>

For the community, this is the history of the appearance of God. | This history is a divine history, whereby the community has come to the certainty of truth. From it develops the consciousness that knows that God is triune. The reconciliation in Christ, in which one believes, makes no sense if God is not known as the triune God, [if it is not recognized] that God *is*, but also is as the other, as self-distinguishing, so that this other is God himself, having implicitly the divine nature in it, and that the sublation of this difference, this otherness, and the return of love, are the Spirit.<sup>209</sup>

These are the moments with which we are here concerned and which establish that humanity has become conscious of the eternal history, the eternal movement, which God himself is. Other forms such as that of sacrificial death reduce automatically to what has been said here. “To sacrifice” means to sublate the natural, to sublate otherness. It is said: “Christ has died for all.”<sup>210</sup> This is not

208. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: But in this moment he has shown himself to the community.

209. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: This consciousness involves the fact that faith is not a relationship to something subordinate but to God himself.

210. [Ed.] See 2 Cor. 5:14–15: “For the love of Christ controls us, because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. And he died for all, that those who live might live no longer for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised.”

a single act but the eternal divine history: it is a moment in the nature of God himself; it has taken place in God himself.<sup>211~</sup>

This is the presentation of the second [element of] the idea, the idea in appearance, the eternal idea as it has become [present] for the immediate certainty of humanity, i.e., as it has appeared. In order that it should become a certainty for humanity, it had to be a sensible certainty, which, however, at the same time passes over into spiritual consciousness, and likewise is converted into the immediately sensible—in such a way that the movement and history of God is seen in it, the life that God himself is.

### C. THE THIRD ELEMENT: COMMUNITY, SPIRIT<sup>212</sup>

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The third element is the element of the community. The first [moment of this element] is, then, the immediate origin of the community—this we have | already observed. It is the outpouring of the Holy Spirit [Acts 2]. [It is] spirit that comprehends this history

211. *L* (1827?) adds, *first sentence similar in W*: It is also said that in Christ all have died [cf. 2 Cor. 5:14]. In Christ this reconciliation has been represented [as being] for all, just as the Apostle compares faith in the crucified with viewing the bronze serpent.

[Ed.] From the context it must be assumed that Hegel is referring to the Apostle Paul, in which case it is likely that he has conflated two texts: 1 Cor. 10:9 and John 3:14. Paul alludes to the first part of the story concerning the setting up of a bronze serpent on a pole (Num. 21:5–9), but the comparison with faith in Christ is not found in Paul, as claimed by Hegel; see 1 Cor. 10:9: “We must not put the Lord to the test, as some of them did and were destroyed by serpents.” Therefore it is probable that Hegel has in mind not the words of the Apostle but rather those of Jesus in conversation with Nicodemus in John 3:14–15: “And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whoever believes in him may have eternal life.” (According to the story in Numbers, anyone bitten by a serpent would save him- or herself from death, by viewing the bronze serpent set up on a pole.)

212. [Ed.] The treatment of the “third element” is relatively brief in the 1827 lectures as compared with 1824 and 1821. The semester ended on Friday, 10 August, in 1827, and Hegel had already nearly completed the lecture on Wednesday, 8 August, before reaching the “third element” (see n. 192). The Wednesday lecture was an addition to the regular schedule, and during the last week of the course Hegel lectured five straight days, Monday through Friday. Fortunately, several of the themes treated in the final section of the lectures in 1824 and 1821 had already

spiritually as it is enacted in [the sphere of] appearance, and recognizes the idea of God in it, his life, his movement. The community is made up of those single, empirical subjects who are in the Spirit of God. But at the same time this content, the history and truth of the community, is distinguished from them and stands over against them. On the one hand, faith in this history, in reconciliation, is an immediate knowledge, an act of faith; on the other hand, the nature of spirit in itself is this process, which has been viewed both in the universal idea and in the idea as [it occurs] in appearance; and this means that the subject itself becomes spirit, and thus a citizen of the kingdom of God, by virtue of the fact that the subject traverses this process in itself. ~It has been set forth above<sup>213</sup> that the human subject—the one in whom is revealed what is through the Spirit the certainty of reconciliation for humanity—has been marked out as singular, exclusive, and distinct from others.<sup>214</sup> Thus for the other subjects the presentation of the divine history is something that is objective for them, and they must now traverse this history, this process, in themselves. In order to do this, however, they must first presuppose that reconciliation is possible, or more precisely, that this reconciliation has happened in and for itself, that it is the truth in and for itself, and that reconciliation is certain.<sup>215</sup> In and for itself, this is the universal idea of God; but the other side of the presupposition is that this is certain for humanity, and that this truth is not [valid] for it [simply] through speculative thinking. This presupposition implies the certainty that reconciliation has been accomplished, i.e., it must be represented as some-

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been discussed in 1827, such as the transition from sensible to spiritual presence, and the question of the verification of faith (whether by miracles or the witness of the Spirit). Thus Hegel could cover “the origin of the community” rather briefly.

213. [Ed.] See above, pp. 313–314.

214. *Thus L (the cross-reference is not found in B, Hu, or An); W<sub>2</sub> (MiscP) reads:* Thus in this divine drama the other that is for [human] subjects is objective to them in the same way that in the [Greek] chorus the audience finds itself objectified. *W (Var) continues:* Initially, of course, the subject, the human subject—the one in whom is revealed what becomes through the Spirit the certainty of reconciliation for humanity—has been defined as singular, exclusive, and distinct from others.

