



ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

BOOK III

Chapter 1

1 1 · Since excellence [virtue] is concerned with passions [feelings] and actions, and on
voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary
forgiveness, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is
5 presumably necessary for those who are studying excellence and useful also for legislators with a
view to the assigning both of honors and of punishments.

 Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to
10 ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in
which nothing is contributed by the person who acts or is acted upon, e.g. if he were to be
carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power.

 But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object
15 (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his
power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it
may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort
happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no
20 one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his
crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary
actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action
is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used
25 with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that

1 moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the
moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions,
therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any
5 such act in itself.

For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they endure something base or
painful in return for great and noble objects gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since
to endure the greatest indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior
10 person. On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but forgiveness is, when one does what
he ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no one could
withstand. But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death
after the most fearful sufferings; for the things that forced Euripides' Alcmaeon to slay his
15 mother seem absurd. It is difficult sometimes to determine what should be chosen at what cost,
and what should be endured in return for what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our
decisions; for as a rule what is expected is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence
praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not.

20 What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer that without qualification
actions are so when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing.
But the things that in themselves are involuntary, but now and in return for these gains are
25 worthy of choice, and whose moving principle is in the agent, are in themselves involuntary, but
now and in return for these gains voluntary. They are more like voluntary acts; for actions are in
the class of particulars, and the particular acts here are voluntary. What sort of things are to be
chosen in return for what it is not easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular
30 cases.

But if some one were to say that pleasant and noble objects have a compelling power, forcing
us from without, all acts would be for him compulsory; for it is for these objects that all men do
35 everything they do. And those who act under compulsion and unwillingly act with pain, but
those who do acts for their pleasantness and nobility do them with pleasure; it is absurd to make

1 external circumstances responsible, and not oneself, as being easily caught by such attractions,
and to make oneself responsible for noble acts but the pleasant objects responsible for base acts.
The compulsory, then, seems to be that whose moving principle is outside, the person
5 compelled contributing nothing.

Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is non-voluntary; it is only what produces
pain and regret that is involuntary. For the man who has done something owing to ignorance,
and feels not the least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know
10 what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by
reason of ignorance he who regrets is thought an involuntary agent, and the man who does not
regret may, since he is different, be called a non-voluntary agent; for, since he differs from the
other, it is better that he should have a name of his own.
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Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; for the
man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance but of one of the
causes mentioned, yet not knowingly but in ignorance.
20

Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain
from, and error of this kind makes men unjust and in general bad; but the term 'involuntary'
tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage--for it is not ignorance in
25 choice that makes action involuntary (it makes men wicked), nor ignorance of the universal (for
that men are blamed), but ignorance of particular circumstances of the action and the objects
with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity and forgiveness depend, since the
person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily.

30 Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to determine their nature and number. A man may be
ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes
also what (e.g. what instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (e.g. for safety), and how
he is doing it (e.g. whether gently or violently). Now of all of these no one could be ignorant
35 unless he were mad, and evidently also he could not be ignorant of the agent; for how could he

1 not know himself? But of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, as for instance people say
'it slipped out of their mouths as they were speaking', †14 or 'they did not know it was a secret',
as Aeschylus said of the mysteries, or a man might say he 'let it go off when he merely wanted to
5 show its working', as the man did with the catapult. Again, one might think one's son was an
enemy, as Merope did, or that a pointed spear had a button on it, or that a stone was pumice-
stone; or one might give a man a draught to save him, and really kill him; or one might want to
touch a man, as people do in sparring, and really strike him. The ignorance may relate, then, to
10 any of these things, i.e. of the circumstances of the action, and the man who was ignorant of any
of these is thought to have acted involuntarily, and especially if he was ignorant on the most
important points; and these are thought to be what he is doing and with what aim. Further, the
doing of an act that is called involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this sort must be painful and
15 involve regret.

Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, the
voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being
aware of the particular circumstances of the action. Presumably acts done by reason of anger or
20 appetite are not rightly called involuntary. For in the first place, on that showing none of the
other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children; and secondly, is it meant that we do not do
voluntarily any of the acts that are due to appetite or anger, or that we do the noble acts
voluntarily and the base acts involuntarily? Is not this absurd, when one and the same thing is
25 the cause? But it would surely be odd to describe as involuntary the things one ought to desire;
and we ought both to be angry at certain things and to have an appetite for certain things, e.g.
for health and for learning. Also what is involuntary is thought to be painful, but what is in
accordance with appetite is thought to be pleasant. Again, what is the difference in respect of
30 involuntariness between errors committed upon calculation and those committed in anger?
Both are to be avoided, but the irrational passions are thought not less human than reason is,
and therefore also the actions which proceed from anger or appetite are the man's actions. It
would be odd, then, to treat them as involuntary.
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Chapter 2

1 Both the voluntary and the involuntary having been delimited, we must next discuss choice; for it is thought to be most closely bound up with excellence and to discriminate characters better than actions do.

5 Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For both children and the other animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen.

10 Those who say it is appetite or anger or wish or a kind of opinion do not seem to be right. For choice is not common to irrational creatures as well, but appetite and anger are. Again, the incontinent man acts with appetite, but not with choice; while the continent man on the contrary acts with choice, but not with appetite. Again, appetite is contrary to choice, but not
15 appetite to appetite. Again, appetite relates to the pleasant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor to the pleasant.

Still less is it anger; for acts due to anger are thought to be less than any other objects of
20 choice.

But neither is it wish, though it seems near to it; for choice cannot relate to impossible things, and if any one said he chose them he would be thought silly; but there may be a wish even for impossible things, e.g. for immortality. And wish may relate to things that could in no
25 way be brought about by one's own efforts, e.g. that a particular actor or athlete should win in a competition; but no one chooses such things, but only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his own efforts. Again, wish relates rather to the end, choice to what contributes to the end; for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the acts which will
30 make us healthy, and we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot well say we choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things that are in our own power.

1 For this reason, too, it cannot be opinion; for opinion is thought to relate to all kinds of
things, no less to eternal things and impossible things than to things in our own power; and it is
distinguished by its falsity or truth, not by its badness or goodness, while choice is distinguished
5 rather by these.

Now with opinion in general perhaps no one really says it is identical. But it is not identical
even with any kind of opinion; for by choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain
character, which we are not by holding certain opinions. And we choose to get or avoid
10 something good or bad, but we have opinions about what a thing is or whom it is good for or
how it is good for him; we can hardly be said to opine to get or avoid anything. And choice is
praised for being related to the right object rather than for being rightly related to it, opinion for
being truly related to its object. And we choose what we best know to be good, but we opine
15 what we do not know at all; and it is not the same people that are thought to make the best
choices and to have the best opinions, but some are thought to have fairly good opinions, but
by reason of vice to choose what they should not. If opinion precedes choice or accompanies it,
that makes no difference; for it is not this that we are considering, but whether it is identical
20 with some kind of opinion.

What, then, or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things we have mentioned? It
seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be an object of choice. Is it, then, what
25 has been decided on by previous deliberation? For choice involves reason and thought. Even the
name seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before other things.

Chapter 3

1 Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is
deliberation impossible about some things? We ought presumably to call not what a fool or a
madman would deliberate about, but what a sensible man would deliberate about, a subject of
5 deliberation. Now about eternal things no one deliberates, e.g. about the universe or the
incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. But no more do we deliberate
about the things that involve movement but always happen in the same way, whether of
necessity or by nature or from any other cause, e.g. the solstices and the risings of the stars; nor
10 about things that happen now in one way, now in another, e.g. droughts and rains; nor about
chance events, like the finding of treasure. But we do not deliberate even about all human
affairs; for instance, no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the Scythians. For
none of these things can be brought about by our own efforts.

15 We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done; and these are in fact what
is left. For nature, necessity, and chance are thought to be causes, and also thought and
everything that depends on man. Now every class of men deliberates about the things that can
be done by their own efforts. And in the case of exact and self-contained sciences there is no
20 deliberation, e.g. about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be
written); but the things that are brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same
way, are the things about which we deliberate, e.g. questions of medical treatment or of money-
making. And we do so more in the case of the art of navigation than in that of gymnastics,
25 inasmuch as it has been less exactly worked out, and again about other things in the same ratio,
and more also in the case of the arts than in that of the sciences; for we have more doubt about
the former. Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most
part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We call in
30 others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal
to deciding.