215. *Thus also W; L (1827?) adds:* The perishing of sin and the negation of immediacy are indicated by the bodily, sensible death [of Christ].

thing historical, as something that has been accomplished on earth, in [the sphere of] appearance.<sup>216</sup> | This is the presupposition in which we must first of all believe.

### 1. The Origin of the Community

For the origin of faith there is necessary<sup>217</sup> first a human being, a sensible human appearance, and second, spiritual comprehension, consciousness of the spiritual. The content is spiritual, involving the transformation of immediacy into what has spiritual character. Verification is spiritual, it does not lie in the sensible, and cannot be accomplished in an immediate, sensible fashion.<sup>218</sup> The transformation of something immediate into a spiritual content is a transition that we have seen in the form of the proofs for the existence of God<sup>219</sup>—namely, that there is also a sensible world, although the truth is not the sensible, not the immediate world of finitude, but is rather the infinite.

<sup>220</sup>As to the empirical mode of the appearance, and investigations concerning the conditions surrounding the appearance of Christ after his death, the church is right insofar as it refuses to acknowledge such investigations; for the latter proceed from a point of view implying that the real question concerns the sensible and historical elements in the appearance [of Christ], as though the confirmation of the Spirit<sup>221</sup> depended on narratives of this kind about something

216. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: For there is no other mode of what is called certainty.

217. *Thus L; W (Var/1831?) reads*: 1. The origin of the community is what occurs as the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The origin of faith is

218. *L* (1827?) adds: Accordingly, objections can always be raised against the sensible facts.

219. [Ed.] See Vol. 1:414–441.

220. *Precedes in L* (1827?), *similar in W*: This conversion, which already begins with the resurrection and ascension, is what we call the origin of the community.

[Ed.] This sentence, if authentic, indicates that the resurrection belongs as much to the history of the community as it does to the history of Christ. It constitutes the point of transition from the Son to the Spirit, from the second to the third element. In nonrepresentational language, the resurrection means for Hegel the spiritual presence of Christ in the community, Christ's presence as spirit. However, he uses resurrection language with reference to this actuality only infrequently.

221. *Thus L; W (Var) adds*: and its truth

represented as [merely] historical [*historisch*], in historical [*geschichtlich*] fashion. It is said that the Holy Scriptures should be treated like the writings of profane authors. One can do this with regard to what concerns the merely historical, the finite and external. But for the rest, | it is a matter of comprehension by the Spirit; the profane [aspect] is not the attestation of the Spirit.

<sup>222</sup>Thus the community itself is the existing Spirit, the Spirit in its existence [*Existenz*], God existing as community.

The first moment is the idea in its simple universality for itself, self-enclosed, having not yet progressed to the primal division, to otherness—the Father. The second is the particular, the idea in appearance—the Son.<sup>223</sup> It is the idea in its externality, such that the external appearance is converted back to the first [moment] and is known as the divine idea, the identity of the divine and the human. The third element, then, is <sup>~</sup>this consciousness—God as the Spirit.<sup>224</sup> This Spirit as existing and realizing itself is the community.

The community begins with the fact that the truth is at hand; it is known, extant truth. And this truth is what God is: he is the triune God; he is life, this process of himself within himself, the determining of himself within himself. The second aspect of this truth, then, is that it has also appeared, it has a relation to the subject, and is [present] for the subject; moreover, the subject is essentially related to it, and is meant to be a citizen of the kingdom of God. That the human subject ought to be a child of God implies that reconciliation is accomplished in and for itself within the divine idea, and secondly that it has appeared too, and hence the truth is certain for humankind. The appearing is precisely this certainty, the idea as it comes to consciousness in the modality of appearance. The third aspect is the relationship of the subject to this truth, the fact that the subject, to the extent that it is related to this truth,

222. *In B's margin: 9 August 1827*

223. *L (1827?) adds, similar in W<sub>1</sub>:* Insofar as the first element is concrete, otherness is indeed already contained in it; the idea is eternal life, eternal bringing forth.

224. *Thus B, Hu, W<sub>1</sub>; An reads:* God as the Spirit within consciousness. *L (Var) reads:* this consciousness of God as the Spirit.

arrives precisely at this conscious unity, deems itself worthy of this known unity, brings this unity forth within itself, and is fulfilled by the divine Spirit.

The fact that the single subject is now filled by the divine Spirit is brought about by mediation in the subject itself, and the mediating factor is | that the subject has this faith. For faith is the truth, the presupposition, that reconciliation is accomplished with certainty in and for itself. Only by means of this faith that reconciliation is accomplished with certainty and in and for itself is the subject able and indeed in a position to posit itself in this unity. This mediation is absolutely necessary.

In this blessedness mediated through the laying hold of the truth, the difficulty that is immediately involved in the grasping of the truth is overcome. This difficulty is that the relationship of the community to this idea is a relationship of the single, particular subject; it is removed in the truth itself. It consists in the fact that the subject is different from absolute spirit.<sup>225</sup> This difference is removed, and its removal happens because God looks into the human heart, he regards the substantial will, the innermost, all-encompassing subjectivity of the human being, one's inner, true, and earnest willing. But apart from this inner will, and distinct from this inner, substantial actuality, there is still the external and deficient side of humanity: we commit errors; we can exist in a way that is not appropriate to this inward, substantial essentiality, this substantial, essential inwardness. The difficulty is removed by the fact that God looks into the heart and sees what is substantial, so that externality—otherness, finitude, and imperfection in general, or however else it may be defined—does no damage to the absolute unity; finitude is<sup>226</sup> reduced to an inessential status, and is known as inessential. For in the idea, the otherness of the Son is a transitory, disappearing moment, not a true, essentially enduring, absolute moment.

This is the concept of the community in general, the idea which, to this extent, is the process of the subject within and upon itself,

225. *Thus L, W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) adds:* it is what appears as its finitude.

226. *Thus L, similar in An; W (Var) reads:* But externality—otherness in general, finitude, imperfection, or however else it may be defined—is

the process of the subject that is taken up into the Spirit, is spiritual, so that the Spirit of God dwells within it. This process, which is its pure self-consciousness, is at the same time the consciousness of | truth, and the pure self-consciousness that knows and wills the truth is precisely the divine Spirit within it.

## 2. The Subsistence of the Community

The community, whose concept we have just seen, also *realizes* itself. The real community is what we generally call the *church*. This is no longer the *emerging* [*entstehende*] but rather the *subsisting* [*bestehende*] community, which maintains itself. In the subsisting community the church is, by and large, the institution whereby [its] subjects come to the truth, appropriate the truth to themselves, so that the Holy Spirit becomes real, actual, and present within them and has its abode in them, whereby the truth can be within them and they can enjoy and give active expression to the ~ truth of ~<sup>227</sup> the Spirit; it is the means whereby they as subjects *are* the active expression of the Spirit.

The first thing that is present in the church is its universality, which consists in the fact that the truth is here presupposed, that it exists as truth already present—not, as in the case of the emerging church, that the Holy Spirit is poured out and engendered for the first time. This is a changed relationship to the beginning [of their religion] for [its] subjects, and for the subjects in their beginnings. The presupposed, extant truth is the *doctrine* of the church, its doctrine of faith. We know the content of this doctrine: it is<sup>228</sup> the doctrine of reconciliation. It is no longer the case that a person is elevated to [the sphere of] absolute meaning by the outpouring and ordaining of the Spirit, but rather that this meaning is something that is known and acknowledged. It is the absolute capability of the subject, both within itself and objectively, to share in the truth, to come to the truth, to abide in the truth, to attain to the consciousness of truth. This consciousness of doctrine is here present and presupposed.

227. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* truth, of

228. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* in one word

Thus it is that doctrine is elaborated within the community itself only as something presupposed and finished. The Spirit that was shed abroad is the beginning, that which makes the beginning, which raises up. The community is the consciousness of this Spirit, the expression of what spirit has discovered and what it has been touched by, namely, that Christ is for spirit. Hence doctrine has been essentially brought forth and developed in the church. First it is [present] as intuition, faith, feeling—as the felt witness of the Spirit like a flame of fire. ~But it is supposed to be present and presupposed; thus it must be developed from the concentration and interiority of feeling into representation as something immediately present.<sup>229</sup> Accordingly, the doctrine of faith is essentially constituted in the church first of all, and then later it is thinking, developed consciousness, which also asserts its rights in the matter, adducing the other [forms of truth] to which it has attained by way of the cultivation of thought, by way of philosophy. For these thoughts, on behalf of these thoughts, and on behalf of this otherwise known truth, thinking first develops a consciousness that is only intermixed with other, impure thoughts. Thus doctrine is developed out of other concrete contents that are intermixed with impurities. This doctrine is present to hand and must then be preserved too. This happens in the church. There, that which is doctrine must also be taught. It *is*, it exists, it is valid, it is acknowledged and immediately presupposed. But it is not present in a sensible manner, such that the comprehension of the doctrine can take place through the senses—in the way that the world, for example, is of course presupposed as a sensible entity, to which we are related externally and sensibly. Instead, spiritual truth exists only as known, and the fact that it also appears, and the mode of its appearance, is precisely this, that it is taught. The church is essentially a teaching church, by virtue of which there is a teaching office whose function is to expound doctrine.

Human beings are already born into this doctrine; they have their beginnings in this context of valid truth, already present, and

229. *Thus L with B and Hu, similar in W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (MiscP) reads:* But this characteristic of bringing forth is itself merely a one-sided one because the truth is at the same time implicitly present and presupposed; the subject is already taken up into the content.

in the consciousness of it. The relationship of single members to this presupposed truth that subsists in and for itself has yet a second aspect. Since individuals are born into the church, they are destined <sup>~</sup>straightaway, while they are still unconscious,<sup>230</sup> to participate in this truth, | to become partakers of it; their vocation is for the truth. The church expresses this too, in the sacrament of *baptism*, which says that the human being, the individual, is in the fellowship of the church, where evil has been overcome, implicitly and explicitly, and God is reconciled, implicitly and explicitly.<sup>231</sup> Initially, doctrine is related to this individual as something external. The child is at first spirit only implicitly, it is not yet realized spirit, is not yet actual as spirit; it has only the capability, the potentiality, to be spirit, to become actual as spirit. Thus the truth is something external to it, and comes to the subject initially as something presupposed, acknowledged, and valid. This means that the truth necessarily comes to humanity at first as *authority*.