1 We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. For a doctor does not
deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall convince, nor a statesman
whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. Having
5 set the end they consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be
produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it
is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this
will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For the
10 person who deliberates seems to inquire and analyze in the way described as though he were
analyzing a geometrical construction (not all inquiry appears to be deliberation--for instance
mathematical inquiries--but all deliberation is inquiry), and what is last in the order of analysis
seems to be first in the order of becoming. And if we come on an impossibility, we give up the
15 search, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do
it. By 'possible things' I mean things that might be brought about by our own efforts; and these
in a sense include things that can be brought about by the efforts of our friends, since the
moving principle is in ourselves. The subject of investigation is sometimes the instruments,
20 sometimes the use of them; and similarly in the other cases--sometimes the means, sometimes
the mode of using it or the means of bringing it about. It seems, then, as has been said, that
man is a moving principle of actions; now deliberation is about the things to be done by the
agent himself, and actions are for the sake of things other than themselves. For the end cannot
25 be a subject of deliberation, but only what contributes to the ends; nor indeed can the particular
facts be a subject of it, as whether this is bread or has been baked as it should; for these are
matters of perception. If we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on to infinity.

30 The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen, except that the object of choice is already
determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the
object of choice. For every one ceases to inquire how he is to act when he has brought the
moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part of himself; for this is what chooses. This
35 is plain also from the ancient constitutions, which Homer represented; for the kings announced
their choices to the people. The object of choice being one of the things in our own power

1 which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power;
for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our
deliberation.

5 We may take it, then, that we have described choice in outline, and stated the nature of its
objects and the fact that it is concerned with what contributes to the ends.

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Chapter 4.

That wish is for the end has already been stated; some think it is for the good, others for the
apparent good. Now those who say that the good is the object of wish must admit in
15 consequence that that which the man who does not choose aright wishes for is not an object of
wish (for if it is to be so, it must also be good; but it was, if it so happened, bad); while those
who say the apparent good is the object of wish must admit that there is no natural object of
wish, but only what seems so to each man. Now different things appear so to different people,
20 and, if it so happens, even contrary things.

If these consequences are unpleasing, are we to say that absolutely and in truth the good is
the object of wish, but for each person the apparent good; that that which is in truth an object
of wish is an object of wish to the good man, while any chance thing may be so to the bad man,
25 as in the case of bodies also the things that are in truth wholesome are wholesome for bodies
which are in good condition, while for those that are diseased other things are wholesome--or
bitter or sweet or hot or heavy, and so on; since the good man judges each class of things rightly,
and in each the truth appears to him? For each state of character has its own ideas of the noble
30 and the pleasant, and perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each
class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of them. In most things the error seems
to be due to pleasure; for it appears a good when it is not. We therefore choose the pleasant as a
35 good, and avoid pain as an evil.

Chapter 5

1 The end, then, being what we wish for, the things contributing to the end what we
deliberate about and choose, actions concerning the latter must be according to choice and
voluntary. Now the exercise of the excellences is concerned with these. Therefore excellence also
5 is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power
not to act, and vice versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which
will be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to
act, which will be base, will also be in our power. Now if it is in our power to do noble or base
10 acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant,
then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious.