All truth, even sensible truth—although it is not truth in the proper sense—comes to people initially in the form of authority; i.e., it is something present that possesses validity and exists on its own account. That is how it comes to me—as something distinct from me. Similarly, the world comes to us in sense perception as an authority confronting us: it *is*, we find it so, we accept it as something that is really there and relate ourselves to it as such. That is how it is, and it is valid just the way it is. Doctrine, which is spiritual, is not present as a sensible authority of that kind; it must be *taught*, and it is taught as valid truth. Custom is something that is valid, an established conviction. But because it is something spiritual, we do not say, “It is,” but rather, “It is right.” However, because it confronts us as what is real, we also say, “It is.” And because it presents itself to us as something valid, we call its way of being “authority.”

Just as people have to learn sensible content from authority, and to be content with the way things are just because they are so—

230. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* although still unconsciously, nonetheless

231. *Thus L; precedes in W<sub>1</sub> (1831), similar in W<sub>2</sub>:* Even though the individual is not spared the real, infinite anguish of being unfit in its relationship to God, it is nonetheless eased; but this is no longer the real struggle from which the community arose.

the sun is there, and because it is there I must put up with it—so also they have to learn doctrine, the truth.<sup>232</sup> What is learned in this way must be taken up by individuals into themselves in order to assimilate it, to appropriate it. As we have already said,<sup>233</sup> the inner spirit is the absolute possibility of this knowledge; it conforms to this content that is itself spirit. What is there in human inwardness, i.e., in one's rational spirit, is therefore brought to consciousness for the individual as something objective; or what is found within the individual is developed so that one knows it as the truth in which one abides. This is the concern of education, practice, cultivation. With such education and appropriation it is a question merely of becoming habituated to the good and *the true* [*Wahrhaftes*].<sup>234</sup> To this extent it is not a matter of overcoming evil because evil has been overcome in and for itself.<sup>235</sup> The child, inasmuch as it is born into the church, has been born in freedom and to freedom. For one who has been so born, there is no longer an absolute otherness; this otherness is posited as something overcome, as already conquered. The sole concern of such cultivation is to prevent evil from emerging, and the possibility of this does in general reside in humanity. But insofar as evil does emerge among human beings when they do evil, at the same time it is present as something implicitly null, over which spirit has power: spirit has the power to undo evil.

*Repentance* or *penitence* signifies that, through the elevation of human beings to the truth, which they now will, their transgression

232. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: The latter, however, arises not through sensible perception, through the activity of the senses on us, but rather through doctrine as what is really there, or through authority.

233. [Ed.] See above, p. 332.

234. *B* reads: *truths* [*Wahrhaftigen*]. *L* reads: *the rational* [*Vernünftige*]. *W* (*Var*) reads: *the true* [*Wahre*].

235. *Thus L; W* (1831) adds: It is a question only of contingent subjectivity. Linked with that element of faith consisting in the determination that the subject is not as it ought to be, there is simultaneously the absolute possibility that the subject can fulfill its destiny, can be received into the grace of God. This is the concern of faith. The individual must lay hold of the implicitly subsisting unity of divine and human nature; this truth is laid hold of through faith in Christ. Thus God is no longer a beyond for the individual; and the laying hold of this truth is opposed to the basic determination referred to above, namely, that the subject is not as it ought to be.

is wiped out. Because they acknowledge the truth over against their evil and will the good—through repentance, that is to say—their evil comes to naught. Thus evil is known as something that has been overcome in and for itself, having no power of its own. The undoing of what has been done cannot take place in a sensible manner; but in a spiritual | manner or inwardly, what has been done can be undone.<sup>236</sup> Therefore it is the concern of the church that this habituating and educating of spirit should become ever more inward, that this truth should become ever more identical with the self, with the human will, and that this truth should become one's volition, one's object, one's spirit. The battle is now over, and the consciousness arises that there is no longer a struggle, as in the Parsee religion or the Kantian philosophy,<sup>237</sup> where evil is always sure to be overcome, yet it stands in and for itself over against <sup>~</sup>the supreme good, so that in these views there is nothing but<sup>~</sup><sup>238</sup> an unending progression.<sup>239</sup>

~The subsistence of the community is completed by sharing in the appropriation of God's presence [i.e., the *communion*]. It is a question precisely of the conscious presence of God, of unity with God, the *unio mystica*, [one's] self-feeling of God, the feeling of God's immediate presence within the subject. This self-feeling, however, since it exists, is also a movement, it presupposes a movement,

236. *L* (1827?) adds, similar in *W*: The sinner is forgiven; he is reckoned as one accepted by the Father among human beings.

237. [Ed.] On Hegel's criticism of the Kantian idea of an unending improvement in ethical conditions, see above, 1824 lectures, n. 194; and on the comparison of Iranian (Parsee) and Kantian dualism, see Vol. 2 of this edition. On the concept of an unending progression, see Hegel's *Science of Logic*, pp. 227–228 (cf. *GW* 11:140–142).

238. *Thus L; W (Var) reads*: the good, and the highest thing is

239. *L* (1827?) adds, similar in *W*: Here, by contrast, evil is known in the Spirit to be overcome in and for itself, and because it is overcome in and for itself, the subject has only to make its own will good in order for evil, the evil deed, to disappear. *After an insertion from the 1824 lectures, W* (1831) continues: Acting in the belief that reconciliation has been implicitly achieved is, on the one hand, the act of the subject, but on the other hand it is the act of the divine Spirit. Faith itself is the divine Spirit that works in the subject. But the subject is not a passive receptacle; rather the Holy Spirit is equally [ebenso] the subject's spirit to the extent that the subject has faith. In such faith the latter acts in opposition to its natural life, sets it aside, puts it away.

a sublation of difference, so that a negative unity issues forth.<sup>240</sup> This unity begins with the host.<sup>241</sup> <sup>242</sup> Concerning the latter, three kinds of view are now prevalent. According to the first, the host—this external, sensible thing | —becomes by consecration the present God, God as a thing in the manner of an empirical “thing.”<sup>243</sup> The second view is the Lutheran one, according to which the movement does indeed begin with something external, which is an ordinary, common thing, but the communion, the self-feeling of the presence of God, comes about only insofar as the external thing is consumed—not merely physically but in spirit and in faith. God is present only in spirit and in faith.<sup>244</sup> Here there is no transubstan-

240. W (1831) adds: Thus the Lord’s Supper is also the midpoint of Christian doctrine, and from this point all the differences within the Christian church receive their coloration and definition.

241. Thus L; among the extant sources only the following is found in Hu (probably added later): Communion [Genuss] is the consciousness of God’s immediate presence in the subject’s heart: *unio mystica*. W (Var) reads: The ultimate in this sphere is sharing in this appropriation, in this presence of God [der Genuss dieser Aneignung, der Gegenwärtigkeit Gottes]. It is precisely a matter of the conscious presence of God, of unity with God, the *unio mystica*, [one’s] self-feeling of God.

242. In B’s margin: 10 August 1827

[Ed.] Since B lacks the preceding passage, it is obvious that Hegel’s final lecture began with the topic of this paragraph, the sacrament of communion, for which he uses the difficult-to-translate term *Genuss*.

243. Thus Hu; L reads: existence. W (1831) reads: thing [possibly from 1824 (G):—likewise partaken of empirically by human beings]. Since God is thus known as something external in the Lord’s Supper—this midpoint of doctrine—this externality is the foundation of the whole Catholic religion.<sup>a</sup> Thus arises the servitude of knowledge and activity [in this religion]; this externality pervades all further characteristics [of it] since the true is represented as something fixed and external. As something existing outside the subject, it can pass into the control of others; the church is in possession of it as well as of all the means of grace. In every respect the subject is a passive, receptive subject that knows not what is true, right, and good, but has only to accept the standard from others.

[Ed.] <sup>a</sup>See Hegel’s defense against the reproach of his having defamed the Catholic religion in *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 572–575.

244. Thus L; W (1831) adds: Sensible presence is nothing on its own account, nor does consecration make the host into an object of veneration; rather the object exists in faith alone, and thus it is in the consuming and destroying of the sensible that we have union with God and the consciousness of this union of the subject with God. Here the grand awareness has arisen that, apart from communion and faith, the host is a common, sensible thing: the process is genuine only within the subject’s spirit.

tiation, or at any rate only one by which externality is annulled, so that the presence of God is utterly a spiritual presence—the consecration takes place in the faith of the subject. The third view is that the present God exists only in representation, in memory, and to this extent he does not have this immediate subjective presence.<sup>245</sup>

~The subject is expected to *appropriate* doctrine, the truth, and hence | the third aspect of the community's self-maintenance is the partaking of the presence of God.~<sup>246</sup> 262

### 3. The Realization of the Spirituality of the Community

The third [aspect] is the *realization* of the spirituality of the community in universal actuality. This involves the *transformation* of the community at the same time. The standpoint is this: in religion the *heart* is reconciled. This reconciliation is thus in the heart; it is spiritual. It is the pure heart that attains to this partaking [*Genuss*] of God's presence within it, and consequently reconciliation, the enjoyment [*Genuss*] of being reconciled. At the same time, however, this reconciliation is abstract and has the world as such over against it. The self that exists in this reconciliation, in this religious communion, is the pure heart, the heart as such, universal spirituality; but at the same time the self or subject constitutes that aspect of spiritual presence in accord with which there is a developed worldliness present in it, and thus the kingdom of God, the community, has a relationship to the worldly. In order that reconciliation may be real, it is required that it should be known in this development, in this totality; it should be present and brought forth [into actuality]. The principles for this worldly realm are ready to hand in the spirituality of the community; the principle, the truth, of the worldly *is* the spiritual.

The spiritual is the truth of the worldly realm in the more prox-

245. *Thus L; W (1831) adds (adopting a statement from the 1824 lectures and the Ms.): [it is] a merely moral relationship.*

[Ed.] The reference here, of course, is to the Reformed view (see the Ms., p. 155), but it applies properly only to Zwingli, not to Calvin. See below, 1831 *Excerpts*, n. 29.

246. *Thus L; Hu reads: These are the three modes of the community.*

[Ed.] The three are doctrine, repentance, and communion.

imate sense that the subject, as an object of divine grace and as one who is reconciled with God, already has infinite value in virtue of its vocation; and this is made effective in the community. On the basis of this vocation, the subject is known as spirit's certainty of itself, as the eternity of spirit. The vocation to infinitude of the subject that is inwardly infinite is its *freedom*. The substantial aspect of the subject is that it is a free person, and as a free person it relates itself to the worldly and the actual as a being that is at home with itself, reconciled within itself, an utterly secure and infinite subjectivity. This vocation of the subject ought to be foundational in its relation with what is worldly. This freedom of the subject is its rationality—the fact that as subject it is thus liberated and has attained this liberation through religion, that in accord with its religious vocation it is essentially free. This freedom, which has the impulse and determinacy to realize itself, is rationality. "Slavery contradicts Christianity because it is contrary to reason."<sup>247</sup> What is required, therefore, is that this reconciliation should also be accomplished in the worldly realm.