 The saying that 'no one is voluntarily wicked nor involuntarily blessed' seems to be partly
false and partly true; for no one is involuntarily blessed, but wickedness is voluntary. Or else we
15 shall have to dispute what has just been said, at any rate, and deny that man is a moving
principle or begetter of his actions as of children. But if these facts are evident and we cannot
refer actions to moving principles other than those in ourselves, the acts whose moving
principles are in us must themselves also be in our power and voluntary.
20

 Witness seems to be borne to this both by individuals in their private capacity and by
legislators themselves; for these punish and take vengeance on those who do wicked acts (unless
they have acted under compulsion or as a result of ignorance for which they are not themselves
25 responsible), while they honor those who do noble acts, as though they meant to encourage the
latter and deter the former. But no one is encouraged to do the things that are neither in our
power nor voluntary; it is assumed that there is no gain in being persuaded not to be hot or in
pain or hungry or the like, since we shall experience these feelings none the less. Indeed, we
30 punish a man for his very ignorance, if he is thought responsible for the ignorance, as when
penalties are doubled in the case of drunkenness; for the moving principle is in the man himself,
since he had the power of not getting drunk and his getting drunk was the cause of his
ignorance. And we punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws that they ought to

1 know and that is not difficult, and so too in the case of anything else that they are thought to be ignorant of through carelessness; we assume that it is in their power not to be ignorant, since they have the power of taking care.

5 But perhaps a man is the kind of man not to take care. Still they are themselves by their slack lives responsible for becoming men of that kind, and men are themselves responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent, in that they cheat or spend their time in drinking bouts and the like; for it is activities exercised on particular objects that make the corresponding character. This is plain from the case of people training for any contest or action; they practice the activity the whole time. Now not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person. Again, it is irrational to suppose that a man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or a man who acts self-indulgently to be self-indulgent. But if without being ignorant a man does the things which will make him unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily. Yet it does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be unjust and will be just. For neither does the man who is ill become well on those terms--although he may, perhaps, be ill voluntarily, through living incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In that case it was then open to him not to be ill, but not now, when he has thrown away his chance, just as when you have let a stone go it is too late to recover it; but yet it was in your power to throw it, since the moving principle was in you. So, too, to the unjust and to the self-indulgent man it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they are such voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is not possible for them not to be so.

30 But not only are the vices of the soul voluntary, but those of the body also for some men, whom we accordingly blame; while no one blames those who are ugly by nature, we blame those who are so owing to want of exercise and care. So it is, too, with respect to weakness and infirmity; no one would reproach a man blind from birth or by disease or from a blow, but rather pity him, while every one would blame a man who was blind from alcoholism or some other form of self-indulgence. Of vices of the body, then, those in our own power are blamed,

1 those not in our power are not. And if this be so, in the other cases also the vices that are
blamed must be in our own power.

5 Now some one may say that all men aim at the apparent good, but have no control over how
things appear to him; but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character. We
reply that if each man is somehow responsible for the state he is in, he will also be himself
somehow responsible for how things appear; but if not, no one is responsible for his own
10 evildoing, but everyone does evil acts through ignorance of the end, thinking that by these he
will get what is best, and the aiming at the end is not self-chosen but one must be born with an
eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good, and he is well endowed
by nature who is well endowed with this. For it is what is greatest and most noble, and what we
cannot get or learn from another, but must have just such as it was when given us at birth, and
15 to be well and nobly endowed with this will be complete and true natural endowment. If this is
true, then, how will excellence be more voluntary than vice? To both men alike, the good and
the bad, the end appears and is fixed by nature or however it may be, and it is by referring
everything else to this that men do whatever they do.

20 Whether, then, it is not by nature that the end appears to each man such as it does appear,
but something also depends on him, or the end is natural but because the good man does the
rest voluntarily excellence is voluntary, vice also will be none the less voluntary; for in the case of
25 the bad man there is equally present that which depends on himself in his actions even if not in
his end. If, then, as is asserted, the excellences are voluntary (for we are ourselves somehow part-
causes of our states of character, and it is by being persons of a certain kind that we assume the
end to be so and so), the vices also will be voluntary; for the same is true of them.

30 With regard to the excellences in general we have stated their genus in outline, viz. that they
are means and that they are states, and that they tend by their own nature to the doing of the
acts by which they are produced, and that they are in our power and voluntary, and act as right
35 reason prescribes. But actions and states are not voluntary in the same way; for we are masters of
our actions from the beginning right to the end, if we know the particular facts, but though we

1 control the beginning of our states the gradual progress is not obvious, any more than it is in illnesses; because it was in our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way, therefore the states are voluntary.

end