The first form of this reconciliation with worldliness is the immediate one, and just for this reason it is not the genuine mode of reconciliation. It appears as follows: at first the community contains the element of spirituality, of being reconciled with God, within itself, in abstraction from the world, so that spirituality renounces the worldly realm, placing itself in a negative relation to the world and also to itself. For the world is in the subject; it is there as the impulse toward nature, toward social life, toward art and science. What is concrete in the self, its passions etc., certainly cannot be justified vis-à-vis the religious aspect just because they are natural impulses; but on the other hand, monkish withdrawal means that the heart is not concretely developed, that it exists as something undeveloped, or that spirituality, the state of being reconciled, and the life of reconciliation are and ought to remain concentrated within themselves and undeveloped. But the very nature of spirit is to develop itself, to differentiate itself even unto worldliness.

The second way of defining this reconciliation is that worldliness and religiosity do indeed remain external to each other, but they

247. *Thus An*

have to enter into relation all the same. Hence the relation in which they stand can itself only be an external one, or more precisely, a relation in which one prevails over the other, and thus there is no reconciliation at all. The religious, it is felt, should be the dominant element; what is reconciled, the *church*, ought to prevail over what is unreconciled, the worldly realm. Accordingly, this is a uniting with a worldly realm that remains unreconciled. In itself, the worldly sphere is uncultured, and as such it ought only to be dominated. But the dominating power takes this same worldliness up into itself, —including all of its passions; as a result of its dominion, there emerges in the church itself a worldliness devoid of spirit<sup>248</sup> | just because the worldly realm is not in itself reconciled. A dominion predicated on the lack of spirit is posited, in terms of which externality is the principle and humanity in its relatedness exists at the same time outside itself—this is the relationship of *unfreedom* in general. In everything that can be called human, in all impulses, in all attitudes that have reference to the family and to activity in public life, a cleavage enters into play. The ruling principle is that humanity is not at home with itself. In all these forms, it exists in a general condition of servitude, and all these forms count for nothing, they are unholy. Inasmuch as human being subsists in them, it is essentially a finite and ruptured being which has in that form no validity; what is valid is something else. This reconciliation with the worldly realm, and with the human heart, comes about in such a way that it is precisely the opposite of [genuine] reconciliation. The further development of this condition of rupture within reconciliation itself is what appears as the corruption of the church, the absolute contradiction of the spiritual within itself.

The third way is that this contradiction is resolved in the *ethical realm*,<sup>249</sup> or that the principle of freedom has penetrated into the

248. *Thus An:* including . . . passions; *and L:* as . . . spirit  $W_1$  is similar to  $L$ ;  $W_2$  (*Var*) reads: all inclinations, all passions, whatever is worldliness devoid of spirit emerges in the church as a result of this very dominion

249. [Ed.] This theme is explicitly developed by Hegel under the category of “objective spirit” in the *Encyclopedia* (1830), §§ 483 ff., and in the whole of the *Philosophy of Right*. The terms used here are *Sittlichkeit* (ethical realm, ethical life, social ethics) and *Sittliche* (ethics, the ethical), not *Moralität*, which refers to the subjective morality of conscience.

worldly realm itself, and that the worldly, because it has been thus conformed to the concept, reason, and eternal truth, is freedom that has become concrete and will that is rational.<sup>250</sup> The institutions of ethical life are divine institutions—not holy in the sense<sup>251</sup> that celibacy is supposed to be holy by contrast with marriage or familial love, or that voluntary poverty is supposed to be holy by contrast with active self-enrichment, or what is lawful and proper. Similarly, blind obedience is regarded as holy, whereas the ethical is an obedience in freedom, a free and rational will, an obedience of the subject toward the ethical. Thus it is in the ethical realm that the reconciliation of religion with worldliness and actuality comes about and is accomplished.

265 Thus reconciliation has three *real* stages: the stage of immediacy [or of the heart], which is more an abstraction than it is reconciliation; the stage in which the church is dominant, a church that is outside itself; and the stage of ethical life.

The second [moment] is that the *ideal* side emerges explicitly in religious consciousness. Inwardness knows itself as subsisting with itself<sup>252</sup> precisely in this reconciliation of spirit with itself; and this knowledge of being at home with itself is precisely thinking. Thinking means reconciledness, being at home or at peace with oneself, even though the peace is a wholly abstract, undeveloped one.<sup>253</sup>

250. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* It is in the organization of the state that the divine has broken through [*eingeschlagen*] into the sphere of actuality; the latter is permeated by the former, and the worldly realm is now justified in and for itself, for its foundation is the divine will, the law of right and freedom. The true reconciliation, whereby the divine realizes itself in the domain of actuality, consists in the ethical and juridical life of the state: this is the authentic discipline [*Subaktion*] of worldliness.

[Ed.] See *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1952), §§ 257–258, 260, 270 remark.

251. *Thus L, W<sub>1</sub>; W<sub>2</sub> (Var) adds:* according to which the holy is opposed to the ethical

252. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and being at home with itself

[Ed.] The distinction is between *bei sich selbst seiend* in the main text and *bei sich selbst zu sein* in the footnote. The latter phrase occurs subsequently in the main text.

253. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* Thus arises the infinite demand that the content of religion should be confirmed by thought, and this requirement should not be turned aside.

Thinking is the universal, the activity of the universal, and it stands generally in contrast with the concrete, as it does with the external. It is the freedom of reason that has been acquired in religion and now knows itself to be for itself in spirit. This freedom now turns against merely spiritless externality and servitude, for the latter is utterly opposed to the concepts of reconciliation and liberation. Thus thinking enters in, defying and destroying externality in whatever form it appears. This is the negative and formal mode of acting which, in its concrete shape, has been called the *Enlightenment*.<sup>254</sup>

This thinking first emerges as abstract universality as such, and is directed not merely against the external but also against the concrete in general. For this reason, it is also directed against the idea of God, against the idea that God as triune is not a dead abstraction but rather relates himself to himself, is at home with himself, and returns to himself. In concreteness there are of course determinations and distinctions. Since abstract thinking turns against | externality in general, it also is opposed to distinction as such because in distinction a reciprocally opposed externality is indeed present—but in the idea of God, in the *concrete* truth, this externality is likewise resolved.<sup>255</sup> Abstract identity prevails as the rule for this abstract thinking, for understanding. Genuine identity is the truth of the concrete. When everything concrete in God has been thus eradicated, this is expressed by saying: “We cannot know God”—i.e., know something specific about God.<sup>256</sup> For to know God cognitively means to know him according to his attributes; but [on this view] he is to remain a pure abstraction. The principle of freedom, inwardness, and religion itself is grasped by this formal perspective, but at first only abstractly.

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But then the other way in which determination enters into universality, according to this abstraction, is the characteristics that reside in the natural impulses and inclinations of the subject. From

254. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: It consists in this: that thinking has turned against externality, and that the freedom of spirit that resides in reconciliation is maintained.

255. *L* (1827?) adds, *similar in W*: This thinking therefore proceeds to annul everything that is concrete and determinate in God.

256. [Ed.] See above, *Ms.*, n. 253.

this standpoint it is said that human being by nature is good.<sup>257</sup> This pure subjectivity indeed clings to the category of the good, since the latter coincides with this identity and pure freedom; but the good itself must by the same token remain for it an abstraction. Here the category of the good is nothing other than the caprice and contingency of the subject as such. This is the extreme of this form of subjectivity and freedom, which renounces the truth and its development and moves within itself, knowing that what it regards as valid is only its own definitions, and that it is the master of what is good and evil. This is an inward weaving of spirit within itself, which can just as readily assume the form of hypocrisy and extreme vanity as it can peaceful, noble, pious aspirations. This is what is called the pious life of feeling, to which *Pietism* also restricts itself.

267 Pietism acknowledges no objective | truth and opposes itself to dogmas and the content of religion, while still preserving an element of mediation, a connection with Christ, but this is a connection that is supposed to remain one of mere feeling and inner sensibility.<sup>258</sup> Such piety, together with the vanity of subjectivity and feeling, is then turned polemically against the philosophy that wants cognition. The result of this subjectivity is that everything fades away in the subject, without objectivity, without firm determinacy, without any development on the part of God, who in the end no longer has any content at all.

“The mode [of thought] first designated [i.e., the Enlightenment] is the ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time.”<sup>259</sup> But the two extremes opposing each other in the further development of the community are, first, this unfreedom and servitude of spirit in the absolute region of freedom, and second, abstract subjectivity or “subjectivity”<sup>260</sup> devoid of content.<sup>261</sup>

257. [Ed.] See above, Ms., n. 106.

258. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* For such piety, everyone has his own God, his own Christ, etc. This privatism [*Partikularität*], in which everyone has his own individual religion, worldview, etc., is certainly present among humanity. But in [true] religion, by means of life in the community, this privatism is consumed, it no longer has validity for truly pious people, it is set to one side.

259. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* This ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time is simultaneously the greatest crudity since it possesses only the *form* of culture.

260. *Thus L; W (Var) reads:* subjective freedom

261. *This paragraph is found only in L; among the extant sources, only the*

The third [moment], then, consists in the fact that subjectivity develops the content from itself, to be sure, but in accord with necessity. It knows and acknowledges that a content is necessary, and that this necessary content is objective, having being in and for itself. This is the standpoint of *philosophy*, according to which the content takes refuge in the concept<sup>262</sup> and obtains its justification by thinking. This thinking is not merely the process of abstraction and definition according to the law of identity; it does not have the concrete “over there,” but rather is itself essentially concrete, and thus it is comprehension, meaning that the concept determines itself in its totality and as idea. It is free reason, which has being on its own account, that develops the content in accord with its necessity, and justifies the content of truth. This is the standpoint of a knowledge that recognizes and cognizes a truth. The Enlightenment of the understanding and Pietism volatilize all content. The purely subjective | standpoint<sup>263</sup> recognizes no content and hence no truth. The concept indeed produces the truth—this is subjective freedom—but it recognizes this truth as at the same time not produced, as the truth that subsists in and for itself. This objective standpoint is alone capable of bearing witness to, and thus of expressing the witness of, spirit in a developed, thoughtful fashion.<sup>264</sup> Therefore, it is the justification of religion, especially of the Christian religion, the true religion; it knows the *content* [of religion] in accord with its necessity and reason. Likewise it knows the *forms* in the devel-

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*following is found in Hu:* These are the two extremes in the life of the community.

[Ed.] The two extremes are, in other words, the religion of the Enlightenment (the “servitude of spirit in the absolute region of freedom”) and of Pietism (“subjectivity devoid of content”). Between these two extremes, speculative philosophy will find the mean.

262. [Ed.] *in den Begriff flüchtet*. This famous metaphor inspired the title of a recent collection of essays on Hegel’s philosophy of religion, *Die Flucht in den Begriff* (“The Flight into the Concept”), ed. F. W. Graf and F. Wagner (Stuttgart, 1982); to which W. Jaeschke has offered the appropriate rejoinder, “Die Flucht vor dem Begriff: Ein Jahrzehnt Literatur zur Religionsphilosophie (1971–1981)” (“The Flight from the Concept . . .”), in *Hegel-Studien* 18 (1983), 295–354.

263. *Thus An with L; W reads, similar in L:* The purely subjective standpoint, the volatilization of all content, the Enlightenment of the understanding, *W<sub>2</sub>* (Var) adds: as well as Pietism,

264. *Thus L; W (Var) adds:* and it is contained in the better dogmatic theology of our time.

opment of this content. The two belong together: form and content. We have seen these forms: the modes of the appearance of God, the ways in which it is represented for the sensible consciousness and for the spiritual consciousness that has arrived at universality and thought, this whole development of spirit we have seen. The content is justified by the witness of spirit, insofar as it is thinking spirit. The witness of spirit is thought. Thought knows the form and determinacy of the appearance, and hence also the limits of the form. The Enlightenment knows only of negation, of limit, of determinacy as such, and therefore does an absolute injustice to the content. Form and determinacy entail not only finitude and limit; rather, as totality of form, determinacy is itself the concept, and these various forms are themselves necessary and essential. In the appearance of God, God determines himself. Sustained by philosophy, religion receives its justification from thinking consciousness.

Ingenuous piety has no need of [justification]; the heart gives the witness of spirit and receives the truth that comes to it through authority; it has a sense of satisfaction and reconciliation through this truth.<sup>265</sup> But insofar as thinking begins | to posit an antithesis to the concrete and places itself in opposition to the concrete, the

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265. *Thus L; W (1831) adds:* In faith the true *content* is certainly already found, but it still lacks the *form* of thinking. All the forms that we have considered earlier<sup>a</sup>—feeling, representation, etc.—are indeed capable of having the content of truth, but they themselves are not the true form, which makes the true content necessary. Thinking is the absolute judge, before which the content must verify and attest its claims.

Philosophy has been reproached for placing itself above religion. But as a matter of fact this is surely false because philosophy has only this and no other content, although it gives it in the form of thinking; it places itself only above the *form* of faith, while the *content* is the same in both cases.

The form of the subject as one who feels, etc., concerns the subject as a single individual; but feeling as such is not eliminated by philosophy. The question is only whether the *content* of feeling is the truth and can prove itself to be true in thought. Philosophy *thinks* what the subject as such *feels*, and leaves it to the latter to come to terms with its feeling. Thus feeling is not rejected by philosophy but rather receives its true content through philosophy.

[Ed.] <sup>a</sup>See Vol. 1:390–403. Not much material on this topic has been preserved from the 1831 lectures; see the excerpts by D. F. Strauss in Vol. 1:465–469.

process of thinking consists in carrying through this opposition until it arrives at reconciliation.

This reconciliation is philosophy. Philosophy is to this extent theology. It presents the reconciliation of God with himself and with nature, showing that nature, otherness, is implicitly divine, and that the raising of itself to reconciliation is on the one hand what finite spirit implicitly is, while on the other hand it arrives at this reconciliation, or brings it forth, in world history. This reconciliation is the peace of God, which does not "surpass all reason,"<sup>266</sup> but is rather the peace that *through* reason is first known and thought and is recognized as what is true.<sup>267</sup>

Two positions are opposed to philosophy. First there is the vanity of the understanding, which is displeased by the fact that philosophy still exhibits the truth in religion and demonstrates that reason resides within it. This Enlightenment wants to have nothing further to do with the content, and therefore is highly displeased that philosophy, as conscious, methodical thinking, curbs the fancies, the caprice, and the contingency of thinking. In the second place, ingenuous religiosity [is opposed to philosophy]. The different positions are as follows: | (a) immediate religion; (b) the Enlightenment of the understanding; and (c) the rational cognition of religion. "It is this last that I have sought to exhibit in these lectures."<sup>268 269</sup>

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266. [Ed.] An allusion to the German translation of Phil. 4:7, which uses *Verunft* ("reason") rather than *Verstand* ("understanding"): "And the peace of God, which surpasses all reason, will keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus."

267. *L (1827?) adds:* This reconciliation by means of the concept is also the goal of these lectures.

268. *Thus Hu, similar in B; L (1827?) reads:* It is my hope that these lectures have afforded a guide and contributed to this rational cognition of religion as well as to the general advancement of [genuine?] religious piety [*Religiosität*].

269. *Follows below in B, similar in Hu:* Concluded 10 August 1827.